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The emergence and persistence of fiscal deficits
over long periods of time, leading to increased
public debt, seems to be a common feature in
most OECD countries, at least in the last 30
years. In these countries, public debt as a per-
centage of GDP rose from an average of
around 40% in 1975 to almost 70% in 2006 (see
OECD, 2007). Fiscal deficits, once typically
small and controlled in most OECD countries,
have risen dramatically in the last two years,
due to the global financial crisis. Had the
emerging deficits and increased debts been the
results of some counter-cyclical policy pursued
in order to deal with adverse developments in
the domestic and/or the world economy, the
problem might not have been that great. But
the systematic emergence of deficits and the
ensuing higher debt in many developed coun-
tries, and indeed over long periods of time, sug-
gest the existence of other endogenous factors
that play a significant role in this development.
According to both theoretical and empirical
studies, lack of fiscal discipline and weak fis-
cal management are such systemic factors. For
instance, it has been established that in peri-
ods of fast growth, governments, rather than
taking advantage of the economic upturn to
improve their country’s fiscal position by cre-
ating surpluses and reducing its debt, tend to
adopt an expansionary fiscal policy, by increas-
ing public expenditure, or cutting taxes, or
both. Thus, when the economic climate
reverses, the counter-cyclical policy pursued
entails the creation of high deficits and a con-
siderable increase of public debt. Typical
examples can be found in many countries of
the euro area, particularly from 2004 onwards.
A period of economic euphoria was not accom-
panied by adequate fiscal adjustment, so the
outbreak of the global economic crisis has led
many of these countries into a fiscal crisis (see
Van Riet, 2010). In the worst case, the ability
to conduct a counter-cyclical policy becomes
considerably limited, as the recent experience
of Greece clearly shows. A key question that
arises is why governments exhibit such a ten-
dency to create fiscal deficits (deficit bias), and
what mechanisms could deter this behaviour.
The main mechanism for ensuring fiscal disci-
pline, implemented at times in most OECD
countries, is the imposition of various forms of
fiscal rules, such as numerical limits to the level
of public expenditure, or to the level of deficit
as a percentage of GDP. For instance, the Sta-
bility and Growth Pact, which constitutes the
regulatory framework for fiscal policy in the
countries of the EU and, more specifically, of
the euro area, sets as a medium-term objective
the achievement of a balanced budget, and, at
the same time, sets a limit of 3% of GDP on
the annual general government deficit.2
Lately, however, attention has also been paid
to the importance of another institution,
namely that of independent fiscal authorities
or councils.
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1 1 The views expressed in this study do not necessarily reflect
those of the Bank of Greece. The authors would like to thank
Heather Gibson and Vassilis Manessiotis for their constructive
comments.
2 2 The strictness and inflexibility of the Pact’s rules led to a revision
of certain provisions in 2005, so that now each member country has
a different medium-term objective; however, the Pact’s overall
rationale regarding the imposition of quantitative rules on key fis-
cal aggregates remains unchanged.The theoretical investigation of such institu-
tions was originally sparked by the successful
assignment of the right to conduct monetary
policy  to  independent  central  banks  (see
Eichengreen  et  al.,  1999,  Calmfors,  2003,
Wyplosz, 2005). In practice, independent fis-
cal councils have gradually been established in
a  growing  number  of  countries  where,
although not involved in the conduct of fiscal
policy (according to the standards applicable
to central banks), they play an important role
in enhancing the reliability and transparency of
the respective countries’ fiscal policy.
The specific activities and responsibilities of
each  of  these  councils  differ  considerably
across countries (see European Commission,
2009); yet, as a general rule, the operation of
almost all of them involves monitoring and
assessing the fiscal policy followed, publicly
making recommendations regarding the coun-
try’s  economic  policy,  assessing  macroeco-
nomic projections and examining the reliabil-
ity of the forecasts for expenditure and revenue
contained  in  the  budget,  and  therefore  the
deficit.  Another  element  systematically
assessed by such councils is the long-term sus-
tainability of fiscal aggregates, and especially
of public debt.
This study attempts to analyse the reasons why
the  establishment  of  such  an  independent
authority may prove extremely useful, partic-
ularly  in  countries  with  considerable  fiscal
problems and a history of inadequate institu-
tions promoting fiscal discipline. Specifically,
the next section examines in brief why gov-
ernments on their own may not adopt a pru-
dent fiscal policy, and why certain mechanisms
already in place for the promotion of fiscal dis-
cipline may not be adequate. The third section
attempts to concisely present the various forms
of independent fiscal authorities suggested in
the theoretical literature, and also examines
the main features of fiscal councils already
active in various OECD countries. Section 4
refers in particular to the role that such a coun-
cil could play in Greece, as well as to the pre-
requisites for its successful operation. Finally,
the last section attempts to draw some basic
conclusions.
2 WHY DO PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS LEAD TO
EXCESSIVE DEFICITS?
In public economics, a major issue that has
attracted  a  lot  of  attention,  particularly  in
recent years, has been to explain why there is
a deficit bias in parliamentary democracies.
The cumulative result of successive deficits is
the gradual accumulation of a high public debt,
with major negative implications for a coun-
try’s growth and social policies. Numerous rea-
sons have been suggested in the theoretical lit-
erature to account for this phenomenon, and
their  detailed  presentation  would  perhaps
necessitate dozens of pages.3 Hence, any ref-
erence made to these reasons in the present
study is more indicative rather than exhaus-
tive.4
The  first  and  most  convincing  explanation
offered  is  the  “common  pool”  problem,  a
notion originally introduced by Hardin (1968)
with respect to the overexploitation of freely
accessible  natural  resources,  and  later
extended in the field of fiscal policy by numer-
ous  other  authors,  including  Shepsle  and
Weingast  (1981),  von  Hagen  and  Harden
(1995), and Krogstrup and Wyplosz (2006). Put
simply, the core idea of this approach is that
when  many  individuals  potentially  have
access to a scarce resource, while at the same
time bearing only a small part of the respective
costs incurred, there is an observed tendency
towards overconsumption of this resource. A
similar phenomenon can often be observed
with respect to a country’s public budget as
well. Under the pressure exerted by usually
small  but  powerful  interest  groups,  public




3 3 The issue has attracted a lot of attention within the strand of Eco-
nomics called Public Choice. For a brief yet thorough presentation
of the main postulates of Public Choice, see Mueller (2003).
4 4 For a more detailed analysis of the reasons creating this deficit bias,
see, among others, Krogstrup and Wyplosz (2010), Wren-Lewis
(2010), Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) and Rogoff and Bertelsmann
(2010).groups, which however contribute only a small
share to the tax revenue required for financing
such  expenditure.  The  government  and  the
parliament should normally understand that
such a policy generates problems, but in prac-
tice, and to the extent they are influenced by
these groups, they give in and raise expenditure
and/or reduce taxes, leading to the creation of
excessive fiscal deficits.
Another distortion that may lead to a lack of
fiscal discipline stems from the fact that the
time horizon within which a government oper-
ates is much shorter than that of the electorate.
Elected representatives are mainly interested
in  their  re-election  and  thus  in  the  conse-
quences the policies they adopt may have only
during their term in power. Based on such an
approach, their consideration for the impact of
their policies in the more distant future is less-
ened, because what matters for them most is
their re-election at the next elections. If they
feel that they can secure political gains by cut-
ting taxes or increasing public expenditure in
the present, and, at the same time, that they
will  not  have  to  bear  the  costs  eventually
incurred  in  the  future  due  to  the  ensuing
expansion of the deficit, the result will always
be  the  creation  of  deficits,  probably  higher
than what the citizens would have approved
(see  Tabellini  and  Alesina,  1990,  Rogoff,
1990). Using a much more complex model that
involves two political parties with dissimilar
preferences as regards public goods and the
total size of the public sector, Persson and
Svensson (1989) arrive at the conclusion that
both parties adopt a myopic behaviour, result-
ing  in  higher  deficits,  exactly  because  they
assume that they are not going to stay in power
forever.
According  to  other  theoretical  approaches,
elected representatives seek to maximise the
state budget, while voters lack the necessary
knowledge and information that would enable
them to effectively assess public policies. Lack
of transparency in the pursuit of fiscal policy
hinders the exercise of democratic control, and
this  leaves  room  for  excessive  increases  in
deficits and debt. Lack of transparency has sev-
eral  dimensions:  insufficient  information
regarding the various state budget aggregates,
an absence of clear rules and accountability
with respect to the preparation of the state
budget and its implementation and ambiguity
of the macroeconomic projections, on which
fiscal policy decision-making relies. These dif-
ferent dimensions of a lack of transparency are
interrelated. For instance, according to von
Hagen (2009), the biased fiscal and macro-
economic forecasts in EU countries seem to be
directly associated with the process of prepar-
ing and implementing the state budget. Single-
party governments that enjoy a strong major-
ity  and  full  power  in  preparing  and  imple-
menting the budget tend to be optimistically
biased when making such forecasts.
Particularly in the case of monetary unions,
assigning the right of monetary policy conduct
to a supranational body reduces governments’
incentive to exercise fiscal discipline. When a
country is responsible for its own monetary
policy, the unpleasant likelihood of increased
public debt ultimately leading to higher inter-
est rates and inflation in the future can prompt
governments to exercise a certain level of self-
discipline. But within a monetary union, this
discipline is indirect, while at the same time
expectations are fostered that, in case serious
fiscal problems appear for a country, support
from other countries of the union would be
very likely (see Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1999).
In the case of Greece, its high fiscal deficits can
be explained in several ways. The most impor-
tant among them is the governments’ inability
to control public expenditure and collect tax
revenue. But the fundamental cause has to be
sought  in  the  weak  institutional  framework
that governs the operation of the public sector.
The mechanisms available for budget prepa-
ration and implementation and for the opera-
tion of tax administration are outdated and
inadequate (see Rapanos, 2007). Moreover,
budgets rely on typically optimistic forecasts
regarding  key  macroeconomic  aggregates
(GDP,  inflation,  etc.),  and  thus  forecasts
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optimistic. If one adds to the above the absence
of any mechanisms for systematically moni-
toring and assessing budget implementation, it
becomes clear that deficit creation is hard to
avoid.5 Another element aggravating the situ-
ation is that the release of fiscal data is usually
fragmented, as well as greatly delayed, so that
ultimately the citizens, the media and even
members of parliament themselves are not in
a position to assess how budget implementa-
tion is progressing, or to identify any possible
deviations from the targets set. It is obvious
that this situation runs contrary not only to the
basic principles of modern fiscal management,
but also to the democratic principles of trans-
parency and accountability.
A factor that could theoretically reduce this
deficit bias is the reaction of financial markets.
A downgrading of the credit rating of a coun-
try that exhibits high fiscal deficits over a num-
ber of years and a growing public debt leads to
a  deterioration  in  its  borrowing  terms.
Financing the deficits and refinancing the pub-
lic debt is then only achievable through the
payment of higher interest rates, a fact entail-
ing a cost for the government: increased expen-
diture for public debt servicing and reduced
funds available for other public expenditure. In
the worst case, borrowing costs rise to a point
where they necessitate a fast and abrupt fiscal
adjustment, with a negative impact on growth
and employment.
But,  in  practice,  financial  markets  do  not
appear particularly consistent or effective in
playing their disciplining role. Markets punish
fiscal indiscipline in an inconsistent manner,
and often only when it has already grown to
particularly  large  proportions.  Empirical
studies that attempt to identify the determi-
nants of real interest rates in developed coun-
tries conclude that the effect of fiscal variables
is in most cases rather small and uncertain.
Therefore, the political cost that markets indi-
rectly create for a country as a response to its
fiscal indiscipline is not high enough to deter
the latter in a consistent and systematic man-
ner (see Gale and Orszag, 2003, Balassone et
al., 2004).6
To deal with deficit creation and increased
debt, a growing number of countries have grad-
ually adopted fiscal rules aimed at limiting or
eliminating  their  deficits.  This  implies  the
imposition of a numerical limit on some key
fiscal variable, such as the fiscal deficit, pub-
lic debt, public expenditure, etc. (see Kopits
and  Symansky,  1998).  Within  EMU  for
instance, the Stability and Growth Pact sets 3%
of GDP as a maximum limit for the general
government deficit, and the achievement of a
balanced budget as a medium-term objective.
Fiscal rules can indeed be very effective, par-
ticularly when they provide for specific sanc-
tions in case of non-compliance (see de Haan
et  al.,  2004,  Wierts,  2008).  The  Maastricht
Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact did
play a catalytic role in reducing the deficits of
countries that wanted to ensure their partici-
pation in the euro area.
However, fiscal rules also exhibit some major
weaknesses. The first is that they encourage
the  adoption  of  pro-cyclical  (rather  than
counter-cyclical) policies. Particularly in the
case of rules that set numerical limits to the
deficit (or the debt), such limits usually risk
being  breached  in  an  economic  downturn.
Therefore, the rule generates incentives for
adopting a restrictive fiscal policy when the
economic juncture would demand the exact
opposite. Correspondingly, against a backdrop
of robust growth, the fiscal rule is relatively
easily respected, and thus there is no motive
for fiscal adjustment. 
Fiscal rules have also been criticised for the
additional reason that they do not contribute




5 5 Macroeconomic  projections  are  prepared  by  the  Ministry  of
Finance and in recent years have systematically proved to be exces-
sively optimistic.
6 6 Recent developments in Greece, with the highly increased bor-
rowing costs, seem to cast doubt on the above views. However, one
should bear in mind that this development came immediately after
a major world economic crisis and while the fiscal deficits of major
economies have soared to unprecedented levels.their sole objective is to reduce e.g. the deficit,
the means by which fiscal adjustment might be
achieved may include the reduction of pro-
ductive  public  expenditure  (e.g.  cuts  in  the
public  investment  budget).  Finally,  if  fiscal
rules do not reflect a broader political will for
fiscal discipline, they may encourage the use of
creative accounting in the production of fiscal
data, reduce the transparency with which the
state budget is implemented, and ultimately
weaken democratic control of the budget (see
von Hagen and Wolff, 2006).
This problem is intensified by the fact that
compliance with a fiscal rule usually entails the
adoption of policies that will put the targeted
fiscal  variable  on  a  future  trajectory  (e.g.
achievement  of  a  balanced  budget  within  a
specified  time  horizon).  But  the  forecasts
regarding the achievement of this target are
usually produced under conditions of uncer-
tainty. Hence, to achieve the target with the
least effort required, governments adopt opti-
mistic projections as regards the evolution of
key  macroeconomic  aggregates  and  budget
revenue. The recent experience of countries
subject to fiscal rules has shown that govern-
ments indeed tend to be biased with respect to
such projections, as they consistently adopt
over-optimistic scenarios about the economy’s
development (see Jonung and Larch, 2004 and
2006).
Overall  therefore,  fiscal  rules,  although
extensively applied, entail considerable prob-
lems. According to Wyplosz (2005), rules “tend
to be rigid and artificial (arbitrary limits set to
the debt or the deficit; ‘golden’ rules that rely
on aggregates that can be misrepresented), so
that in the end their application is impossible
to justify in the eyes of public opinion”. Within
the euro area, Wyplosz’s view has some merit.
There is no doubt that the fiscal rules imposed
by the Stability and Growth Pact contributed
to the containment of deficits among euro area
countries. However, strict adherence to these
rules proved impossible when EU economies
entered  periods  of  recession  or  prolonged
weak growth (well before the emergence of the
recent financial crisis). Yet the dilemma exists,
however, in that any degree of flexibility is only
achievable  through  increased  complexity,
something that reduces the rule’s functional-
ity (see Anderson and Minarik, 2006).
3 THE ROLE OF INDEPENDENT FISCAL
AUTHORITIES
In the wake of the problems analysed above, in
recent years all the more emphasis has been
placed at the global level on the complementary
role  that  independent  fiscal  authorities  (or
councils) can play in a country’s fiscal consol-
idation. This role could theoretically involve the
analysis and assessment of fiscal policy and/or
a partial assignment of its conduct. The theo-
retical literature has examined two types of fis-
cal authorities, distinguished based on whether
the conduct of fiscal policy is partially assigned
by  the  elected  representatives  to  the  inde-
pendent authority or not. Discussions over the
establishment of independent fiscal authorities
empowered to make decisions that would be
binding for the government are of great theo-
retical interest, as they focus on whether such
an authority could operate according to the
standards of independent monetary authorities,
such as the central banks, that exist in practi-
cally all developed countries.7
The  present  study  focuses  on  the  possible
role of fiscal councils generally entrusted with
the analysis and assessment of fiscal policy,
while the fiscal policy decision-making and
implementation competences remain with the
parliament and/or the government. After all,
this is the type of fiscal councils that operate
in many countries today. Relying as much on
the relevant theoretical literature as on the
experience of countries that have made best
use of the institution at issue, we will next
examine the main activities of these councils,





7 7 For a more detailed presentation of relevant theorisations, see
Debrun et al. (2009) and Wyplosz (2008).Although in practice the type and scope of the
competences entrusted to these fiscal councils
differ considerably across countries, one can dis-
cern three basic areas for which such councils
are responsible (see von Hagen, 2010, Ander-
son, 2009, European Commission, 2006): 
1. They assess the reliability of the macroeco-
nomic projections on which forecasts about
budget aggregates are based. Fiscal policy
planning relies on a series of assumptions
regarding the future course of the economy.
Therefore, successful budget implementa-
tion presupposes the adoption of realistic
and prudent macroeconomic forecasts. In
fact, in some countries fiscal councils are
mandated to produce independent macro-
economic forecasts, which are binding for
the government in the budget preparation
process.  Such  are,  e.g.,  the  cases  of  the
WIFO  in  Austria,  the  Federal  Planning
Bureau (FPB) in Belgium, and the Central
Planning Bureau (CPB) in the Netherlands.
2. They  analyse  and  assess  the  forecasts  on
public revenue and expenditure, and high-
light possible risks of deviation from the tar-
gets set in the budget. In several countries
―see e.g. Calmfors (2010) for Sweden and
Chote et al. (2010) for the UK― fiscal coun-
cils check whether the policy and the meas-
ures announced by the government are com-
patible with the fiscal targets the govern-
ment  itself  has  set  (e.g.  the  deficit  that
appears in the Stability and Growth Pro-
gramme).
3. They supervise the budget implementation
process throughout the year and provide rel-
evant information and statistical data at reg-
ular intervals.
Through its above activities and functions, a
fiscal council enhances the degree of trans-
parency and accountability in the conduct of
fiscal policy and contributes to its improved
reliability. It thus ensures better information
for parliament members and citizens alike,
assesses the pragmatism of suggested policies,
and systematically monitors the progress of
their implementation. Any deviations from the
targets  set  are  promptly  identified,  which
entails a higher political cost for the govern-
ment in case of any inconsistency in its poli-
cies. In addition to these basic functions, fis-
cal councils ―depending on their available
resources and personnel― engage in other
activities as well, such as assessing the pro-
posed policies over a short- and medium-term
horizon,  examining  the  long-term  sustain-
ability of public finances, analysing the con-
sequences of the state-imposed institutional
and regulatory frameworks on the operation
of markets, analysing the impact of proposed
tax reforms, etc.
The  scope  and  type  of  their  activities  vary
across countries, and are defined depending on
each country’s institutional framework, tradi-
tions, historical evolution, particularities, and
challenges to be met. It would be interesting to
cite a few examples. The oldest fiscal council
is the Central Planning Bureau (CPB) in the
Netherlands, which was established in 1947
and numbers approximately 150 staff members.
The CPB’s activities cover almost all the fields
mentioned above, such as producing short- and
medium-term forecasts for key macroeconomic
aggregates, analysing the institutions in certain
sectors of the economy, conducting cost/ben-
efit  analyses  regarding  proposed  public
investment projects, assessing the fiscal poli-
cies pursued by the government, etc. (see Bos
and Teulings, 2010). Its reports and studies are
widely accepted and constitute points of ref-
erence in public debates. One particularity of
the CPB is that it also carries out estimates of
the  fiscal  cost  entailed  by  the  pre-election
promises of political parties. These estimates
meet with such broad acceptance that citizens
literally demand that politicians accompany
any pre-election promise with the respective
CPB estimate as regards its fiscal cost. 
The fiscal council with the highest number of
staff members (235 people) is the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) in the US, an independ-
ent authority that reports to the US Congress.
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adoption or not of proposals submitted by the
US President. The main role of the CBO is to
provide analysis and information on all, pro-
posed  or  alternative,  policies  describing  the
advantages and disadvantages of each, while it
also carries out studies on various issues of fis-
cal interest. Its primary objective, therefore, is
to improve the quantity and quality of the infor-
mation on which Congress members will rely to
make decisions, without however making sug-
gestions as to what they would ultimately need
to vote for.
In the case of Belgium, the country’s conver-
sion into a federal state in 1989 was accompa-
nied by a transfer of the powers related to
expenditure programmes to local governments,
while the responsibility for revenue collection
remained with the central administration. This
fact gave rise to reasonable concerns about the
fiscal problems that may emerge as a result of
any lack of coordination among the various lev-
els of government. Since then, the Belgian fis-
cal council (the High Council of Finance) has
been playing an important coordinating role,
setting medium-term targets for the budgets of
both  central  government  and  the  regions.
These targets form the basis of negotiations
between central and local government, in order
to  arrive  at  an  agreement  concerning  the
annual target for the fiscal deficit/surplus of
each level of government.
In Chile, the role of the independent advisory
committee (ACRCP) is to provide the Ministry
of Finance with, among other things, forecasts
on the potential level of world copper prices,
on which a significant part of the country’s
public revenue depends. Similar councils have
lately been established in other countries as
well,  e.g.  Sweden  and  Hungary,  while  one
should not overlook the existence of such a
council operating under the Canadian Federal
Parliament, modelled along the standards of
the Congressional Budget Office in the US.
The  above  brief  and  quite  selective  review
points to the conclusion that the independent
fiscal councils currently active in various coun-
tries are, according to Wyplosz’s (2008) ter-
minology, “soft” fiscal policy councils, in the
sense that their role is mainly advisory. But
how can one ensure the effectiveness of this
type of institution in influencing the fiscal pol-
icy pursued, if it lacks the power to make gov-
ernment-binding decisions? As international
experience shows, even a soft council can play
an important role, provided that political par-
ties and society in general accept its studies
and view them as a product of scientific analy-
sis and not according to whether they agree
with their own ideological or political stand-
points.
4 IS GREECE IN NEED OF A FISCAL POLICY
COUNCIL?
This question is vital for Greece, considering
the size of fiscal imbalances the country cur-
rently faces. Indeed, the government recently
announced its intention to establish an inde-
pendent fiscal council that will report to Par-
liament. As mentioned above, the experience
of other countries has shown that such a coun-
cil may prove to be useful, given that its exis-
tence enhances transparency in the conduct of
fiscal policy and therefore increases the polit-
ical cost of ‘bad’ or inconsistent policies. In a
country such as Greece, where a critical ele-
ment with respect to fiscal policy is the relia-
bility of data included in the budget, the exis-
tence of a body such as ―let’s name it― the
Parliamentary Budget Office, may contribute
substantially  to  the  improved  quality  and
prompt release of fiscal aggregates. Moreover,
by carrying out analyses of the reliability of the
government’s macroeconomic forecasts, eval-
uating the forecasts related to budget revenue
and expenditure and monitoring budget imple-
mentation,  such  a  council  will  provide
extremely useful information to the political
parties and Members of Parliament, enabling
them to better carry out their work.
It is known that the reliability of Greece’s fis-
cal statistics is quite low, a fact attributable as
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tardy release. The existence of such a council
that will report to Parliament can exert con-
siderable pressure on the executive branch,
both to promptly provide data on the process
of implementing the budget and to improve
their quality. But to be able to play this role,
the Parliamentary Budget Office, first of all,
has to gradually and methodically build its rep-
utation – a task not easy to accomplish.
The credibility of a fiscal council stems from its
independence from government, political par-
ties and other interest groups. Therefore, it
must  be  above  all  political  affiliations.  As
Anderson (2009) states, such a council has to
be “non-partisan”, which does not mean that
it should be “bi-partisan”. The former means
not  affiliated  to  any  party  (apolitical),
whereas the latter means affiliated to and/or
influenced by the two major (or all) parties. It
is imperative for its members to be selected
based on merit and professional skills, and not
with a view to striking a political balance by let-
ting all parties have a representative in the
council. In the case of Greece, it would per-
haps be advisable to keep the number of coun-
cil members relatively low (e.g. three) so as to
dissuade  negotiations  between  the  political
parties for appointing persons somehow affil-
iated to each of them. If the composition of the
council is the result of political arrangements,
its effectiveness and credibility will be under-
mined  ab  initio (see  Rapanos,  2010).  The
absence of any political identity is a key char-
acteristic of all fiscal councils that successfully
play  their  role  (see  Steuerle  and  Rennane,
2010, Bos and Teulings, 2010).
Another  parameter  that  contributes  to  the
actual independence of a fiscal council relates
to the duration of its members’ mandate. It is
advisable for this duration to exceed the gov-
ernment’s term of office. In several countries
it has been set at 5 years, and council members
can only be replaced in case of a serious breach
of their duties. Their dates of appointment
could also be different, so as to ensure that
memberships do not expire simultaneously.
Another question that arises with respect to the
design of such a council relates to its reporting
line and its financing. The practice followed in
other countries is not universal. In some coun-
tries  (e.g.  the  US  and  Canada)  the  council
reports to parliament (Congress); in others it
operates under the Ministry of Finance (e.g. the
Netherlands, Chile) or reports to the govern-
ment  (Sweden)  or  is  a  totally  independent
authority. In the case of countries with power-
ful  single-party  governments  that  enjoy
absolute control over budget preparation and
implementation, the subordination of an inde-
pendent fiscal council to parliament is a rather
appropriate  choice  (see  Anderson,  2009,
Schmidt-Hebbel, 2010).
In the case of Greece, according to the Con-
stitution (Article 79), the Parliament votes to
approve the budget of central government rev-
enue and expenditure for the following year,
and, in fact, broken down by ministry. There-
after, however, the Parliament has no mecha-
nism available for monitoring the implemen-
tation of the budget it has approved. There-
fore, although it has an important institutional
role, in practice the Parliament is unable to
effectively play it. A fiscal council reporting to
Parliament would therefore enhance the Par-
liament’s role in the budget implementation
process, and, by way of releasing reports and
conducting open public debates, it would put
pressure on the government so as to deter devi-
ations  from  the  budget  targets.  Hence,  the
intention of the Greek government to establish
a fiscal council under Parliament appears to be
the right choice, as this would strike a better
balance between the legislative and the exec-
utive branches.
As  regards  the  financing  of  the  council,  in
other countries this is usually covered by gov-
ernment or parliamentary funds, while a small
fraction is offered by the private sector. How-
ever, financing an authority with funds from
the  government,  the  policies  of  which  this
authority is called to transparently and objec-
tively assess, could potentially be a problem.
An indicative recent example is that of the Par-
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established as recently as in 2008. The release
of a council report that assessed the cost of the
Canadian engagement in the Afghanistan war
resulted  in  a  considerable  reduction  of  the
funds granted to the council for the following
year. But even so, such actions obviously entail
a  huge  political  cost  for  the  government,
exactly because they are widely publicised, and
are thus rarely attempted. Nevertheless, in the
case  of  Greece,  financing  the  council  with
funds  from  the  Parliament’s  own  budget
(approved only by the Parliament itself and not
by the Ministry of Finance), is perhaps the
most appropriate choice.
A connected issue relates to the recruitment of
specialised and properly trained personnel for
the council. The number of people supporting
the work of fiscal councils varies significantly
across countries, from 4 people in Sweden to
roughly 250 people in the US (CBO), and the
scope of activities these councils can undertake
is of course proportional to that number. Ini-
tially, such a council could hire a small num-
ber of experts with a background in fiscal and
macroeconomic analysis, and use, even under
part-time employment contracts, members of
the academia. In Greece, recruiting the appro-
priate scientific personnel is usually a time-
consuming and costly process. For this reason,
until  it  finally  hires  its  own  personnel,  the
council  could  make  best  use  of  the  human
resources available in certain other general
government institutions ―such as the Centre
of  Planning  and  Economic  Research
(KEPE)―  to  provide  technical  support  on
some fiscal issues at least (e.g. conduct macro-
economic analyses and assess the consistency
of official forecasts, etc.). With respect to its
inspectional role, the council should not only
employ a small number of specialised experts,
but should also enjoy legally secured access to
data from the State General Accounting Office
and other services of various Ministries and
authorities of the broader public sector.
In light of the above, it becomes evident that
the creation of a Fiscal Policy Council report-
ing to Parliament could contribute consider-
ably to Greece’s efforts to consolidate its pub-
lic finances. To deal with the current fiscal cri-
sis, which has recently turned into a gener-
alised economic crisis, Greece needs not only
a strict fiscal policy, but also major changes in
its institutional framework for conducting fis-
cal policy. One such institutional change is the
creation of such a council.
In conclusion, the experience of countries with
active independent fiscal councils shows the
immense importance of allowing such a coun-
cil to build up the reputation that its assess-
ments are reliable, and to convince the markets
and the public that it is unbiased and truly
independent of any government, political party
or other interest group. In the case of Greece,
an independent fiscal council could become a
point of reference, not only for Members of
Parliament but also for economic analysts or
even international credit rating agencies, and
―together with the Bank of Greece― could
constitute a valid source of information on the
country’s  fiscal  developments.  One  of  the
major problems of Greece today is the lack of
credibility of its fiscal policy and the poor qual-
ity of the statistical data related to its public
finances. Restoring such credibility is a long
process, in which an independent fiscal coun-
cil could play a catalytic role.
However, regardless of how good it is consid-
ered to be or how successfully it has functioned
in other countries, no institution can serve as
a magic bullet (see Debrun et al., 2009, von
Hagen, 2010). The ability of an independent
fiscal  council  to  effectively  fulfil  its  task
depends on the prevailing political will and the
support it receives from all political parties, as
well as on the eagerness of the government and
its authorities to cooperate, by providing sta-
tistical data and other information to the coun-
cil even if the supply of such data does not con-
stitute  a  formal  legal  obligation.  An  inde-
pendent fiscal council can contribute to the
improvement of a country’s fiscal performance
only in the case the government itself shares
the opinion that there is indeed a fiscal disci-
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coincidental that many countries have estab-
lished  independent  fiscal  councils  precisely
during or right after a serious fiscal crisis. As
regards Greece, the current fiscal crisis is not
the first in its recent history. Based on the
above rationale, the opportunities for strength-
ening the fiscal policy framework through insti-
tutions such as that of an independent fiscal
policy council could have already been seized
in the past.
Thus, a question arises whether the existence
of such a council would have helped the coun-
try avoid, or limit to some extent, the current
fiscal  crisis.  Answering  this  question  is  not
straightforward. It is well-known that an insti-
tution can only operate successfully if its cre-
ators respect its terms of operation and all oth-
ers  that  enjoy  its  services  consider  it  to  be
impartial, reliable and effective. Political, eco-
nomic and other institutions do not operate in
a vacuum, but within a certain political, eco-
nomic and social arena, which both affects and
is affected by their operation. In our opinion
therefore, even if a council existed and was
reliable, and the political system had invested
in its impartiality and reliability, the council by
itself would not have averted the crisis. But the
members of our political system and the pub-
lic would have been provided with much more
accurate and promptly released information
regarding the dramatic deterioration of the
country’s fiscal aggregates, and this would have
led them to realise and respond to the problem
much earlier.
5 CONCLUSIONS
The sustainability of a country’s fiscal position
is a prerequisite for sound growth. According
to a widely accepted definition, a country’s fis-
cal position is sustainable when the existing
institutions  (tax  system,  social  security  and
public healthcare system, etc.) can be sustained
over a long-term horizon without generating an
uncontrolled increase in public debt. In the
international literature, the problems created
by  a  high  level  of  debt  mainly  refer  to  the
future. As Musgrave (1988) wrote, “debt cre-
ation allows the generations that live now to
take resources from the generations that will
live  in  the  future”.  But  as  experience  has
recently proved once again, a high public debt
can also create considerable problems at the
present time (see Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010).
Indeed  in  the  case  of  Greece,  what  lately
became painfully evident is that a high public
debt is not only a problem for future genera-
tions, but may even cause a chain of problems
in the economy and put at risk the country’s
growth trajectory in the present as well. In that
sense, the systematic lack of fiscal discipline
that leads to such situations constitutes a fail-
ure of the political system (political failure),
hence, one way to support its redress could be
through reforms of the institutional framework
that governs the preparation and implemen-
tation of the general government budget.
In the course of the past few months, Greece
has entered a profound fiscal crisis. In order to
deal with this crisis, and following the dictates
of the international organisations monitoring
the  Greek  economy,  the  government  has
adopted an ambitious programme of strict fis-
cal adjustment. The Greek government’s com-
mitment  to  reduce  the  general  government
deficit from 13.6% of GDP to below 3% within
a period of 3 to 4 years represents the greatest
adjustment  ever  attempted  by  a  euro  area
country. The target is ambitious, but feasible.
If Greece wants to avoid reliving the history of
the 1990s, when the period of fiscal adjustment
was followed by a relaxation of fiscal policy and
an ensuing expansion of deficits with devas-
tating  results,  it  needs  to  resolvedly  move
ahead  with  the  reform  of  the  institutional
framework governing its fiscal policy as well.
In this direction, the establishment of an inde-
pendent fiscal council could offer a key ele-
ment of credibility. But one should not remain
under the false impression that such an estab-
lishment is going to solve the fiscal problem.
This council could play an important but only
complementary role in the overall effort to rad-
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work for fiscal policy.
Decisions regarding the conduct of fiscal pol-
icy in a country inescapably involve value judg-
ments related to a series of questions, such as
the importance of individual liberty and free-
dom of choice, solidarity with other members
of society, compassion for the disadvantaged in
need of assistance, people’s right to be com-
pensated in the future in exchange for efforts
made in the present, responsibility towards and
care for future generations (see Kornai, 2010),
etc. In this sense, such decisions are political
in nature, and it is not the role of an inde-
pendent fiscal council to act as a substitute to
the executive. The potential value added of
such a council resides in its ability to analyse
the  short-  and  long-term  implications  of
adopted or alternative policy choices, to verify
their consistency, and ultimately to enhance
transparency in the conduct of fiscal policy, dis-
seminating information that is accessible to all,
rather than to a closed circle of technocrats. It
can thus strengthen the exercise of democratic
control over the executive and the latter’s obli-
gation  for  accountability,  which  is  a  funda-
mental principle of democracy.
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The problem of unemployment, especially
youth unemployment, is a central issue of pub-
lic discourse in Greece. Youth unemployment
rates in Greece are among the highest across
the EU and, in contrast with other countries,
a significant proportion of young unemployed
persons are tertiary education graduates. This
study aims to provide a detailed analysis of the
determinants of unemployment in Greece, with
an emphasis on the variables related to the
educational qualifications of the labour force,
using microdata from the Labour Force Sur-
veys conducted by the National Statistical Serv-
ice of Greece (NSSG) between 2004 and 2007.
Theresultsofthisstudyimplythatthediscussion
aboutyouthunemploymentisslightlymisplaced.
The problem is not quite one of youth unem-
ployment as such, but a problem of transition
from education to the labour market, irrespec-
tive of age. It also involves graduates of all edu-
cation levels, not only tertiary education. The
difference between tertiary education graduates
and graduates of lower education levels is that
the unemployment rates of the first tend to
decline at an acceptable level a few years after
graduation, while for the latter the pace of this
decline is substantially slower and unemploy-
mentratesusuallyconvergetohigherlevels.Fur-
thermore, across the entire spectrum of tertiary
education(TechnologicalEducationalInstitutes
–TEI,Universities–AEI,postgraduatestudies),
the higher the level of education the lower the
long-term unemployment rate, although signif-
icant variations can be observed in each educa-
tion level. In fact, certain groups of tertiary edu-
cation graduates (Law school or IT graduates),
at least men, face no real unemployment prob-
lems after their graduation. Some other groups,
however, run a high risk of unemployment but
only for a few years after graduation (graduates
from Schools of Physical Sciences, Mathematics
& Statistics) and yet others face serious unem-
ployment problems for several years after grad-
uation (Physical Education & Sports, Social Sci-
ences and several TEI graduates). Finally,
ceteris paribus, women in general, and female
tertiary education graduates in particular, face
a significantly higher probability of unemploy-
ment compared to men with similar educational
qualifications. In some groups of female tertiary
education graduates, the estimated unemploy-
ment rates are exceptionally high, even several
yearsaftergraduation(universitygraduatesfrom
Horticulture&Forestry,TEIgraduatesfromthe
schools of Agriculture & Food Technology and
Economics & Management).
The results of this study reflect the conditions
in the labour market between 2004 and 2007;
thus it would not be advisable to extrapolate
them to the future. This is due to the fact that
in the past fifteen years tertiary education in
Greece, like in most OECD countries, has
expanded very rapidly and the share of tertiary
education graduates in recent cohorts is sub-
stantially higher than in previous ones. More-
DETERMINANTS OF YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT
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about significant changes to employment and
unemployment, as well as to the real economy
both at the national and the international level.
Whether the increase in graduate labour supply
in Greece will lead to a more lasting rise in grad-
uate employment rates, even after some diffi-
culties in the first years of labour market par-
ticipation, depends on several factors, such as
whether enterprises will increase their demand
for high-skilled human capital or whether they
will be willing to recruit graduate labour to fill
positions where higher education qualifications
are not required. Nevertheless, the results of the
paper suggest that the high demand of young
individuals for tertiary education is rational, as
tertiary education seems to be quite effective in
shielding against unemployment, even if only in
the long run. It should also be noted that schools
associated with lower unemployment rates are
among the most popular ones.
1 INTRODUCTION
In the last two decades, the problem of unem-
ployment, especially youth unemployment, is a
central issue for public discourse in Greece. The
rate of unemployment, which stood at 7.4% in
1986, peaked to 11.9% in 1999, fell to 8.8% in
2006 and further to 7.6% in 2008. Female unem-
ployment rates are twice as high as male unem-
ployment rates in every year for which data are
available, while a constantly rising proportion of
the unemployed are long-term unemployed, i.e.
unemployed for more than 12 months. This per-
centage started off from 42.5% in 1986 and sta-
bilised  to  over  50%  after  1993.  In  2006,  it
reached 56.1%, but dropped to 49.6% in 2008.
Finally, both for males and females, there is a
negative relationship between age and unem-
ployment rate, with unemployment percentages
for the age groups 15-19 and 20-24 being dis-
proportionally  higher  than  those  for  older
groups. In most of the years in the period under
review the unemployment rate of the (numeri-
cally small) group of women aged 15-19 who
participate in the labour market was above 50%,
whereas that of women aged 20-24 was con-
stantly higher than 30%. High unemployment
rates are also recorded among females aged 25-
34 (14%-22%). Rates for the corresponding
male groups are also high, but not as high as for
the female ones, which range from 14% to 28%
for the 15-19 age group, and from 15% to 22%
for the 20-24 age group.
It should be clarified that the problem of youth
unemployment is shared by all European coun-
tries. However, as shown by recent Eurostat
data for the first quarter of 2009, based on the
harmonised definition of unemployment, the
unemployment rate of persons aged up to 24
in Greece was 24.2%, against 18.3% of the EU-
27  average.  This  stems  from  the  very  high
unemployment rate of young women (31.8%
against 19.1% of the EU average); by contrast,
the unemployment rate of young men was not
much  higher  than  the  EU  average  (18.3%
against 17.4%).1
Therefore, it is of particular interest ―in terms
of both scientific analysis and policymaking―
to explore the determinants of unemployment
for the entire labour force and more specifi-
cally  of  youth  unemployment.  This  can  be
achieved in two ways: either at the macroeco-
nomic level, with a view to identifying the fac-
tors that influence the aggregate unemploy-
ment rate (and possibly its composition) or at
the microeconomic level, with the purpose of
assessing the determinants of the probability of
unemployment, given the total unemployment
rate. This study adopts the second approach
and aims at investigating the determinants of
unemployment, focusing on tertiary education
graduates  and  using  the  micro  data  from
Labour  Force  Surveys  (LFS)  conducted
between 2004 and 2007.
In the following section, we present a brief
overview of the findings of available empirical
studies  on  youth  unemployment  in  Greece.
The third section presents the LFSs used in the




1 1 In the first quarter of 2009, compared with Greece, the only coun-
tries which recorded higher unemployment rates for young people
aged up to 24, were Spain (33.6%) and Italy (24.9%).important empirical results of this study and
the last one summarises its findings.
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
2
Certain features of the Greek labour market
often account ―more or less― for the high
unemployment rates, observed mainly in young
people and women. For instance, the Greek
labour market features dualism, i.e. there is an
official  labour  market  (subject  to  regula-
tions/controls and offering job security) and an
unofficial labour market (without job security,
often with black labour, bad employment con-
ditions and low compensation).3
In the past 25 years, the unemployment of ter-
tiary education graduates has risen (4.3% in
1981, 6.6% in 1990, 7.6% in 1997), but this
does not seem to affect all graduates in the
same  way.  Thus,  according  to  Karamessini
(2003), unemployment among graduates from
physical education & sports, philosophy, the-
ology, horticulture & forestry is higher than
average. Graduates from economics, social and
political sciences, pedagogics, physical sciences
and mathematics follow next.
In particular as regards high-skilled individu-
als, there is some imbalance between supply
and  demand  (Liagouras  et  al.,  2003,  Kat-
sanevas and Livanos, 2005), either because of
the education system failure to adjust to the
needs of the labour market, or because of the
Greeks’ insistence to acquire tertiary education
(Papailias, 2006). Conversely, ISTAME (2006)
considers that the main factor behind the high
unemployment rates is the inadequate devel-
opment of the economy’s private sector and
the subsequent low demand for highly skilled
human capital (e.g. tertiary education gradu-
ates). According to this study, most new jobs
require low specialisation and offer low com-
pensation in return. The strong demand for
tertiary education is often attributable to the
comparatively low unemployment rates of ter-
tiary  education  graduates  (Kassimis,  2002,
Karamessini, 2003). Keeping its focus on grad-
uates,  IOBE  (2007)  attributes  high  unem-
ployment on the one hand to the inability of
the education system to adjust to rapid tech-
nological progress4 and on the other hand to
the slow adjustment process of a significant
portion of the economy’s productive (private)
sector. Even graduates themselves consider the
lack of adequate information and ―at the per-
sonal level― the lack of appropriate recom-
mendations as the main reasons behind unem-
ployment (IOBE, 2007).
There are relatively few available empirical
studies on the issue of youth unemployment in
Greece; these can be grouped in three cate-
gories according to the data they use. The first
consists of the studies based on the single spe-
cialised survey on the transition from educa-
tion to the labour market that was carried out
by the National Statistical Service of Greece
(NSSG), under the auspices of Eurostat, in the
second  half  of  2000.  The  second  contains
research based on field studies on the gradu-
ates of specific university schools or faculties.
The main advantage of such studies is that they
are targeted and thus, the interviewees supply
all necessary information for the investigation
of the issue at hand. On the other side, though,
such studies typically involve small subgroups
of youth population (or young graduates), thus
providing an incomplete picture. Finally, the
third category is based on Labour Force Sur-
veys compiled by the NSSG, which offer the
advantage of country-wide coverage and a mul-
titude of useful information for the analysis of
the unemployment issues. Most of the avail-
able empirical studies are primarily descriptive
and their conclusions are not always consistent.
The results of studies in the first category show




2 2 For a detailed review of the literature on the employability of ter-
tiary education graduates in Greece, see Cholezas and Tsakloglou
(2008). This section provides a brief overview of the main findings
of empirical studies regarding the issue of youth employment and
especially youth unemployment of tertiary education graduates in
Greece.
3 3 See ISTAME (2006).
4 4 According to a study conducted by the Hellenic Federation of
Enterprises – SEV (2004), half of the enterprises reported lack of
tertiary education graduates with specific qualifications.first important job ―defined as a job of at least
20  hours  per  week,  held  for  at  least  six
months― lasts longer compared with women
(36 months on average against 29), although
this  can  be  attributed  to  military  service
(Karamessini  and  Kornelakis,  2005).  More-
over, according to the same authors, graduates
specialised in the provision of services need
less  time  than  other  graduates  to  find  an
important job. When the sample is limited to
those  who  graduated  (any  education  level)
between 1996 and 1999, then about one third
of AEI graduates and one fourth of TEI grad-
uates had not managed to find an important
job until the second quarter of 2000. Among
AEI graduates, this percentage is compara-
tively higher for the graduates of physics, math-
ematics, IT, social sciences, mass communica-
tion, humanities and pedagogics (over 40%).
All in all, tertiary education graduates need on
average more than 16 months to find an impor-
tant job but, still, they are in a better position
than those without a degree. Based on this cri-
terion, graduates of physics, mathematics, IT,
physical education & sports and polytechnic
schools hold the worst position between all ter-
tiary education graduates (over 18 months). In
relation  to  gender,  male  tertiary  education
graduates seem to find an important job with
more  delay  than  female  ones  (around  20
months compared to 14).
Using  the  same  data,  Nicolitsas  (2007)
attempts to investigate the determinants of the
duration of the transition period, applying haz-
ard models. The results of her study show that
the transition period is longer for married men,
foreigners, residents in rural areas and older
graduates, while the period is shorter for per-
sons whose father is engaged in some business
activity. The duration of the transition period
is negatively correlated with local unemploy-
ment rate, graduation year and education level.
Finally, female graduates of technical schools,
TEI, IEK, polytechnic and medical schools find
a job faster.
In the second type of research which is based on
field studies, Bitros (2002) analyses the condi-
tions for Economics graduates. According to his
conclusions, slightly more than half of the grad-
uates find a job within less than a year after grad-
uation. The main justification for this low per-
centage, according to the graduates themselves,
is the mismatch between education and labour
market demands, as well as the lack of additional
skills.  The  transition  of  engineering  schools’
graduates,  especially  graduates  from  the
National  Technical  University  of  Athens
(NTUA), to the labour market is the object of
a number of studies; the results of these studies
show, on the one hand, low unemployment rates
(2.2% according to NTUA, 2002) and, on the
other hand, short periods of transition to the first
job (only 5 months after graduation, according
to NTUA, 2002, and 5.7 months according to the
Technical Chamber of Greece – TEE, 2006).
Another  field  study  forms  the  basis  for
Karamessini’s (2006b) analysis, which focuses
on graduates from the University of Thessaly.
Roughly 5 years after graduation, the unem-
ployment rate of that University’s graduates is
7%.  Ceteris  paribus,  women,  kindergarten
teachers, horticulturalists and land planning &
regional  development  engineers  face  the
biggest problems in entering the labour mar-
ket.  However,  according  to  the  author,  the
temporary nature of many graduates’ employ-
ment remains a big problem, as 5-8 years after
graduation 45% of the graduates still have no
permanent job.
The  field  study  conducted  by  IOBE  (2007)
addresses both firms (about 200) and employ-
ees (about 500), which makes it particularly
interesting. Results show that over 90% of the
graduates found a job within 20 months after
graduation – most of them in fields related to
their studies. Conditions seem to be more dif-
ficult for graduates of social sciences, biology,
horticulture and genetics, as well as for those
who come from families with poor education
background, are younger graduates or post-
graduates. Turning to their field of work, it
takes graduates from schools of fine arts and
mathematics & statistics longer to find a job
relevant to their degrees.
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Karamessini (2007), which covers a large num-
ber of Greek AEI. According to its findings, 5-
7 years after graduation 84% of AEI graduates
found a job, with minor differences between
men and women. Lower employment rates are
observed among graduates from schools of biol-
ogy, theology, history, archaeology and political
science. Regarding unemployment, rates are
higher for women (7% against 5% for men and
6.4% on average) and for graduates of history,
archaeology and theology. Although 5-7 years
after graduation from AEI almost all graduates
(97%)  have  some  working  experience,  18%
have no important working experience and just
71% have non-temporary employment (69% of
women and 74% of men). As regards the tim-
ing of the first important job, large variations
are observed. Thus, 15% found a job before
graduation, 19% within one month from grad-
uation, 33% needed one year and the remain-
ing 33% more than one year. These results paint
a different picture than IOBE (2007), where the
percentage of graduates who found a job within
a year was much higher (91% against 67%); this
is possibly due to both the stricter definitions
used in Karamessini (2007) and the fact that
IOBE (2007) excluded unemployed graduates
from its sample. However, a really alarming
finding of Karamessini (2007) is that 41% of the
graduates reported that they remained unem-
ployed for more than 12 months after gradua-
tion. The picture only gets gloomier for women.
Finally, the studies of Karamessini (2006a) and
Karamessini and Prokou (2006) fall under the
third category, i.e. those using LFS data. In
both studies, emphasis is placed on AEI and
TEI graduates. According to their results, TEI
graduates have higher rates of participation in
the labour market in the first years after grad-
uation  ―probably  because  proportionally
more AEI graduates undertake further (post-
graduate) studies― which are equalised there-
after (about 6 years after graduation). With
respect to gender, men have higher rates of
participation if they are TEI graduates, but dif-
ferences are negligible among AEI graduates.
Conversely, unemployment rates are clearly
higher for TEI graduates and women, while the
gap widens as we move further away from grad-
uation. These higher unemployment rates are
attributed by the authors to the higher partic-
ipation rate of TEI graduates in the labour
market and to discrimination against women.
The results show that new graduates face high
rates  of  unemployment  after  graduation
(34.4% for AEI and 36.5% for TEI graduates),
which decline with time, especially for AEI
graduates. Also, they have difficulties in solid-
ifying  themselves  to  employment,  as  32%
(29%) of AEI (TEI) graduates still have no
permanent job 6 years after graduation. 
3 LABOUR FORCE SURVEY: SHORT DESCRIP-
TION AND FIRST DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS
For the purposes of this study, we used the micro-
data of quarterly LFSs that the NSSG conducted
during 2004(Q1)-2007(Q3). We chose this period
because the methodology of collecting data for
the LFS was radically revised in 2004 and, more-
over, for this period micro-data are available by
the NSSG in the form of rotating panels, as each
member of the sample participates in the LFS for
six consecutive quarters (“waves”).
The LFS has been conducted on a quarterly
basis by the NSSG since 1998 (earlier it was
conducted only in the second quarter of every
year) with the aim of collecting detailed data
on the employment and unemployment status
of household members aged 15 or over.
More specifically, the LFS aims at:
(a) recording the employment status of house-
hold members aged 15 or over, together with
gender,  age  and  education  background,  at
national and regional level;
(b) studying the breakdown of employment by
sector of economic activity, profession, work-
ing hours etc.;
(c) monitoring the duration of unemployment,
in  relation  to  gender,  age,  education  back-
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job, such as the sector of economic activity and
the profession;
(d)  studying  the  employment  condition  of
household members a year before, whether
employed persons have a second job, etc.
In  the  LFS,  the  unemployed  are  defined
according  to  the  original  definition  of  the
International Labor Organization (ILO); we
used the same definition in our study too. In
particular, a person is considered unemployed
if:
(i) s/he hasn’t worked for even one hour in the
reference week;
(ii) s/he’s looking for a job;
(iii) s/he reports the actions s/he did to this end
in the last four weeks before the study;
(iv) s/he is ready to start working the following
week, if s/he finds a job.
The LFS quarterly sample includes approxi-
mately 30,000 households (a sampling fraction
of 0.85% of the total population of the coun-
try),  with  one  sixth  of  the  sample  rotating
(being replaced) every quarter.
The main features of the LFS used in this study
are depicted in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 shows
participation rates of persons aged 15-64, by
gender, level of education and breakdown by
age group, for the period 2004-2007. The total
participation rate follows a slightly upward path
in the period under review. Male participation
is significantly higher than female participation
(79.0% against 54.5%, on average) and, fur-
thermore, there are significant differences in
terns of education level and age. Female par-
ticipation is higher at tertiary educational lev-
els, whereas male participation shows a small
decline between primary and secondary edu-
cation and a sharp increase in tertiary educa-
tion graduates. Differences between male and
female labour force participation rates of ter-
tiary education graduates are relatively small
(below 10%), especially in the age group 15-34.
By contrast, for the two other education levels,
large differences are noticeable in male and
female participation rates: over 35% for pri-
mary or lower education graduates and over
25% for secondary education graduates.
Table 2 shows unemployment rates by gender,
education level and age group between 2004
and 2007. During this period, total unemploy-
ment declined (from 11.3% to 9.1%). For both
men and women, the decline was substantial
but it was more pronounced in the case of
women, even though the female unemploy-
ment rate was constantly more than double
that of men. Both for men and women, unem-
ployment rates decline with age (with a small
exception for the male group aged 55-64). In
the age group 15-24, unemployment rates are
particularly high. In women, unemployment
rates are markedly higher among secondary
education graduates, whereas in men, differ-
ences in unemployment rates do not vary sub-
stantially with the education level.
As it was already mentioned above, one of the
most attractive features of the LFS for the pur-
poses of this study, besides its large sample, is
the form of rotating panel which (theoretically)
allows for the isolation of the impact of non-
observable individual characteristics, with the
use  of  appropriate  econometric  techniques,
and the calculation of a “net” impact that par-
ticular components of the educational system
have on a person’s probability of unemploy-
ment. This isolation was not possible, however,
as the intertemporal variation of the depend-
ent variable and (to an even greater extent) of
many independent variables per individual was
extremely limited. In other words, most of the
participants were either always employed or
always unemployed over the quarters they par-
ticipated in the LFS, while all other features
remained usually unchanged throughout their
participation in the survey. Therefore, for the
purpose of analysis, we used the first observa-
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7 7 . 4
3 9 . 4
5 6 . 8
7 7 . 3
3 9 . 8
5 7 . 0
7 7 . 7
3 8 . 3
5 6 . 3
7 7 . 4
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7 3 . 3
4 6 . 6
6 0 . 4
7 3 . 5
4 6 . 0
6 0 . 6
7 3 . 3
4 6 . 2
6 0 . 2
7 4 . 6
4 7 . 8














































































































































































































































































































T o t a l
9 1 . 1
8 2 . 2
8 6 . 6
9 1 . 2
8 4 . 0
8 7 . 5
9 0 . 6
8 3 . 4
8 7 . 0
9 0 . 8
8 2 . 2
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7 8 . 9
5 3 . 6
6 6 . 1
7 8 . 9
5 4 . 5
6 6 . 7
7 8 . 9
5 4 . 3
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7 9 . 6
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9 . 9
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1 2 . 0
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.The next problem we encountered relates to
the definition of education groups. The LFS
divides the population into a large number of
education groups – sometimes quite arbitrar-
ily. As this study focuses on tertiary education
graduates, we chose to group AEI and TEI
graduates  with  as  much  detail  as  possible.
However, in many cases this was not feasible,
as the number of observations was too small.
In the end, the criterion for keeping or merg-
ing tertiary education groups, apart from the
homogeneity of the disciplines, was the exis-
tence of a minimum number of observations
(around 100 men or women, whichever lower)
covering a large number of years since gradu-
ation. For lower education levels, fewer groups
were  formed.  Moreover,  it  was  decided  to
exclude from the sample a small number of
groups that presented specific problems (e.g.
graduates of special needs schools; open uni-
versity  and  inter-disciplinary  selection  pro-
grammes,  graduates  of  military  and  law
enforcement schools and the School of Peda-
gogical  and  Technological  Education–
SELETE/ASPETE, graduates from pedagogic
academies with a two-year duration of studies).
Even after these exclusions, the sample of the
analysis remains very large, as it covers a total
of 108,847 employed or unemployed individu-
als (58% men and 42% women). Labour force
participation rates and unemployment rates of
the sample are shown in Table 3. The varia-
tions in both percentages on account of the
education level are obvious. The rate of par-
ticipation  in  the  labour  force  is  positively
related to the education level and variations
within a level do exist but are not large – with
one  exception:  the  participation  of  general
lyceum graduates in the labour force is about
27  percentage  points  smaller  than  that  of
higher technical education graduates (techni-
cal lyceum, post-gymnasium technical school).
Table 3 also shows that the unemployment rate
is lower in the small group of individuals with
postgraduate studies (7.5%) and higher in the
group of post-lyceum and non-tertiary education
graduates (14.3%). Significant variations are also
observed between the two larger groups of ter-
tiary education graduates (AEI: 7.9% and TEI:
12.3%). Even within the narrow definition of
education  levels,  there  are  variations.  For
instance, the unemployment rate of technical
lyceum graduates is 18.4%, whereas that of gen-
eral lyceum graduates, albeit higher than the
national average, is significantly lower (10.9%).
Accordingly, within AEI, the unemployment rate
of Law school graduates is just 2.8%, while the
corresponding rate for graduates of Social Sci-
ences is 12.9%. Within TEI, the unemployment
rate of polytechnic schools graduates (Structural
Engineering, Mechanical Engineering and IT) is
less than 8% and the rate of the graduates from
the school of Agriculture & Food Technology is
more than 17%. Therefore, it is of particular
interest to analyse the probability of unemploy-
ment for specific graduate groups. Moreover,
these  variations  may  be  the  result  of  factors
which are not associated with the education sys-
tem. For example, according to many studies, the
probability of unemployment is negatively cor-
related with the time that has lapsed since grad-
uation. Given the very rapid growth of tertiary
education in Greece in recent decades, it is quite
probable that tertiary education graduates will be
much younger on average than the graduates of
lower education levels. It is, thus, particularly
interesting to isolate the effect of the two factors
(education and years after graduation).
Especially in relation to this last point, we have
to  underline  that  public  discourse  typically
makes mention of “youth unemployment”. But
is it really a youth unemployment problem or
a problem of transition from education to the
labour  market?  Undoubtedly,  5  or  even  10
years after graduation, a compulsory education
(gymnasium) graduate is still very young; this,
however, is not necessarily true for a tertiary
education graduate or, even less, for a post-
graduate degree holder. An initial approxi-
mation to this problem is made in Charts 1 and
2 where the members of the sample are divided
into two large groups according to the number
of years that have lapsed since their gradua-
tion: those with 5 or less years and those with
6 or more years since graduation.
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by education level for recent (up to 5 years) and
older (6 or more years) graduates. Panels 1b
and 1c repeat the same, splitting the sample for
men and women. For reasons of comparability,
in all three panels we applied the same scale to
the x-axis. In the first panel, it is clear that for
all education levels, the rate of unemployment
is substantially higher for recent than for older
graduates (27.0% against 8.6% for the total). In
general, the unemployment rates of tertiary
education graduates are lower than those of
primary or secondary education graduates, both
for recent and for older graduates. However,
what is impressive with tertiary education grad-
uates is the discrepancy in the unemployment
rates of recent and older graduates (ratios of
3.7:1 for TEI graduates, 5.1:1 for AEI gradu-
ates and 4.0:1 for postgraduates). Especially in
the case of older AEI graduates and postgrad-
uates, at first sight unemployment rates do not
appear to be particularly alarming (4.7% and
3.8% respectively).
Charts 1b and 1c paint a similar picture for
both men and women: unemployment rates are
significantly higher for recent graduates com-




Pre-lyceum education 9.8 56.8 40,955
Primary 9.1 59.6 27,891
Lower secondary 11.1 52.3 13,064
Lyceum 11.7 65.1 35,773
General lyceum 10.9 60.5 27,514
Technical lyceum 18.4 86.3 4,529
Post-gymnasium technical school 9.4 88.2 3,730
Post-lyceum non-tertiary education 14.3 85.5 9,844
IEK 14.6 86.0 8,573
Other post-lyceum education 12.4 82.4 1,271
TEI 12.3 90.2 5,490
Structural Engineering  7.5 90.3 326
Mechanical & Computer Engineering 7.9 92.3 1,319
Agricultural & Food Technology  17.2 89.5 463
Economics & Management  15.9 90.1 1,720
Medical Sciences 11.3 90.0 1,418
Other TEI 12.8 82.7 244
AEI 7.9 88.0 15,093
Structural Engineering  5.0 91.9 1,252
Mechanical Engineering  6.5 92.3 888
IT  5.1 88.5 203
Physical Sciences  7.3 87.2 860
Mathematics & Statistics 5.7 90.0 680
Medical School etc. 5.5 89.8 1,804
Horticulture & Forestry  8.9 88.7 513
Law School 2.8 87.4 1,120
Economics & Management 7.8 85.5 2,824
Social Sciences 12.9 81.8 405
Humanities  11.8 86.2 2,131
Languages 9.5 86.2 600
Physical Education & Sports 11.8 92.1 665
Pedagogics 11.0 91.2 918
Other AEI 11.4 79.9 230
Postgraduate studies 7.5 94.3 1,292
Postgraduate degree 8.6 93.2 875
Doctorate 4.9 97.1 417
T TO OT TA AL L 1 10 0. .7 7 6 67 7. .5 5 1 10 08 8, ,4 44 47 7
Education level Rate of unemployment
Rate of participation in
labour force N (labour force)
Table 3  Rate of unemployment and participation in the labour force of persons aged 15-64
the first time they are included in the LFS sample (2004 Q1 – 2007 Q3)33
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sive. In all individual groups, without excep-
tion, female unemployment rates are higher
than  male  ones.  Especially  for  women  who
have  recently  graduated  from  lyceum,  the
unemployment rate is excessively high (41.2%).
Male unemployment rates for older tertiary
education (AEI, TEI, postgraduate studies)
graduates are in the area of 2.6% to 3.7%,
whereas in the corresponding female group
these rates are considerably higher (6.0% to
11.3%). Moreover, although male unemploy-
ment rates of recent tertiary education gradu-
ates are not very different from those of lower
education graduates, there are significant dif-
ferences in women.
Charts 2a, 2b and 2c focus on tertiary educa-
tion graduates and provide a more detailed pic-
ture for TEI and AEI graduates, as well as for
the small but rapidly growing group of post-
graduates (Kikilias, 2008). The conclusion that
is clearly drawn from these charts is that, even
though some generalisation is possible, there
are major intra-group differences. Chart 2a
shows that, among TEI graduates with high
unemployment  rates,  there  are  similarities
between the groups of recent and older grad-
uates (with the exception of graduates from the
school of Economics & Management). How-
ever, unemployment rates of recent graduates
and, to a greater extent, of older graduates
show considerable differences between groups
of schools. For example, the unemployment
rate  for  older  graduates  from  Polytechnic
Schools (Structural Engineering, Mechanical
Engineering and IT) is below 4%, whereas for
older graduates from the school of Economics
&  Management  and  Agricultural  &  Food
Technology it is above 10%.
There are even larger differences within the
group of AEI graduates, which is evident in
Chart 2b, possibly as a result of the larger num-
ber of sub-groups in the sample. In all these
groups, without exception, unemployment rates
of recent graduates are much higher than those
of older ones. However, in some groups, unem-
ployment rates are alarmingly high for older
graduates (e.g. graduates from the schools of
Physical Education & Sports: 9.8%), whilst in
other groups the corresponding rates are lower
than  those  typically  classified  as  frictional
unemployment (e.g. graduates from IT: 1.3%
or Law: 1.7%). Furthermore, in the classifica-
tion of schools by unemployment rates of older
and recent graduates, the groups are not really
correlated. For example, while the unemploy-
ment rates of older graduates from the schools
of Physical Sciences and Mathematics & Sta-
tistics are very low, those of the recent gradu-
ates from the same schools are among the high-
est for recent graduates. Finally, Chart 2c shows
that acquiring a postgraduate or a doctorate
degree is associated with very low unemploy-
ment rates 6 or more years after graduation;
however, such degrees should not be consid-
ered as effective shields against unemployment
in the first five years after graduation (unem-
ployment rates of recent graduates are 15.8%
and 12.9% respectively). 
4 ECONOMETRIC RESULTS
Naturally,  an  individual’s  probability  of
unemployment is influenced by various factors
and not solely by educational qualifications.
Some of these factors are directly observable
while others are not. Furthermore, random
factors may influence this probability. The LFS
includes  a  number  of  variables  which  may
influence  the  probability  of  unemployment.
Therefore, in order to better understand the
phenomenon, it is necessary to apply a multi-
variate  econometric  probability  analysis,
which is the primary objective of this part of
the study.
The descriptive results of the previous section
provide  some  indications.  First,  the  labour
force participation rate seems to be associated
with  both  the  individual’s  age  ―and,  most
likely,  with  the  number  of  years  that  have
lapsed since graduation― and the education
level, as well as with gender (and, possibly,
other factors such as family status). Hence,
without  controlling  for  the  probability  of
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the  estimated  results  for  the  probability  of
unemployment are biased (from a statistical
point of view). In other words, it is highly likely
that  a  two-stage  estimation  method  is
required: (i) a first estimation of the proba-
bility of labour force participation, and (ii) a
subsequent  estimation  of  the  probability  of
unemployment following the inclusion of the
relevant correction term in the explanatory
variables (Inverse Mills Ratio).
The descriptive results show that, in all likeli-
hood, the variable related to the probability of
unemployment is the time interval from grad-
uation and not the individual’s age per se. The
same results imply that the time interval from
graduation has a non-linear effect on the prob-
ability  of  unemployment,  something  that
should be taken into account in the econo-
metric estimation.
Moreover, the descriptive results indicate that
both the unemployment rate and its change
after  graduation  vary  significantly  between
men and women. Therefore, it is essential to
estimate  different  equations  for  men  and
women rather than introducing a dummy vari-
able for women in the unemployment proba-
bility equation for the entire sample.
Lastly, since the evolution of the unemploy-
ment rate in relation to the years that have
lapsed since graduation shows substantial dif-
ferences between groups of graduates of the
same education level, graduates of different
schools should not only be distinguished by
applying dummy variables, but flexible, non-
linear  formulas  should  also  be  used,  which
allow for different unemployment probabilities
as a function of the time after graduation for
different types of education groups.
All of the above were taken into account in the
specification and estimation of the economet-
ric model. The methodology used is a variation
of Heckman’s (1979) two-stage method, with
which we attempted to correct the sample’s
selection bias. At a first stage, the probability
of  labour  force  participation  was  estimated
using the sample of all individuals aged 15-64
who participated in the labour market. The
variation lies in the fact that at the second stage
of the estimation of the unemployment prob-
ability, a binominal variable (instead of a con-
tinuous  one,  as  in  Heckman’s  classical
method) was used as a dependent variable. This
has brought about changes in the estimated
maximum  likelihood  function  (Pindyck  and
Pubinfeld, 1998, Greene, 2003). The detailed
results of these estimations and the definitions
of  the  variables  used  are  presented  in  the
Annex.
The presentation of the results begins with the
estimation of the labour force participation
probability, in which the sample comprises all
individuals aged 15-64 (79,288 men and 83,736
women). The male labour force participation
rate in our sample is 79.9% and the female rate
is 53.8%. In both equations (men and women)
the control group consists of members of child-
less couples, who are Greek nationals, general
lyceum  graduates,  residents  of  Athens  and
took part in the LFS in 2007(Q3), whereas, on
account of heteroskedasticity, the estimated
standard errors of coefficients were corrected
using White’s (1980) method.
Both for men and ―markedly― women, the
probability  of  labour  force  participation  is
closely linked with their family status. In com-
parison with the control group, the probabil-
ity of female labour force participation is sig-
nificantly lower when women are married with
children (the opposite is usually observed for
female  heads  of  single-parent  households),
while, in connection to men, the result varies
depending on the number and age of the chil-
dren. In terms of education level, for both men
and women, ceteris paribus, the labour force
participation probability for graduates of all
education groups (except gymnasium gradu-
ates) is higher compared with general lyceum
graduates. For both genders, the labour force
participation probability of postgraduates is
particularly high (a finding which is in line with
the predictions of human capital theory). Fur-
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ability of labour force participation appears to
have a close but non-linear association with the
number of years since graduation.
Regional differences in terms of labour force
participation are not particularly large in men,
whereas,  in  women,  differences  are  more
important and probabilities of participation
are higher in most regions (compared with
Attica). As regards the degree of urbanisation,
ceteris paribus, higher participation rates are
observed in semi-urban and, particularly, rural
areas. Finally, there are no significant differ-
ences with respect to the year of the LFS or
seasonality  (the  survey’s  quarter).  In  both
equations,  the  coefficient  showing  whether
there is bias (“arthrho”) is statistically signif-
icant and implies the existence of systematic
bias, which is corrected using the Inverse Mills
Ratio in the equations for the probability of
unemployment (in other words, the results of
the estimation for the probability of unem-
ployment presented below would not be reli-
able without this correction).
After the presentation of the results on the
probability of labour force participation, we
move on to the presentation of the results from
the  estimation  of  the  probability  of  unem-
ployment. This time, the samples consist of
63,378 men and 45,060 women. Similarly to
previous  equations,  on  account  of  het-
eroskedasticity, the estimated standard errors
of coefficients were corrected using White’s
(1980) method. Most of the results are pre-
sented in charts. Once more, the control group
comprises members of childless couples, who
are Greek nationals, general lyceum graduates,
residents of Athens and took part in the LFS
in 2007(Q4). The dependent variable is the
probability of unemployment and independent
variables  include  the  individual’s  education
background, the number of years after gradu-
ation (and its square), dummy variables related
to  household  composition,  the  individual’s
nationality,  the  region  and  the  degree  of
urbanisation of the place of residence, the local
unemployment rate, as well as the dummy vari-
ables for the year and the quarter of the LFS
in which they participated. Education groups
are much more detailed, compared with the
previous equations (like the groups of Table 3),
while demographic groups (household com-
position) are much less detailed. In order to
capture the different unemployment proba-
bilities for each education group in relation to
the time interval from the year of graduation,
we introduced multiplicative terms between
the dummy variable of each education group
and (a) the time from the individual’s gradu-
ation and (b) its square.
The dummy variables of the quarters aim to
capture  the  potential  seasonality  of  unem-
ployment, while the dummy variables of the
years seek to capture possible effects of the
economic  cycle  on  employment.5 The  two
groups of variables are not statistically signif-
icant, both in the female and the male function.
The variable that relates to the local unem-
ployment rate refers to the unemployment rate
of the region of the individual’s place of resi-
dence in the period of their participation in the
LFS. As expected, this variable has a positive
effect on the unemployment probability and is
statistically significant. As regards the demo-
graphic features of the individual’s household,
the  results  indicate  that  both  for  men  and
women, single parenthood as well as the pres-
ence of household members other than spouse
and children increase the probability of unem-
ployment compared with the control groups
(members of childless couples).
Before moving on to the presentation of results
in detailed charts, it would be interesting to
examine  the  corresponding  results  for  six
broad groups according to the education level
(pre-lyceum, lyceum, post-secondary non-ter-
tiary, TEI, AEI, postgraduate studies). These
results stem from estimations that use the vari-
ables  mentioned  above,  but  this  time  for
broader  groups  of  graduates,  and  are  pre-




5 5 However, it should be noted that the LFS used in this paper cover
a period of 4 years, during which the Greek economy was growing
at a quite high rate.women, respectively. These charts show the
estimated  rate  of  unemployment  (vertical
axis)6 as a function of the first 20 years since
graduation from the highest education level
completed (horizontal axis), after controlling
for the effect of all other variables (family sta-
tus, region, urbanisation, nationality, local rate
of  unemployment,  etc.).7 Similar  charts  are
used in the remainder of this study.
Many  interesting  conclusions  can  be  drawn
from Charts 3a and 3b. Both men and women
with low education level (pre-lyceum) begin
with lower rates of unemployment compared
to the other members of the sample right after
their graduation, but their estimated rate of
unemployment changes very slowly throughout
their  working  life.  Differences  between
lyceum and post-secondary non-tertiary grad-
uates are negligible for women, while for men
estimated rates of unemployment of post-sec-
ondary non-tertiary graduates are considerably
higher than those of lyceum graduates in the
first 5-6 years after graduation; differences get
small thereafter. As regards tertiary education
graduates, estimated rates of both male and
female unemployment for a given number of
years since graduation are lower for holders of
postgraduate degrees, followed by AEI grad-
uates and, finally, TEI graduates. However,
while estimated rates of female unemployment
of AEI graduates and holders of postgraduate
degrees converge about 20 years after gradu-
ation, they never converge with the estimated
rate of unemployment of TEI graduates. On
the contrary, the difference in the estimated
rates of male unemployment of AEI and TEI
graduates  is  very  small  about  6  years  after
graduation and converges with the estimated
rate of unemployment of postgraduate degree
holders 12-13 years after graduation, at levels
much lower than in other education levels.
The next seven charts, 4.1a to 4.7b, present the
estimated rates of unemployment (one for men
and one for women) as a function of the years
since  graduation,  for  homogeneous  groups
within education levels. Because the scale of
the  vertical  axis  (estimated  rates  of  unem-
ployment)  does  not  always  have  the  same
length, all charts referring to education groups
also include, for reasons of comparability, the





6 6 It should be noted that the scale which measures the rate of unem-
ployment is much “lengthier” in the case of women, since their esti-
mated rates of unemployment were much higher than those of men.
7 7 In all likelihood, 20 years after graduation is the maximum period
that young people consider when deciding on the level and specialty
of their studies.Charts 4.1a and 4.1b refer to groups with low
educational qualifications: primary education
and lower secondary education. It should be
noted that most members of these groups are
of relatively old age. The “primary education”
category comprises both persons who have not
finished primary school and primary school
graduates who have additionally attended a
few  years  of  gymnasium.  Male  members  of
lower  secondary  education  groups  start  off
with a low rate of unemployment and their esti-
mated  rate  of  unemployment  changes  little
with time, while the rate of unemployment of
primary education graduates remains at rela-
tively high levels even many years after grad-
uation. For female graduates of these two cat-
egories, the results are rather surprising, as the
estimated  rate  of  unemployment  seems  to
increase in the first few years since graduation
(especially for “primary education” graduates),
before starting to decline.
Charts 4.2a and 4.2b show the estimated rates
of unemployment of higher secondary and post-
secondary  non-tertiary  education  graduates.
Graduates of higher secondary education are
grouped into three categories: general lyceum,
technical lyceum and post-gymnasium techni-
cal schools. The first category also comprises
persons who have not completed tertiary edu-
cation studies; the second category consists of
graduates from Technical Vocational Lyceums
(TEL),  Unified  Multidisciplinary  Lyceums
(EPL)  and  Technical  Vocational  Institutes
(TEE); and the third category comprises grad-
uates  from  Technical  Vocational  Schools
(TES), post-gymnasium foreman schools and
post-gymnasium  mercantile  marine  schools.
Post-secondary non-tertiary education gradu-
ates are grouped into two categories: graduates
from (public or private) Institutes of Voca-
tional Training (IEK) and graduates from other
post-secondary education. The latter category
comprises graduates of colleges, dance schools,
tourism,  (non-university)  foreign  languages,
mercantile marine officers, etc.
Differences  between  men  and  women  in
Charts 4.2a and 4.2b are noteworthy. For men,
differences  between  general  and  technical
lyceum graduates are negligible. Graduates of
post-gymnasium  technical  schools  are  at  a
slightly better position in the first few years
after  graduation,  but  differences  from  the
other levels of higher secondary education are
eliminated  about  6  years  after  graduation.
Conversely,  graduation  from  IEK  or  other
post-secondary non-tertiary education estab-
lishment  is  associated  with  higher  rates  of
unemployment than graduation from a higher
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of IEK, the estimated rates of unemployment
converge with those of higher secondary edu-
cation about 10 years after graduation, while
in  the  case  of  graduates  of  other  post-sec-
ondary establishments, the estimated rate of
unemployment constantly diverges from that of
higher secondary education graduates. As in
almost all charts, the estimated rates of female
unemployment in Chart 4.2b are higher than
those of male unemployment for each educa-
tion group of Chart 4.1a. In women, however,
the lowest estimated rates of unemployment
are recorded among general lyceum graduates.
In the first 15 years after graduation, the rates
of unemployment of female technical lyceum
graduates are higher than those of post-gym-
nasium  technical  schools  graduates  and,  as
mentioned above, both are much higher than
those of general lyceum graduates. Estimated
rates of unemployment of IEK graduates and,
to a lesser extent, other post-secondary estab-
lishments are very high and, in the case of
other post- secondary establishments, diverge
from the rates of unemployment of general
lyceum graduates. The above results do not
corroborate the view often expressed in pub-
lic discourse on the need to boost technical
education  in  order  to  combat  youth  unem-
ployment in Greece.
Charts 4.3a and 4.3b show the estimated rates
of unemployment of TEI graduates (or, pre-
viously, KATEE, i.e. Centers of Higher Tech-
nical and Vocational Training). These gradu-
ates have been grouped into six categories. The
first two categories have a technical orientation
(Structural  Engineering  and  Mechanical  &
Computer Engineering), the third one resulted
from the merging of the graduates of Agricul-
tural and Food Technology schools, the next
two relate to graduates of Economics & Man-
agement and Medical (or Paramedical) Sci-
ences, while the last one (other TEI) comprises
Librarians, Social Workers and Applied Arts
graduates. Due to the heterogeneity of the lat-
ter  and  the  small  number  of  observations,
results concerning the category “other TEI”
must be interpreted with caution.
For both male and female TEI graduates, the
lowest  estimated  rates  of  unemployment  are
observed among technical school graduates. A
relatively better position between the two groups
is held by Structural Engineering graduates com-
pared with Mechanical & Computer Engineer-
ing graduates (for women, this is true only for the
first 7 years after graduation). Among men, Med-
ical Sciences graduates begin with extremely high
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graduation, while rates of female unemployment
among graduates of Agricultural & Food Tech-
nology and, to a lesser extent, Economics & Man-
agement begin with and remain at very high lev-
els, even many years after graduation.
Because of the classification of AEI graduates
(except for postgraduates) into a large number
of categories, the relevant results have been
grouped and are presented in three sets of
charts. Charts 4.4a and 4.4b show the estimated
rates of unemployment of science graduates.
More specifically, estimates are presented for
two groups of technical schools graduates, i.e.
(a) Structural Engineering and (b) Mechanical
Engineering, as well as for (c) graduates of IT,
(d)  graduates  of  Physical  Sciences  and  (e)
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group of IT graduates is numerically small and
includes relatively few individuals several years
after their graduation; consequently, the cor-
responding results should be interpreted with
caution. The main reason we decided to group
IT graduates in a separate category is the fre-
quency with which this particular group is men-
tioned in public discourse as an example of
excessive demand in the labour market. Under
Structural Engineering we have included grad-
uates from schools such as Civil Engineering,
Architecture,  Topography,  etc.  Mechanical
Engineering  also  includes  graduates  from
Naval  Architecture,  Electrical  Engineering,
Chemical  Engineering,  Mineralogy,  etc.
Under  Physical  Sciences  graduates  from
Physics, Chemistry, Biology (apart from Med-
ical Biology) and Geology are included.
Among both men and women, the best per-
formers are IT graduates (which confirms the
references in public discourse), followed by
―at least for the first years after graduation―
Polytechnic School graduates (from Structural
Engineering and Mechanical Engineering). On
the other hand, male ―and, to a much larger
degree, female― graduates of Physical Sci-
ences or Mathematics and Statistics start with
extremely high estimated rates of unemploy-
ment. In the case of men, these rates drop dra-
matically after 5-10 years, while in the case of
women, the rates remain very high even 10
years after graduation. 
Charts 4.5a and 4.5b illustrate the estimated
rates of unemployment for five groups of AEI
graduates: (a) Medicine, (b) Horticulture &
Forestry, (c) Law, (d) Economics & Manage-
ment and (e) Social Sciences. Apart from Med-
ical School graduates, the Medicine group also
includes dentistry, pharmaceutical and veteri-
nary graduates, while Social Sciences include
Sociology, Psychology, Anthropology, etc. 
Both  male  and  female  graduates  of  Law
Schools have low rates of unemployment (in
the case of men the rates are extremely low),
even during the first years after graduation.
For Medical School graduates, the rates tend
to get close to zero only many years after grad-
uation. To illustrate this better, the estimated
rates of unemployment of men in this group 8
years  after  graduation  are  higher  than  the
respective rates of men who have graduated
from a general lyceum. Female graduates of
Horticulture  &  Forestry  or  Social  Sciences
also have high estimated rates of unemploy-
ment  for  many  years  after  graduation.
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of Economics & Management graduates lie in
the middle of the range. 
The third category of AEI graduates is that of
“Instructors”. Charts 4.6a and 4.6b show the
estimated  rates  of  unemployment  for  five
groups of schools, namely Humanities, Lan-
guages, Physical Education & Sports, Peda-
gogics and other AEI. The latter includes Fine
Arts,  Medical  Biology,  Nursing,  Dietetics,
Journalism, Librarianship, Home Economics,
etc. As in the case of TEI, the high degree of
heterogeneity  among  the  members  of  the
group may render the interpretation of the cor-
responding results almost meaningless. The
same applies to men who have graduated from
Language Schools, since very few of them are
included in the LFS sample. The Humanitar-
ian Studies group includes graduates of Greek
Literature, Philosophy, History, Archaeology,
Theology, Music, Theatre, etc. 
Among  men,  those  with  the  best  prospects
appear to be the graduates of Pedagogics and
among women the graduates of Languages. By
contrast, male graduates of Physical Education
seem  to  face  high  unemployment  for  many
years after graduation. Among women, high
rates of unemployment are observed for grad-
uates of Humanitarian Studies and Pedagogics,
especially during the first years after gradua-
tion. The shape of the curve for female gradu-
ates from Physical Education & Sports is rather
surprising, as it implies a rise in the estimated
unemployment rate in the first 7 years after
graduation and a gradual decline thereafter.
Finally, Charts 4.7a and 4.7b show the results
for individuals with postgraduate studies, sep-
arately for Master’s degree holders (MA, MSc,
MBA) and doctorate (PhD) holders. In the
case  of  men,  the  estimated  rates  of  unem-
ployment of postgraduate degree holders start
from unexpectedly high levels (7%-9% for the
first year after graduation), but then drop rap-
idly. In the case of doctorate holders, their
rates of unemployment come close to zero in
less than 10 years after graduation, while in the
case  of  Master’s  degree  holders  they  drop
below 5% about 5 years after graduation. As
for women, differences between the two groups
are very difficult to ascertain. Although com-
pared to most groups of female tertiary edu-
cation graduates their estimated rates of unem-
ployment are lower, they seem to be quite high
during the first years after graduation (for the
first year, their estimated rate of unemploy-
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after graduation, their estimated rate of unem-
ployment remains higher than that of male
lyceum graduates, in the corresponding phase
of their career. 
Table 4 tackles the question “what is the esti-
mated rate of unemployment 1, 3, 5 and 10
years  after  graduation,  after  isolating  the
impact of all other factors?” Many interesting
conclusions  can  be  drawn  from  the  results
reported there and we have already mentioned
some of them. Let us start from the groupings
according to education level. Both men and
women with basic or lower education have the
lowest estimated rates of unemployment one
year after the completion of their studies. This
is  not  surprising,  as  most  drop-outs  leave
school because they have already found a job.
Coming to 3, 5 and 10 years after graduation,
the lowest rates of unemployment are regis-
tered for the group with very high educational
qualifications (postgraduate degree holders).
As years go by, the relative position of tertiary
education graduates improves and AEI grad-
uates are (in general) in a better position than
TEI graduates. 
At  this  point  we  should  make  two  more
remarks. First, even if the impact of all other
factors is eliminated, the relative position of
women in general ―and of female higher edu-
cation graduates in particular― is much worse
than that of men. For instance, even 10 years
after graduation, when the estimated rate of
male unemployment drops to 2.6% for both
AEI and TEI graduates, the rates for women
are 7.0% for AEI graduates and 9.9% for TEI
graduates. Similar differences are also evident
among  graduates  of  other  education  levels.
Second,  there  exist  very  large  differences
across groups within specific education levels.
Referring to tertiary education alone, one can
see the differences in the estimated rates of
unemployment  in  all  three  time  periods
(immediately after graduation, after 3 years
and after 5 years) for both male and female
graduates  of  Physical  Sciences  and  Mathe-
matics & Statistics on the one hand and Law
and IT on the other. However, even if a higher
education degree shields against unemploy-
ment in the long run, Table 4 shows that this
does not apply to all graduates. For instance,
even 10 years after graduation, the estimated
rates of unemployment for women who have
graduated from Horticulture & Forestry or
Physical Sciences (AEI) as well as from Agri-
cultural & Food Technology or Economics &
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Table 4 Estimated rate of unemployment as a function of years since graduationTable 5 attempts to answer the question “after
how many years would the estimated rate of
unemployment  drop  to  2%,  4%  and  6%?”.
Undoubtedly,  2%  can  be  considered  to  fall
within frictional unemployment, many econo-
mists would consider 4% to fall within the nat-
ural rate of unemployment and, given the cur-
rent conditions prevailing in the Greek econ-
omy, 6% can be considered a relatively satis-
factory rate of unemployment. In Table 5 it is
assumed that 40 years after graduation is the
maximum  time  period  that  an  individual
remains in the labour market. The sample of the
LFS used in our analysis includes a few persons
who were less than 65 years old and reported
that they had reached their highest education
achievement 40 years earlier. In any case, the
vast majority exits the labour market in less than
40 years after the completion of studies. 
Women reach the 6% threshold after 18, 12
and 9 years from the completion of their TEI,
AEI  and  postgraduate  studies  respectively.
The estimated rates of 4% are reached only by
female  graduates  of  AEI  and  postgraduate
studies, while 2% is reached only by AEI grad-
uates (23 years after graduation) and not by
female  postgraduates.  Men  reach  the  esti-
mated rates of unemployment much sooner
than women and, in general, the higher the
education level, the fewer the years required
for the attainment of these levels. Again, the
differences across education groups within the
same level are very large. At the tertiary edu-
cation level, men are close to 2% already from
the first year after graduation from IT and Law
Schools, but never after obtaining a degree in
Social Sciences. Additionally, while the rate of
unemployment is less than 6% already from
the first year since graduation from IT, Law,
Structural Engineering (both AEI and TEI)
and Mechanical Engineering, or again already
from the second year since graduation from
Horticulture & Forestry and Languages, it usu-
ally takes graduates of Physical Education &
Sports 12 whole years to reach the same levels.
As regards women, the rate of unemployment
drops to 2% in 10 years after graduation from
IT Schools. According to our estimates, female
graduates  of  Economics  &  Management,
Social Sciences and Languages (AEI), gradu-
ates of any TEI (excluding Medical Sciences)
and holders of Master’s degrees and doctorates
do not fall below these unemployment rates
within the period of 40 years after graduation. 
The last part of our empirical results is pre-
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Table 5 Years until the estimated rate of unemployment drops to 2%, 4% and 6%impact of three factors on the probability of
unemployment. These factors are: nationality,
region and urbanisation level of the place of
residence. The results are set forth in Charts
5.1a through to 5.3b, separately for men and
women, and involve all AEI graduates. As the
terms  of  the  equation  are  introduced  as
dummy variables, the respective curves do not
intersect. 
Charts  5.1a  and  5.1b  depict  the  estimated
unemployment rates for male and female grad-
uates  of  AEI,  in  relation  to  the  degree  of
urbanisation of their place of residence, hold-
ing constant the impact of other factors. Both
men and women residing in Athens or another
urban center (apart from Thessaloniki) face
considerably higher rates of unemployment,
especially during the first years after gradua-
tion. On the other hand, residence in rural
areas is associated with lower rates of unem-
ployment. It is quite possible ―but cannot be
ascertained by our results― that the negative
(positive) impact of living in a rural area (large
urban centre) on the rate of unemployment
can be attributed to the excess demand (sup-
ply) of labour in those areas. This finding may
also be related to the high level of underem-
ployment in rural areas. 
Charts 5.2a and 5.2b repeat the same proce-
dure for the 13 regions of the country. The
results are quite similar for men and women.
Residents in Thessaly, Western Greece and
Central Macedonia (men) or the Peloponnese
(women) face higher rates of unemployment.
By contrast, residing in Crete, the islands of the
North Aegean, the remaining Central Greece
and Euboea (men) or Attica (women) is asso-
ciated with lower rates of unemployment. It
should be noted that differences in the esti-
mated  regional  rates  of  unemployment  are
considerably high, especially in the first years
after graduation. 
Finally, Charts 5.3a and 5.3b show the esti-
mated rates of unemployment for AEI gradu-
ates according to the years after graduation,
separately for men and women, on the basis of
their nationality. The LFS sample is divided
into three categories: Greek nationals, other
EU countries’ nationals and non-EU nationals.
The estimated rate of unemployment of Greek
men is considerably higher than the rates of the
other two groups. By contrast, Greek women
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ment rates, while the estimated unemployment
rate of women from EU countries other than
Greece is slightly higher. 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
According  to  Georganta,  Kandilorou  and
Livada (2008), 58% of second-year students of
the Athens University of Economics and Busi-
ness  and  the  University  of  Macedonia
reported that they decided to pursue tertiary
education in order to find a better-paid job
more easily (the “better-paid” part will be the
subject of another study). Can our findings jus-
tify the “more easily” part? In other words, can
tertiary  education  shield  against  unemploy-
ment? The results of our analysis show that
these students took a very rational decision, as
better educational qualifications seem to be
quite effective in shielding against unemploy-
ment, even if it is only in the long run. It should
also be noted that Schools whose graduates
experience the lowest unemployment rates are
the most popular ones among tertiary educa-
tion applicants.
This study has yielded other findings as well.
Some of these findings are consistent with the
results  of  previous  studies.  However,  as  it
becomes clear from the review of the second
section, empirical studies on youth unemploy-
ment in Greece show divergent results. The
first finding of the present paper is that the dis-
course on youth unemployment is rather mis-
placed. The problem is not quite a problem of
youth unemployment, but a problem of tran-
sition from education to the labour market,
irrespective of age. It also involves graduates
of all education levels, not only tertiary edu-
cation. The difference between tertiary edu-
cation graduates and graduates of lower edu-
cation levels is that the unemployment rates of
the first drop to acceptable levels a few years
after graduation, while for the latter the pace
of this decline is substantially slower and unem-
ployment rates converge to higher levels. This
is the second significant finding of our paper.
In general, the higher the education level (TEI,
AEI, postgraduate studies) the lower the rate
of unemployment in the long run. 
The third finding relates to the very significant
differences  within  education  levels.  Some
groups of graduates face no real problems after
graduating (from IT and Law Schools – at least
the male graduates), others run a serious risk
of unemployment for a relatively small number
33
Economic Bulletin
May 2010 46of years after graduation (Physical Sciences,
Mathematics & Statistics), while others face a
serious problem of unemployment for several
years after graduation (Physical Education and
&  Sports,  Social  Sciences  and  several  TEI
Schools). The last finding of the study is that,
ceteris paribus, women in general, and female
tertiary education graduates in particular, face
a significantly higher risk of unemployment
compared to male graduates with similar edu-
cational qualifications. For certain categories
of  female  tertiary  education  graduates,  the
estimated unemployment rates are exception-
ally high, even several years after graduation
(AEI: Horticulture & Forestry, Physical Edu-
cation & Sports; TEI: Agricultural & Food
Technology, Economics & Management).
Would it be possible to generalise the above
results and extrapolate them to the future?
Possibly  yes,  but  that  would  be  too  risky
because of ever-changing circumstances. Ter-
tiary education in Greece ―like in most OECD
countries― has expanded rapidly in the past 15
years. A recent OECD report concludes that
demand for tertiary education will increase in
the years to come. The recent economic crisis
and the recession could possibly push more
young people to remain in education as, in
most countries, the pay gap between tertiary
education  graduates  and  people  with  lower
education keeps widening (OECD, 2009). 
In Greece, the number of places available in
AEI and TEI for students accounts for more
than 80% of the corresponding (annual) demo-
graphic cohort. Of course, many places remain
vacant and some students never graduate. But
even if these two factors are taken into con-
sideration, the share of tertiary education grad-
uates in recent cohorts is substantially higher
than in previous ones. Would this imply that
the increased supply of graduates ―which is
expected to continue in the next years― will
lead to a more permanent increase in the grad-
uate  unemployment  rate,  or  that  graduate
unemployment is not just a temporary phe-
nomenon,  as  described  in  this  study?  The
answer to this depends on a number of factors,
as for example whether enterprises in Greece
will  increase  their  demand  in  high-skilled
human capital or whether they will be willing
to  recruit  graduate  labour  to  fill  positions
where higher education qualifications are not
required (Kikilias, 2008). If these prospects do
not materialise, and if there is no significant
brain drain, then we may witness higher rates
of graduate unemployment and the phenome-
non of graduate unemployment may turn out
to be more permanent (Karamessini, 2003). 
Finally, there are a number of policy implica-
tions stemming from our results. It is obvious
that all curricula, especially in tertiary educa-
tion, have to be upgraded and linked to the
knowledge society and the labour market. They
should provide young people with the neces-
sary skills to creatively address the great chal-
lenges of modern world. Their content must
focus on the development of cutting-edge and
high-demand skills that respond to the needs
of the Greek labour market, thus contributing
in effectively shielding from unemployment.
Mechanisms linking education to the labour
market could also contribute to the achieve-
ment of this goal since, as confirmed by our
analysis, the main problem is not youth unem-
ployment but the transition from education to
the labour market, irrespective of age. The
effective  operation  and  upgrading  of  such
mechanisms, e.g. the National System for Link-
ing  Vocational  Education  and  Training  to
Employment, the Career Offices of AEI and
TEI and the services of the Greek Manpower
Employment  Organisation  (OAED),  could
help curb the problem of youth and graduate
unemployment.  Private  human  resources
management firms may also play an important
role. However, contrary to what happens in
other  countries,  the  small  number  of  such
enterprises  in  Greece  focuses  on  recruiting
high-skilled executives primarily on behalf of
multinational corporations. This is probably
due to the structure of the Greek economy,
with its large number of small and medium-
sized enterprises, which do not turn to spe-
cialised (especially private) entities to cover









Single parent with children – male 0.2322
Single parent with children and other members – male  0.6288 ***
Couple with children – male 0.0029
Couple with children and other members – male 0.3106 ***
Single male 0.1746 ***
Couple without children – male Reference group
Other type of household, single parent (without children) – male 0.5408 ***
Other type of household, couple (without children) – male 0.4359 ***
Primary or lower education 0.2393 **
Lower secondary education -0.1521 *
General Lyceum Reference group
Technical Lyceum 0.0475
Post-gymnasium technical school -0.0827
IEK 0.2024 **
Other post-lyceum education -0.0453
Structural Engineering (TEI) 0.0228
Mechanical & Computer Engineering (TEI) 0.2402
Agricultural & Food Technology (TEI) 0.3476
Economics & Management (TEI) 0.2827 *
Other TEI 0.3133
Medical Sciences (TEI) 0.6851 **




Horticulture & Forestry -0.0078
Medical School etc. 0.1395
Physical Sciences 0.5213 *
Mathematics & Statistics 0.8121 **
Law School -0.8395 *









Table A1 MALE – Estimated probability of unemployment
Dependent variable: unemployed=1
*** Statistically important coefficient at importance level 1%
**   Statistically important coefficient at importance level 5%
*     Statistically important coefficient at importance level 10%33
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Years since graduation x Primary or lower education 0.0100
Years since graduation x Lower secondary education 0.0275 ***
Years since graduation x General Lyceum Reference group
Years since graduation x Technical Lyceum -0.0115
Years since graduation x Post-gymnasium technical school 0.0065
Years since graduation x IEK -0.0243 *
Years since graduation x Other post-lyceum education 0.0174
Years since graduation x Structural Engineering (TEI) -0.0454
Years since graduation x Mechanical & Computer Engineering (TEI) -0.0589 **
Years since graduation x Agricultural & Food Technology (TEI) -0.0468
Years since graduation x Economics & Management (TEI) -0.0524 *
Years since graduation x Other TEI -0.0783
Years since graduation x Medical Sciences (TEI) -0.1116 *
Years since graduation x Structural Engineering -0.0418
Years since graduation x Mechanical Engineering -0.0104
Years since graduation x Other AEI 0.0122
Years since graduation x IT 0.2280
Years since graduation x Horticulture & Forestry -0.0111
Years since graduation x Medical School etc. 0.0153
Years since graduation x Physical Sciences -0.0603
Years since graduation x Mathematics & Statistics -0.1527 **
Years since graduation x Law School -0.0152
Years since graduation x Economics & Management -0.0655 ***
Years since graduation x Social Sciences -0.0431
Years since graduation x Humanities -0.0385
Years since graduation x Languages -0.0410
Years since graduation x Physical Education & Sports -0.0033
Years since graduation x Pedagogics -0.0093
Years since graduation x Postgraduate degree -0.0396
Years since graduation x Doctorate -0.0469
Independent variables Coefficient
Table A1 MALE – Estimated probability of unemployment (continued)
Dependent variable: unemployed=1
*** Statistically important coefficient at importance level 1%
**  Statistically important coefficient at importance level 5%
*     Statistically important coefficient at importance level 10%33
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Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Primary or lower education -0.0209
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Lower secondary education -0.0498 **
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x General Lyceum Reference group
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Technical Lyceum 0.0504
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Post-gymnasium technical school 0.0008
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x IEK 0.0561
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Other post-lyceum education -0.0026
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Structural Engineering (TEI) 0.0763
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Mechanical & Computer Engineering (TEI) 0.1438 **
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Agricultural & Food Technology (TEI) 0.1290
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Economics & Management (TEI) 0.1311
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Other TEI 0.2277
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Medical Sciences (TEI) 0.1535
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Structural Engineering 0.1053
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Mechanical Engineering 0.0577
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Other AEI -0.0102
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x IT -2.0429
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Horticulture & Forestry -0.0133
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Medical School etc. -0.3710
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Physical Sciences 0.0319
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Mathematics & Statistics 0.3621 **
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Law School 0.0713
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Economics & Management 0.1761 ***
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Social Sciences 0.1690
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Humanities 0.0074
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Languages -0.6442
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Physical Education & Sports -0.0494
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Pedagogics -0.0969
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Postgraduate degree 0.1188
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Doctorate -0.1342
Years since graduation -0.0311 ***
Years since graduation sqrd./100 0.0213
Independent variables Coefficient
Table A1 MΑLE – Estimated probability of unemployment (continued)
Dependent variable: unemployed=1
*** Statistically important coefficient at importance level 1%
**   Statistically important coefficient at importance level 5%
*     Statistically important coefficient at importance level 10%33
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Greek national Reference group
Other EU national -0.2253
Third country national -0.2265 ***
East Macedonia–Thrace  0.1591 ***
Central Macedonia 0.1442 ***
West Macedonia 0.1558 **
Epirus 0.1578 ***
Thessaly 0.1090 **
Ionian Islands 0.2150 ***
West Greece 0.0682




South Aegean 0.2027 ***
Crete 0.1552 ***
Capital region – Attica Reference group
City complex – Thessaloniki -0.1974 ***
Other urban areas -0.1154 ***
Semi-urban areas -0.2366 ***
Rural areas -0.3146 ***
First year of survey (2004) -0.0644 **
Second year of survey (2005) -0.0190
Third year of survey (2006) -0.0154
Fourth year of survey (2007) Reference group
1st quarter  0.0260
2nd quarter -0.0206
3rd quarter Reference group
4th quarter 0.0343
Regional rate of unemployment 5.2382 ***
Constant term -1.8455 ***
Independent variables Coefficient
Table A1 MALE – Estimated probability of unemployment (continued)
Dependent variable: unemployed=1
*** Statistically important coefficient at importance level 1%
**   Statistically important coefficient at importance level 5%
*     Statistically important coefficient at importance level 10%33
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Single parent with children (0 aged up to 5, 1+ aged 6-17) – male -0.8720 ***
Single parent with children (1+ aged up to 5, 0+ aged 6-17) – male -0.4188
Single parent with children (0 aged up to 5, 1 aged 6-17) and other members – male -0.1822 **
Single parent with children (0 aged up to 5, 2 aged 6-17) and other members and
Single parent with children (0+ aged up to 5, other aged 6-17) and other members – male 0.2099
Couple with children (0 aged up to 5, 1 aged 6-17) – male -0.2698 ***
Couple with children (0 aged up to 5, 2 aged 6-17) – male -0.3715 ***
Couple with children (0 aged up to 5, 3+ aged 6-17) – male -0.5677 ***
Couple with children (1 aged up to 5, 0 aged 6-17) – male 0.9621 ***
Couple with children (1 aged up to 5, 1 aged 6-17) – male 0.4873 ***
Couple with children (1 aged up to 5, 2 aged 6-17) – male -0.1258
Couple with children (1 aged up to 5, 3+ aged 6-17) – male -0.4203 ***
Couple with children (2 aged up to 5, 0 aged 6-17) – male 0.6096 ***
Couple with children (2 aged up to 5, 1 aged 6-17) and Couple with children (2 aged up to 5, 2 aged 6-17)
and Couple with children (2 aged up to 5, 3+ aged 6-17) – male 0.4779 ***
Couple with children (3+ aged up to 5, 0+ aged 6-17) – male 0.3124
Couple with children (0 aged up to 5, 1 aged 6-17) and other members – male -0.1442 ***
Couple with children (0 aged up to 5, 2 aged 6-17) and other members – male -0.2168 ***
Couple with children (0 aged up to 5, 3+ aged 6-17) and other members – male -0.4081 ***
Couple with children (1 aged up to 5, 0 aged 6-17) and other members – male 0.3859 ***
Couple with children (1 aged up to 5, 1 aged 6-17) and other members – male -0.0453
Couple with children (1 aged up to 5, 2 aged 6-17) and other members – male -0.3340
Couple with children (1 aged up to 5, 3+ aged 6-17) and other members and
Couple with children (2+ aged up to 5, 0+ aged 6-17) and other members – male 0.1775
Single male -0.2780 ***
Couple without children – male Reference group
Other type of household, single parent (without children) – male 0.0752 **
Other type of household, couple (without children) – male 0.0989 ***
Primary or lower education 0.9370 ***
Lower secondary education -0.1058 ***
General Lyceum Reference group
Technical Lyceum 0.5414 ***
TEI 0.9062 ***
AEI 0.5051 ***
Postgraduate degree 1.2741 ***
Years since graduation 0.2280 ***
Years since graduation sqrd./100 -0.4791 ***
Independent variables Coefficient
Table B1 MALE – Estimated probability of participation in labour force
Dependent variable: labour force participant=1
Note: Wald test (rho = 0): x2(1) = 21.80 Prob > x2 = 0.0000.
*** Statistically important coefficient at importance level 1%
**   Statistically important coefficient at importance level 5%
*     Statistically important coefficient at importance level 10%33
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Eastern Macedonia–Thrace  -0.0539
Central Macedonia -0.0167
Western Macedonia -0.2810 ***
Epirus -0.1581 ***
Thessaly 0.0655 *
Ionian Islands -0.1276 **
Western Greece -0.1348 ***
Central Greece and Euboea -0.0373
Attica Reference group
Peloponnese 0.0196
North Aegean -0.1632 ***
South Aegean 0.0359
Crete -0.0572 *
Attica capital region Reference group
Thessaloniki city complex -0.0090
Other urban areas 0.0581 **
Semi-urban areas 0.2506 ***
Rural areas 0.3917 ***
First year of survey (2004) -0.0118
Second year of survey (2005) -0.0037
Third year of survey (2006) -0.0063
Fourth year of survey (2007) Reference group
1st quarter  -0.0257
2nd quarter -0.0220
3rd quarter Reference group
4th quarter 0.0133




Table B1 MALE – Estimated probability of participation in labour force (continued)
Dependent variable: labour force participant=1
Note: Wald test (rho = 0): x2(1) = 21.80 Prob > x2 = 0.0000.
*** Statistically important coefficient at importance level 1%
**   Statistically important coefficient at importance level 5%
*     Statistically important coefficient at importance level 10%33
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Single parent with children – female 0.2290 ***
Single parent with children and other members – female 0.3122 ***
Couple with children – female 0.0425
Couple with children and other members – female 0.1301 ***
Single female -0.0417
Couple without children – female Reference group
Other type of household, single parent (without children) – female 0.2758 ***
Other type of household, couple (without children) – female 0.2364 ***
Primary or lower education -0.1336
Lower secondary education -0.1995 **
General Lyceum Reference group
Technical Lyceum 0.2934 ***
Post-gymnasium technical school 0.1110
IEK 0.3416 ***
Other post-lyceum education 0.0879
Structural Engineering (TEI) 0.1420
Mechanical & Computer Engineering (TEI) 0.5612 ***
Agricultural & Food Technology (TEI) 0.5574 ***
Economics & Management (TEI) 0.3562 ***
Other TEI 0.6333 **
Medical Sciences (TEI) 0.4790 ***




Horticulture & Forestry 0.4771
Medical School etc. 0.2780
Physical Sciences 0.9142 ***
Mathematics & Statistics 1.0191 ***
Law School -0.0904
Economics & Management 0.2610 **
Social Sciences 0.6999 ***
Humanities 0.5627 ***
Languages 0.0490





Table A2 FEMALE – Estimated probability of unemployment 
Dependent variable: unemployed=1
*** Statistically important coefficient at importance level 1%
**   Statistically important coefficient at importance level 5%
*     Statistically important coefficient at importance level 10%33
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Years since graduation x Primary or lower education 0.0446 ***
Years since graduation x Lower secondary education 0.0246 ***
Years since graduation x General Lyceum Reference group
Years since graduation x Technical Lyceum -0.0104
Years since graduation x Post-gymnasium technical school 0.0023
Years since graduation x IEK -0.0219 **
Years since graduation x Other post-lyceum education -0.0075
Years since graduation x Structural Engineering (TEI) -0.0549
Years since graduation x Mechanical & Computer Engineering (TEI) -0.1250 ***
Years since graduation x Agricultural & Food Technology (TEI) -0.0459
Years since graduation x Economics & Management (TEI) -0.0247
Years since graduation x Other TEI -0.1123 **
Years since graduation x Medical Sciences (TEI) -0.0763 ***
Years since graduation x Structural Engineering -0.1036 ***
Years since graduation x Mechanical Engineering -0.0910 *
Years since graduation x Other AEI -0.0534
Years since graduation x IT 0.0570
Years since graduation x Horticulture & Forestry 0.0055
Years since graduation x Medical School etc. -0.0860 ***
Years since graduation x Physical Sciences -0.1088 **
Years since graduation x Mathematics & Statistics -0.1669 ***
Years since graduation x Law School -0.0504
Years since graduation x Economics & Management -0.0560 ***
Years since graduation x Social Sciences -0.1145 ***
Years since graduation x Humanities -0.0661 ***
Years since graduation x Languages -0.0385
Years since graduation x Physical Education & Sports 0.0785
Years since graduation x Pedagogics -0.0593
Years since graduation x Postgraduate degree -0.0801 **
Years since graduation x Doctorate -0.0890 *
Independent variables Coefficient
Table A2 FEMALE – Estimated probability of unemployment (continued)
Dependent variable: unemployed=1
*** Statistically important coefficient at importance level 1%
**   Statistically important coefficient at importance level 5%
*     Statistically important coefficient at importance level 10%33
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Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Primary or lower education -0.0943 ***
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Lower secondary education -0.0453 **
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x General Lyceum Reference group
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Technical Lyceum 0.0116
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Post-gymnasium technical school -0.0136
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x IEK 0.0564 **
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Other post-lyceum education 0.0721
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Structural Engineering (TEI) 0.1944
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Mechanical & Computer Engineering (TEI) 0.3986 ***
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Agricultural & Food Technology (TEI) 0.1653
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Economics & Management (TEI) 0.1020 *
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Other TEI 0.3469 **
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Medical Sciences (TEI) 0.1429 *
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Structural Engineering 0.2845 **
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Mechanical Engineering 0.3187 **
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Other AEI 0.2010
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x IT -2.1860
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Horticulture & Forestry -0.2124
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Medical School etc. 0.1787 **
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Physical Sciences 0.1397
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Mathematics & Statistics 0.3821 **
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Law School 0.0733
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Economics & Management 0.1242 **
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Social Sciences 0.3136 ***
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Humanities 0.0725
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Languages 0.1115
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Physical Education & Sports -0.4890 *
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Pedagogics 0.0650
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Postgraduate degree 0.2242 *
Years since graduation sqrd./100 x Doctorate 0.2503 *
Years since graduation -0.0106 **
Years since graduation sqrd./100 -0.0257 **
Independent variables Coefficient
Table A2 FEMALE – Estimated probability of unemployment (continued)
Dependent variable: unemployed=1
*** Statistically important coefficient at importance level 1%
**   Statistically important coefficient at importance level 5%
*     Statistically important coefficient at importance level 10%33
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Greek national Reference group
Other EU national 0.0886
Third country national -0.0209
East Macedonia–Thrace  0.2138 ***
Central Macedonia 0.2224 ***
West Macedonia 0.1497 **
Epirus 0.2442 ***
Thessaly 0.2709 ***
Ionian Islands 0.1629 ***
West Greece 0.1769 ***
Central Greece and Euboea 0.2305 ***
Attica Reference group
Peloponnese 0.2947 ***
North Aegean 0.2930 ***
South Aegean 0.1607 ***
Crete 0.2483 ***
Capital region – Attica Reference group
City complex – Thessaloniki -0.2156 ***
Other urban areas -0.0822 ***
Semi-urban areas -0.1664 ***
Rural areas -0.2119 ***
First year of survey (2004) -0.0201
Second year of survey (2005) -0.0133
Third year of survey (2006) 0.0129
Fourth year of survey (2007) Reference group
1st quarter  0.0068
2nd quarter -0.0161
3rd quarter Reference group
4th quarter -0.0021
Regional rate of unemployment 5.6842 ***
Constant term -1.7809 ***
Independent variables Coefficient
Table A2 FEMALE – Estimated probability of unemployment (continued)
Dependent variable: unemployed=1
*** Statistically important coefficient at importance level 1%
**   Statistically important coefficient at importance level 5%
*     Statistically important coefficient at importance level 10%33
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Single parent with children (0 aged up to 5, 1 aged 6-17) – female 0.2829 ***
Single parent with children (0 aged up to 5, 2 aged 6-17) – female 0.1740 **
Single parent with children (0 aged up to 5, 3+ aged 6-17) – female -0.0355
Single parent with children (1 aged up to 5, 0 aged 6-17) – female 0.6509 ***
Single parent with children (1 aged up to 5, 1 aged 6-17) – female -0.1298
Single parent with children (1 aged up to 5, 2+ aged 6-17) – female -0.0771
Single parent with children (2+ aged up to 5, 0+ aged 6-17) – female -0.3168
Single parent with children (0 aged up to 5, 1 aged 6-17) and other members – female 0.2237 ***
Single parent with children (0 aged up to 5, 2+ aged 6-17) and other members – female 0.1241
Single parent with children (1+ aged up to 5, 0+ aged 6-17) and other members – female 0.1153
Couple with children (0 aged up to 5, 1 aged 6-17) – female -0.2394 ***
Couple with children (0 aged up to 5, 2 aged 6-17) – female -0.2951 ***
Couple with children (0 aged up to 5, 3+ aged 6-17) – female -0.3850 ***
Couple with children (1 aged up to 5, 0 aged 6-17) – female -0.2161 ***
Couple with children (1 aged up to 5, 1 aged 6-17) – female -0.3661 ***
Couple with children (1 aged up to 5, 2 aged 6-17) – female -0.4686 ***
Couple with children (1 aged up to 5, 3+ aged 6-17) – female -0.4620 ***
Couple with children (2 aged up to 5, 0 aged 6-17) – female -0.3920 ***
Couple with children (2 aged up to 5, 1 aged 6-17) – female  -0.6709 ***
Couple with children (2 aged up to 5, 2 aged 6-17) – female  -0.9113 ***
Couple with children (2 aged up to 5, 3+ aged 6-17) – female -1.2648 ***
Couple with children (3+ aged up to 5, 0+ aged 6-17) – female -0.7267 ***
Couple with children (0 aged up to 5, 1 aged 6-17) and other members – female -0.2126 ***
Couple with children (0 aged up to 5, 2 aged 6-17) and other members – female -0.2168 ***
Couple with children (0 aged up to 5, 3+ aged 6-17) and other members – female -0.3372 ***
Couple with children (1 aged up to 5, 0 aged 6-17) and other members – female -0.0799
Couple with children (1 aged up to 5, 1 aged 6-17) and other members – female -0.0237
Couple with children (1 aged up to 5, 2 aged 6-17) and other members – female -0.5561 ***
Couple with children (1 aged up to 5, 3+ aged 6-17) and other members and -0.4717 ***
Couple with children (2+ aged up to 5, 0+ aged 6-17) and other members – female -0.3842 ***
Single female -0.0037
Couple without children – female Reference group
Other type of household, single parent (without children) – female 0.2677 ***
Other type of household, couple (without children) – female 0.0292 *
Independent variables Coefficient
Table Β2 FEMALE – Estimated probability of participation in labour force
Dependent variable: labour force participant=1
Note: Wald test (rho = 0): x2(1) =53.40  Prob > x2 = 0.0000
*** Statistically important coefficient at importance level 1%
**   Statistically important coefficient at importance level 5%
*     Statistically important coefficient at importance level 10%33
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Primary or lower education 0.0901 ***
Lower secondary education -0.3163 ***
General Lyceum Reference group
Technical Lyceum 0.8168 ***
TEI 1.0967 ***
AEI 0.9779 ***
Postgraduate degree 1.5844 ***
Years since graduation 0.0906 ***
Years since graduation sqrd./100 -0.2136 ***
East Macedonia–Thrace  0.2354 ***
Central Macedonia 0.1183 ***
West Macedonia 0.0554 *
Epirus 0.0815 ***
Thessaly 0.1502 ***
Ionian Islands 0.0931 **
West Greece -0.0107
Central Greece and Euboea 0.0750 ***
Attica Reference group
Peloponnese 0.2317 ***
North Aegean -0.1056 ***
South Aegean -0.0672 **
Crete 0.2336 ***
Attica capital region Reference group
Thessaloniki city complex -0.1756 ***
Other urban areas -0.0980 ***
Semi-urban areas 0.0261
Rural areas 0.2388 ***
First year of survey (2004) -0.0047
Second year of survey (2005) 0.0048
Third year of survey (2006) 0.0031
Fourth year of survey (2007) Reference group
1st quarter  -0.0009
2nd quarter 0.0175
3rd quarter Reference group
4th quarter -0.0319 *




Table Β2 FEMALE – Estimated probability of participation in labour force (continued)
Dependent variable: labour force participant=1
Note: Wald test (rho = 0): x2(1) =53.40  Prob > x2 = 0.0000
*** Statistically important coefficient at importance level 1%
**   Statistically important coefficient at importance level 5%
*     Statistically important coefficient at importance level 10%33
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The goal of monetary policy in most advanced
economies is that of price stability, usually
defined as some low rate of inflation. This is
seen as crucial to providing a predictable envi-
ronment, where expectations of future inflation
are anchored. The rationale for such a policy
goal is founded on the idea that inflation brings
both direct and indirect costs.
Understanding the nature of these costs has
proved to be a fundamental task for theoreti-
cal economists. A consensus that has emerged
views moderate anticipated inflation as being
associated with small welfare costs. Rather, it
is unexpected inflation that is the source of the
costs of inflation. Uncertainty about future
inflation is generally thought to distort the
relative-price mechanism, leading to a misal-
location of resources and thus harming growth.
Within the context of the literature on the costs
of inflation,1 the aspect that has often been the
subject of academic debate is the relationship
between inflation and inflation uncertainty.
Some have argued that higher inflation directly
causes inflation uncertainty, thus generating
real indirect costs from inflation for any econ-
omy (Friedman, 1977, Ball, 1992); others hold
the view that the direction of causality is
reversed, with higher inflation uncertainty
causing higher average inflation (Cukierman
and Meltzer, 1986; Cukierman, 1992).
The purpose of this paper is to examine the
relationship between inflation and inflation
uncertainty for Greece covering the period
from 1981 to 2008. This relationship has not
been studied for Greece before. Yet Greece,
as a country which has experienced both peri-
ods of high and variable inflation and, more
recently, low inflation, could well prove an
interesting testing ground for the competing
theories. Univariate GARCH models are used
to generate alternative measures of inflation
uncertainty, using both seasonally unadjusted
and seasonally adjusted data. Subsequently,
Granger causality tests are employed to inves-
tigate causality between inflation and inflation
uncertainty and, where present, to detect its
direction and sign.
The paper proceeds as follows: in Section 1 we
consider the extensive theoretical and empir-
ical academic literature on both the costs of
inflation and the possible relationship between
inflation and inflation uncertainty; Section 2
describes our data and Section 3 outlines and
discusses our empirical approach; Section 4
presents our findings, and Section 5 provides
some concluding remarks.
1 THE COSTS OF INFLATION: A SELECTED
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Fully anticipated inflation can generate costs for
an economy from two main sources. First there
are search costs (often referred to as “shoe-
leather”costs).Asinflationrises,holdingmoney
becomes more costly because it loses its value
over time (that is, a given amount can purchase
a smaller basket of goods as time progresses).
Individuals will thus spend their money closer to
the time when they receive their income and
shops will hold smaller stocks, which implies
more queuing or searching. At the same time, to
economise on holding cash, more will be held in
banks, which implies the need for more trips to
the bank (hence the “shoe-leather” costs). All
these consequences of effectively taxing the
holdings of money balances generate costly and
unproductive activities in any economy.
INFLATION AND NOMINAL UNCERTAINTY:





1 1 For a good early survey of the literature, see Driffill et al. (1990).The second main cost of anticipated inflation
arises from the fact that tax systems are often
not indexed to inflation. Consider a tax system
with various tax bands, where the tax rates are
unchanged. In an economy with positive infla-
tion, effective tax rates (the actual rate paid)
will usually rise with inflation. This leads to dis-
tortions with respect to both private savings
and labour supply decisions. 
It is often argued that the costs associated with
anticipated inflation are likely to be small. This
is particularly true in a world where tax systems
are indexed and where cash transactions are
limited because of new electronic means of
payment. However, it is unlikely that inflation
can ever be fully anticipated. This leads econ-
omists to focus on the costs from unanticipated
inflation. Unanticipated inflation can generate
welfare costs because of its impact on the price
mechanism’s ability to allocate resources effi-
ciently (that is, to where they will do the most
good).
An early attempt at explaining this was pro-
vided by Lucas (1973). In his model, unantic-
ipated inflation causes economic agents to con-
fuse  absolute  and  relative  price  changes.
Assume  producers,  for  example,  know  the
price of the goods they produce or trade, at any
point in time; the absolute price level in the
economy as a whole is, however, known only in
the next period. Assume there is an unexpected
rise in the money supply. The demand for all
goods will rise and, for given output levels,
prices will rise. Each individual producer expe-
riences a rise in the price of the good they pro-
duce. Thinking this to be a rise only in the price
of their good and not a general rise in prices,
they increase output. Of course in the next
period they realise that the increase in prices
was a general one and not specific to the good
they produce; their response of increasing out-
put  was  inappropriate,  since  there  was  no
increase in relative demand.
In short, inflation causes agents to confuse real
shocks, which warrant a change in quantities
(output, labour supply, investment, etc.), with
nominal shocks (or monetary shocks), which
do not. If economic agents realise that both
kinds of shocks are possible, but neither is pre-
dictable, then they will tend to overreact to
monetary  shocks  and  underreact  to  real
shocks. It is this kind of story that leads econ-
omists to argue that inflation can be costly
when it is unpredictable – it distorts the price
mechanism  in  a  way  that  changes  in  prices
(either of goods, services or assets) no longer
reflect underlying real changes in the economy
which may warrant a change in the allocation
of resources to certain activities and hence
investment in one sector rather than another.
However, if it is inflation unpredictability or
uncertainty that generates costs, the interest-
ing  question  arises  as  to  whether  inflation
uncertainty is connected in some way to the
actual level of inflation. Several, often con-
tradictory  theoretical  arguments  can  be
found in the academic literature regarding the
possible  direction  of  a  causal  relationship
between inflation and inflation uncertainty.
Okun (1971) was perhaps the first to suggest
that countries with high rates of inflation were
also likely to experience high inflation vari-
ability. The underlying theoretical insight for
this  argument  was  provided  by  Friedman
(1977) in his Nobel lecture. He reasoned that,
while high inflation generates political pressure
to reduce it, policy makers are usually reluctant
to do so, for fear of the possible recessionary
effects of such an effort. This lack of strong
commitment on behalf of the monetary policy
authority  creates  nominal  uncertainty  and
higher inflation volatility, which in turn results
in instability in consumption, production and
investment decisions, and hence growth and
welfare losses. All these consequences justify
the public’s underlying aversion to inflation.
Friedman’s well-known insight was first for-
malised by Ball (1992) in the context of a game
of asymmetric information between the mon-
etary authority and the public, in which higher
inflation leads to increasing uncertainty over
the monetary policy stance. Economic agents
know there are two types of policy makers, only
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costs of reducing inflation. When inflation is
low, both types of policy makers strive to keep
it so, giving rise to low inflation uncertainty as
perceived by economic agents. At higher lev-
els of inflation, however, only one type is will-
ing to disinflate, the other being reluctant to do
so for fear of causing a recession. Given that
the policy makers stochastically alternate in
office, an increase in inflation creates uncer-
tainty  about  future  monetary  policy,  future
inflation and thus the general prospects of the
real economy. This line of argument is often
referred to in the literature as the Friedman-
Ball hypothesis. Its conclusion is that inflation
very clearly causes inflation uncertainty and
the higher the rate of inflation, the greater that
uncertainty will be. Thus inflation is costly not
only  because  of  its  direct  costs,  but  also
because of its indirect costs arising from its
impact on inflation uncertainty.
Another strand of the academic literature pur-
sues the idea that causality may run in the
opposite direction, i.e. that in fact it is greater
inflation uncertainty which causes higher aver-
age  inflation.  This  possibility  has  been  for-
malised as a feature of models based on the
Barro-Gordon framework. Seminal among this
body of work is that of Cukierman and Meltzer
(1986) and Cukierman (1992), in whose model
the  low  policy  credibility,  the  ambiguity  of
objectives and the poor quality of monetary
control  that  characterise  policy  makers
increase  the  average  rate  of  inflation.  The
monetary policy authority has a dual mandate,
containing inflation and promoting economic
growth,  which  is  reflected  in  its  stochastic
objective function, as is the trade-off between
the two objectives. However there is no com-
mitment  mechanism.  The  monetary  policy
authority has an incentive to create monetary
surprises  ―i.e.  to  generate  inflation  uncer-
tainty―  in  an  effort  to  stimulate  economic
growth; this in turn leads to increases in the
level of inflation. The money supply process is
also assumed to have a random component,
due to the monetary authority’s inability to dis-
cern  the  most  appropriate  monetary  policy
instrument and to precisely control it. There-
fore, not only are economic agents uncertain
about the level of future inflation but, more-
over, they have no way of inferring whether an
increase in the observed level of inflation is
due to a random money supply disturbance or
to  a  shift  in  the  government’s  emphasis  on
unemployment. In this context, higher inflation
uncertainty generates higher inflation and is
evidence of an “opportunistic” or “myopic”
central bank.2
It is not only the direction of causality that is
questioned – that is, whether it is inflation that
causes inflation uncertainty or vice-versa. It is
also  the  sign.  In  both  Friedman-Ball  and
Cukierman-Meltzer, higher inflation is asso-
ciated with higher inflation uncertainty. Fol-
lowing a different thread, Holland (1995) pro-
poses that, if the Friedman-Ball hypothesis is
valid, there may also be a secondary feedback
effect from inflation uncertainty back to infla-
tion, as a result of the policy makers’ stabili-
sation efforts. As inflation uncertainty rises
due  to  increasing  inflation,  there  is  an
increased  incentive  for  policy  makers  to
respond by contracting money supply growth
and contain inflation in order to reduce infla-
tion uncertainty and the associated negative
real output and welfare effects. Thus, a nega-
tive causal effect of inflation uncertainty on
inflation is evidence of what is known as the
“stabilisation motive” of the monetary policy
authority, which views inflation uncertainty as
a  welfare  cost.  It  generates  the  result  that
higher inflation uncertainty lowers inflation
because of the monetary authorities’ response.
The final case argues that it is inflation that




2 2 In a comparable theoretical setup, Devereux (1989) justifies the
causal link from inflation uncertainty to the level of inflation, by
modelling discretionary monetary policy as incorporating not only
inflation but also real disturbances and the degree of endogenous
wage indexation. He argues that a rise in the variance of real dis-
turbances in the economy lowers the optimal degree of wage index-
ation in the labour market and provides a stronger incentive for pol-
icy makers to create surprise inflation, thereby increasing the aver-
age rate of inflation in a “discretionary equilibrium”. Lower index-
ation provides a stronger incentive for policy makers to create sur-
prise inflation, and thereby inflation uncertainty, which can be
argued to precede the higher average rate of inflation.trast to the Friedman-Ball theory, higher infla-
tion reduces inflation uncertainty. Pourgerami
and Maskus (1987) and Ungar and Zilberfarb
(1993) argue that, as inflation increases, so
agents  invest  more  resources  in  forecasting
inflation thus, in theory at least, reducing infla-
tion uncertainty.
The different hypotheses on the link between
inflation and inflation uncertainty have given
rise to a large empirical literature. Using US
data, Ball and Cecchetti (1990) investigate the
effects of inflation on inflation uncertainty at
different horizons and find that they are much
stronger at long horizons. This finding implies
increased inflation risks for individual agents
who commit to nominal contracts, as well as
large monetary policy swings and output fluc-
tuations. Evidence in support of the Friedman-
Ball hypothesis for US data is also presented in
Holland (1995) and Caporale and McKiernan
(1997). Grier and Perry (2000), using post-war
US data, fail to find any evidence that it is infla-
tion  uncertainty  which causes  inflation.
Indeed, their estimation results indicate that,
in line with Friedman’s argument, higher infla-
tion uncertainty does significantly lower output
growth. Moreover, Hwang (2001) considers US
data  for  the  sample  periods  1926-1992  and
1947-1992 and finds that, while it is inflation
that causes inflation uncertainty, the effect is
negative – in line with Pourgerami and Maskus
(1987) and Ungar and Zilberfarb (1993).
Grier and Perry (1998) undertake a similar
investigation for the G7 countries using data
for  the  period  1948-1993.  They  report  that
higher inflation significantly raises inflation
uncertainty in all countries. Mixed evidence is
obtained for the reverse causal relationship, as
increased  inflation  uncertainty  appears  to
lower inflation in the US, the UK and Ger-
many, in line with Holland’s concept of a “sta-
bilisation  motive”  for  the  monetary  policy
authority, and to raise it in Japan and France,
as  predicted  by  the  Cukierman-Meltzer
model of “opportunistic” central bank behav-
iour. The authors note that these differential
responses to inflation uncertainty are corre-
lated with Cukierman’s (1992) ratings of cen-
tral  bank  independence,  with  Japan  and
France ranking less independent than the rest.3
The  results  of  Hwang  (2001)  and  Apergis
(2004) for the G7 economies are in the same
direction – higher inflation causes inflation
uncertainty but the reverse is not necessarily
true.  More  recently,  in  the  tests  in  Henry,
Olekalns and Suardi (2007) on the G7, Fried-
man-Ball effects are reported for the US, the
UK and Canada.
Fountas, Ioannidis and Karanasos (2004) con-
sider 6 major EU countries and report Fried-
man-Ball effects in all of them. They also find
that  in  Germany  and  the  Netherlands
increased inflation uncertainty lowers inflation,
while in Italy, Spain and, to a lesser extent,
France increased inflation uncertainty raises
inflation.  Caporale  and  Kontonikas  (2006)
empirically investigate the presence of struc-
tural breaks in the relationship between infla-
tion and inflation uncertainty in 12 EMU coun-
tries and find that, with the introduction of the
euro, any relationship that existed appears to
have broken down in many countries.
For the UK in particular, Fountas (2001), using
a century of data, provides strong evidence in
favour of the hypothesis that inflationary peri-
ods are associated with high inflation uncer-
tainty. Likewise, Kontonikas (2004), whose sam-
ple period spans from 1972 to 2002, estimates
a positive relationship between past inflation
and uncertainty about future inflation in the
UK. Moreover, by controlling for the indirect
effects of lower average inflation ―which have
historically coincided with inflation targeting
periods― he concludes that the adoption of an
explicit inflation target eliminates inflation per-
sistence and reduces long-run uncertainty. 
Finally,  turning  to  recent  multi-country
research, the results of Thornton (2007) for 12




.3 3 Berument and Dincer (2005) support these findings in a G7 sam-
ple from 1957 to 2001, with the exception that in their work Japan
is the only country for which increased inflation uncertainty raises
inflation.support  for  the  Friedman-Ball  hypothesis.
Daal,  Naka  and  Sanchez  (2005)  consider  a
large  panel  comprising  22  developed  and
emerging economies and find that, for most
countries,  inflation  causes  inflation  uncer-
tainty, while evidence for causality in the oppo-
site direction is mixed. Their results also indi-
cate that positive inflationary shocks have a dif-
ferential impact on inflation uncertainty across
countries – it is mainly Latin American coun-
tries, with their history of many episodes of
high inflation, which have the strongest impact.
In summary, the majority of the available empir-
ical evidence appears to indicate that it is infla-
tion that causes inflation uncertainty for most
countries and that the effect is positive. This
provides support for the Friedman-Ball hypoth-
esis. In contrast, the evidence for an effect run-
ning  from  inflation  uncertainty  to  inflation
appears to be mixed, if not inconclusive.
2 DATA
Our data is the monthly consumer price index
(CPI) for Greece, spanning the period 1981-
2008, as provided by the National Statistical
Service of Greece. This series, which is not sea-
sonally adjusted, is used to calculate CPI infla-
tion in month-on-month annualised percentages.
As an alternative measure, we also calculate
and use a seasonally adjusted time series for
CPI  inflation,  by  applying  the  Census  X12
technique provided by the US Bureau of the
Census (http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpisapage.htm)
and used by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics
for the estimation of seasonally adjusted US
CPI-U. The resulting constructed data series
allows us to explore causality once seasonal
variation has been accounted for. Both time
series are plotted in Chart 1.
3 EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
In order to test the theories outlined in Sec-
tion 2 one requires an adequate measure of
inflation  uncertainty;  therein  lies  the  first
empirical issue to be addressed in this litera-
ture. Several alternative empirical approaches
to proxying uncertainty can be found in the lit-
erature. Early cross-country work in this area
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deviation  of  inflation  across  countries  as  a
measure  of  differences  in  inflation  uncer-
tainty.4 More  recent  work  relies  either  on
rolling statistical measures of variability or on
the dispersion of survey-based individual fore-
casts  as  proxies  for  inflation  uncertainty.5
However, neither can be said to adequately
capture uncertainty as understood in the pres-
ent context. Statistical measures of variability,
such  as  the  moving  average  of  a  variable’s
standard  deviation,  incorporate  both  pre-
dictable and unpredictable variability; how-
ever, only the variance of the stochastic, or
unpredictable,  component  of  a  variable
reflects true economic uncertainty. In the case
of inflation in particular, predictable inflation
variability  can  be  addressed  by  economic
agents,  e.g.  through  indexation;  unpre-
dictable inflation variability, which cannot, is
more in line with the notion of inflation uncer-
tainty. Survey-based measures suffer from the
same shortcoming. Moreover, while they do
summarise the range of disagreement among
individual forecasters at a given point in time,
they hold no information on the individual
forecasters’  level  of  uncertainty  regarding
their point respective forecasts, and hence may
potentially be misleading.6
Current  research  largely  relies  on  model-
derived measures of inflation uncertainty, pri-
marily on GARCH-type estimations.7 In con-
trast to the above measures, GARCH specifi-
cations provide a tool to formally model and
estimate  the  time-varying  variance  of  the
dependent  variable’s  unpredictable  innova-
tions, i.e. a measure that corresponds well to
the notion of uncertainty used in the theoret-
ical literature underlying our work and reflects
its time variation. Hence, this is our method-
ology of choice.
A  second  empirical  issue  to  be  addressed
relates to deciding upon a way of testing for
causality. Virtually all of the aforementioned
academic  literature  uses  Granger  causality
tests to detect the presence of a causal rela-
tionship between inflation and inflation uncer-
tainty. These tests, just as any other statistical
approach,  actually  explore  temporal  prece-
dence  rather  than  causation,  a  point  to  be
borne in mind when results are interpreted.
An exception to this norm are Berument and
Dincer (2005) who, in a multi-country setup,
test for causality between inflation and infla-
tion uncertainty by using the Full Information
Maximum Likelihood Method with extended
lags, in addition to Granger causality tests. In
principle, in multi-country VAR-type estima-
tions, impulse responses could also be used to
draw relevant conclusions. However, neither
approach is applicable in our single-country
setting, nor indeed do they indicate anything
more than temporal precedence themselves.
Hence we perform Granger causality tests on
our variables and try to reinforce our results
by using many different horizons and alterna-
tive proxies for uncertainty.
Three sequentially nested GARCH models of
inflation are used to obtain the corresponding
estimated time-varying conditional variances
which  are  subsequently  used  as  alternative
measures of inflation uncertainty. These are
presented in equations (1) to (5).
A standard general GARCH (1,1) model of




4 4 See, for example, Okun (1971) and Logue and Willett (1976).
5 5 For example, Cukierman and Wachtel (1979) analyse this rela-
tionship using the moving variances of the observed rates of change,
as well as the variance of inflation expectations as published in the
Livingston and Michigan Survey Research Center surveys. Other
research using statistical measures of inflation variability include
that by Pagan, Hall and Trivedi (1983) and Silver (1988). Davis and
Kanago (1998) use ex-ante inflation forecasts produced and pub-
lished by Business International while Davis and Kanago (2000) use
ex-ante forecasts made by the OECD and published in Economic
Outlook. It is noted that the findings reported by research employ-
ing survey data to capture inflation uncertainty are less unanimous.
6 6 We note that, in any case, such measures are not available for
Greece over a sufficiently long sample period.
7 7 There have been a number of single country studies utilising the
ARCH class of models to proxy inflation uncertainty, seminal
among which are those by Engle (1983), Bollerslev (1986), Evans
(1991), and Brunner and Hess (1993). Others include Caporale
and McKiernan (1997), Balcombe (1999), Caporale and Capo-
rale (2002) and Hwang (2001) for the USA, Fountas (2001) and
Kontonikas (2004) for the UK, and Bohara and Sauer (1994) for
Germany. Multi-country studies include Grier and Perry (1998),
Apergis  (2004),  Berument  and  Dincer  (2005)  and  Henry,
Olekalns and Suardi (2007) for the G7 countries, Fountas, Ioan-
nidis and Karanasos (2004) for six European Union countries,
Daal, Naka and Sanchez (2005) for twenty-two developed and
less  developed  economies,  and  Thornton  (2007)  for  twelve
emerging markets.it = α + ∑
12
ʺ=1
bkit-k + et (1)
˃2
t = α + βe2
t-1 + ʳ˃2
t-1 (2)
The conditional mean of inflation is specified
in equation (1) as an autoregressive process of
order 12, so as to reflect the monthly nature of
our data. it denotes inflation at time t and et is
the error term which is assumed to follow a
conditional normal distribution. The GARCH
(1,1) representation of the conditional variance
is presented in equation (2) where ˃2
t denotes
the conditional variance of inflation at time t.
The model assumes the conditional variance of
inflation follows an ARMA (1,1) process, i.e.
that the conditional variance at time t depends
on past innovations and variances. The impli-
cation is that, in predicting the variance of this
period’s  inflation,  economic  agents  form  a
weighted  average  of  the  long-term  average
variance α, the variance observed in the pre-
vious period ˃ 2
t-1, and the size of last period’s
forecast  error  as  captured  by e2
t-1. If  last
period’s forecast error and/or variance were
unexpectedly  large,  economic  agents  will
increase their estimates of the variance for the
next period.
Equation (3) presents the alternative specifi-
cation of the conditional variance implied by
a  Threshold-GARCH  model  (see  Zakoian,
1994, and Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle,
1993).
˃2




where rt = 1 if et < 0, and rt = 0 otherwise. In
this specification, past innovations are allowed
to have a different impact on the conditional
variance depending on their sign, i.e. positive
news may have a smaller impact on the vari-
ance of inflation than negative news. In equa-
tion (3) positive news has an impact of β, while
negative news has an impact of β + βn.
Equations (4) and (5) present the conditional
variance  specification  of  a  Component
Threshold-GARCH (1,1) model. This formu-
lation extends the previous ones by addition-
ally allowing the conditional variance to mean
revert to a time-varying level.
˃2
t – mt = β(e2
t-1 – mt-1) + βnrt-1(e2
t-1 – mt-1)
+ ʳ(˃2
t-1 – mt-1) (4)
mt = α + ˁ(mt-1 – ˉ) ˆ(e2
t-1 – ˃2
t-1) (5)
where mt is  the  now  time-varying  long-run
volatility. The first equation describes the tran-
sitory component ˃2
t – mt which converges to
zero, while the second equation describes the
long-run component mt which converges to ∞,
at rates defined by the coefficients of their
respective equations. The variables in the tran-
sitory  equation  will  have  an  impact  on  the
short-run movements in volatility, while the
variables in the permanent equation will affect
the long-run levels of volatility.
Having estimated these three alternative uni-
variate GARCH specifications for the error
term, we examine their relative goodness of fit
to each data series and proceed to use the esti-
mated conditional volatilities as proxies for
inflation uncertainty. We perform pairwise bi-
directional  Granger  causality  tests  between
each of the three estimated conditional vari-
ance  series  and  CPI  inflation,  seasonally-
adjusted  and  unadjusted  for  different  lag
lengths (i.e. different causality horizons) up to
12 months and examine the sign of the sum of
the auxiliary  (Granger  causality)  equations’
relevant coefficients, in order to establish the
direction of the effect where Granger causal-
ity is found. Subsequently, we separate our
sample at two different dates of possible struc-
tural breaks and repeat the process in order to
consider whether there has been a shift in the
relationships detected using the full sample.
4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
4.1 ANALYSIS OF THE FULL SAMPLE PERIOD
A diagnostic Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test on
our  data  indicates  the  presence  of  strong
ARCH effects, that is, that volatility is time-
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tend  to  cluster  together.  Indeed,  all  three
GARCH specifications appear to provide a
good  fit  to  the  data,  as  indicated  by  the
adjusted  R-squared  measures  reported  in
Table 1. The T-GARCH model appears to pro-
vide a superior fit to the unadjusted data on the
basis of the Schwartz and Akaike information
criteria; i.e. threshold effects appear to be sig-
nificant in the variance of the inflation process,
while allowing for a time-varying mean vari-
ance by using the C-GARCH specification not
so  much  so.  Conversely,  using  seasonally
adjusted  data,  it  is  the  C-GARCH  which
appears to provide a marginally superior fit –
i.e. threshold effects in combination with a
time-varying mean variance appear to provide
the closest fit to the data. One may speculate
that the seasonal component of inflation ren-




S Se ea as so on na al ll ly y   u un na ad dj ju us st te ed d   C CP PI I   i in nf fl la at ti io on n
GARCH 6.64 6.83 0.78
T-GARCH 6.58 6.78 0.78
C-GARCH 6.60 6.82 0.78
S Se ea as so on na al ll ly y   a ad dj ju us st te ed d   C CP PI I   i in nf fl la at ti io on n
GARCH 5.87 6.06 0.55
T-GARCH 5.87 6.07 0.55
C-GARCH 5.80 6.02 0.56
Akaike Schwarz Adj. R2
Table 1 Information criteria
Note: Smaller values of the Akaike and Schwarz criteria are preferred.of conditional inflation variance harder to dis-
entangle.
The conditional variances derived from the
various  GARCH  specifications  are  plotted
against time in Chart 2. The volatility indicated
by  the  conditional  variances  is  in  line  with
developments in the Greek economy over the
sample period. In the early part of the sample,
volatility was high, with peaks after the 1983
and 1985 drachma devaluations, as would be
expected. Volatility also rose in the early 1990s,
linked to oil price rises and large fiscal deficits
which caused inflation to rise. Inflation was
then propagated by the wage indexation mech-
anism. From around 1994 onwards, volatility
fell gradually and has, largely, remained low
thereafter. This coincides with important pol-
icy choices made by Greek governments. The
Maastricht  treaty  entered  into  force  on  1
November 1993. It set out the path to mone-
tary union in Europe and the Greek govern-
ment publicly stated its aim to become a mem-
ber. 1994 was to be a crucial year towards that
goal. Controls on capital movements were fully
liberalised and monetary financing of the gov-
ernment’s budget deficit was prohibited. The
first  convergence  programme  of  the  Greek
government  was  adopted  by  ECOFIN  and
focused on fiscal consolidation to meet the
Maastricht  Treaty  criteria.  From  1995,  the
hard  drachma  policy  was  adopted  to  foster
nominal convergence.8 Thus, it is not surpris-
ing that the behaviour of inflation volatility
changes rather strikingly from the mid-1990s
onwards. We return to this below.
Table 2 presents all Granger causality tests
performed  on  the  full  sample  data.  Test




8 8 See Garganas and Tavlas (2001) for a discussion of this period.
S Se ea as so on na al ll ly y   u un na ad dj ju us st te ed d   C CP PI I   i in nf fl la at ti io on n   - -   f fu ul ll l   s sa am mp pl le e
Null Hypothesis: Probability (p-values)
Inflation does not Granger cause GARCH cond. variance 0.003 + 0.003 + 0.002 + 0.000 + 0.002 + 0.000 +
GARCH cond. variance does not Granger cause inflation 0.000 + 0.000 + 0.000 + 0 0. .0 08 87 7 + + 0 0. .0 08 88 8 + + 0.000 −
Inflation does not Granger cause T-GARCH cond. variance 0.000 + 0.000 + 0.000 + 0.000 + 0.000 + 0.000 +
T-GARCH cond. variance does not Granger cause inflation 0.000 + 0.000 + 0.000 + 0.000 + 0.000 + 0.000 −
Inflation does not Granger cause C-GARCH cond. variance 0.003 + 0.004 + 0.001 + 0.000 + 0.001 + 0.000 +
C-GARCH cond. variance does not Granger cause inflation 0.000 + 0.000 + 0.000 + 0.039 + 0 0. .0 05 50 0 + + 0 0. .0 05 51 1 −
S Se ea as so on na al ll ly y   a ad dj ju us st te ed d   C CP PI I   i in nf fl la at ti io on n   - -   f fu ul ll l   s sa am mp pl le e
Null Hypothesis: Probability (p-values)
Inflation does not Granger cause GARCH cond. variance 0.000 + 0.000 + 0.000 + 0.000 + 0.000 + 0.000 +
GARCH cond. variance does not Granger cause inflation 0.155 − 0.175 − 0.379 − 0.705 − 0.626 − 0 0. .0 06 60 0 −
Inflation does not Granger cause T-GARCH cond. variance 0.000 + 0.000 + 0.000 + 0.000 + 0.000 + 0.000 +
T-GARCH cond. variance does not Granger cause inflation 0.129 − 0.162 − 0.365 − 0.704 − 0.615 − 0 0. .0 06 62 2 −
Inflation does not Granger cause C-GARCH cond. variance 0.000 + 0.000 + 0.000 + 0.000 + 0.000 + 0.000 +
C-GARCH cond. variance does not Granger cause inflation 0 0. .3 31 12 2 + 0 0. .3 31 14 4 + 0 0. .5 50 09 9 + 0 0. .8 80 03 3 − 0 0. .8 84 45 5 − 0.035 −
Causality horizon (in months): 2 3 4 6 8 12
Table 2 Granger causality tests - full sample
Note: Figures in normal fonts denote that the null can be rejected at the 1% significance level.
Figures in italics denote that the null can be rejected at the 5% significance level.
Figures in bold italics denote that the null can be rejected at the 10% significance level.
Figures in bold underlined italics denote that the null cannot be rejected at the 10% significance level.
Plus and minus symbols indicate the sign of the sum of the relevant estimated coefficients in the corresponding auxiliary equation.sented in the top panel while those for the
seasonally adjusted series are in the bottom
one. For each set of data (seasonally unad-
justed and seasonally adjusted), there are 3
sets of results depending on the particular
GARCH specification used. Finally, for each
specification two hypotheses are tested. First,
we test the hypothesis that inflation does not
Granger-cause inflation uncertainty. Rejec-
tion of this hypothesis at conventional levels
of significance provides support for the view
that causality runs from inflation to inflation
uncertainty. Second, we test the hypothesis
that inflation uncertainty does not cause infla-
tion and rejection in this case provides sup-
port  for  the  view  that  causality  runs  from
inflation uncertainty to inflation. Using all
three conditional variance estimates on sea-
sonally unadjusted data, one can reject the null
hypothesis of no Granger causality for almost
all  causality  horizons  up  to  1  year,  in  both
directions.  Thus,  inflation  Granger-causes
inflation uncertainty and vice versa, at con-
ventional significance levels. Since the sign of
the causal relationship is positive in both cases,
these  full-sample  results  on  the  seasonally
unadjusted data provide support for both the
Friedman-Ball hypothesis and for the presence
of a secondary feedback effect resulting from
Holland’s (1995) “stabilisation motive”.
In the context of this application, however,
using non-seasonally adjusted data may have a
marked impact on our results. Indeed, inflation
is  known  to  exhibit  strong  seasonality.  The
component  of  inflation  variability  which
reflects  seasonal  patterns  in  consumption
behaviour is of no interest to us here, but may
nonetheless  strongly  affect  our  measure  of
inflation uncertainty, as it is likely to filter
through to our estimates of the conditional
variance of inflation. This concern is the the-
oretical motivation for repeating this exercise
on seasonally adjusted data of our own con-
struction.
The findings presented in the second panel of
Table 2 are strikingly different to those above.
While,  using  any  of  the  three  alternative
GARCH-specifications,  one  can  yet  again
reject the null hypothesis that inflation does
not Granger-cause its own estimated condi-
tional variance for all causality horizons up to
1 year, the reverse is no longer true, i.e. we can-
not reject the null hypothesis that the esti-
mated conditional variance of inflation does
not  Granger-cause  inflation  for  almost  all
causality horizons. In other words, based on
the seasonally adjusted data Granger causality
seems to run from inflation to inflation uncer-
tainty and not vice versa. Correcting for sea-
sonality appears to have completely eliminated
the causal effect from inflation uncertainty to
inflation which had previously been detected.
The sign of the cumulative effect in the causal
relationship remains positive and the Fried-
man-Ball effect appears even stronger.
4.2 ANALYSIS OF SAMPLE SUB-PERIODS DEFINED
ON THE BASIS OF POSSIBLE STRUCTURAL
BREAKS
Given the substantial changes the Greek econ-
omy has undergone in the nearly three decades
covered by our sample, it seems reasonable to
consider the possibility of structural breaks in
our data. We consider two different structural
breaks: the end of 1993, when the Maastricht
Treaty entered into force, and January 2001,
when Greece joined the euro area. As we noted
above  when  describing  Chart  2,  a  structural
break around 1994 is not surprising. Similarly,
the joining of the euro area in 2001 radically
altered the framework of monetary policy for-
mulation and, more generally, economic policy
making. Chow tests indeed support the exis-
tence of structural breaks at both these times.
The  Granger  causality  tests  on  seasonally
adjusted data for the sub-periods suggested by
these structural breaks are presented in Tables
3 and 4, respectively.9 The top panels now pres-
ent Granger causality tests for the first sub-
sample, while those for the second subsample




9 9 The corresponding tests on seasonally unadjusted data are avail-
able upon request.Both sample splits appear to significantly affect
our results. In both cases our earlier findings
for seasonally adjusted data are confirmed for
the first subsample, i.e. inflation appears to
Granger-cause inflation uncertainty but not
vice versa. Moreover, the sign of the cumula-
tive effect in the detected causal relationships
is almost exclusively positive, in line with the
Friedman-Ball  hypothesis.  However,  in  the
bottom panels representing either the period
1994-2008 (Table 3) or 2001-2008 (Table 4),
the presence of Granger causality now appears
to be rejected in both directions and at most
horizons.
When cast against developments in the Greek
economy over the sample period, these find-
ings appear to be intuitive. We seem to find
support for the Friedman-Ball hypothesis dur-
ing the first sample sub-period (whether that
be 1981-1993 or 1981-2000) which corresponds
to a period of high and volatile inflation rates
coupled  with  substantial  real  and  nominal
uncertainty. This appears to be evidence of the
Cukierman-Meltzer hypothesis regarding cen-
tral  bank  behaviour,  that  is,  of  a  monetary
authority which is tempted to use inflation in
order to stimulate growth. 
The  second  subsamples  correspond  to
Greece’s  efforts  to  curb  inflation,  reduce
interest rates and meet the Maastricht crite-
ria with a view to becoming accepted as a
member of the EMU (1994-2008) and/or to
the EMU era itself (2001-2008). Our findings,
which appear to be particularly clear for esti-
mates on the periods before  and after the
end-1993 break, imply, in line with economic
intuition, that the preparation for and cre-




S Se ea as so on na al ll ly y   a ad dj ju us st te ed d   C CP PI I   i in nf fl la at ti io on n   - -   S Sa am mp pl le e: :   1 19 98 81 1M M0 01 1   2 20 00 00 0M M1 12 2
Null Hypothesis: Probability (p-values)
Inflation does not Granger cause GARCH cond. variance 0.000 + 0.000 + 0.000 + 0.000 + 0.000 + 0.000 +
GARCH cond. variance does not Granger cause inflation 0.262 − 0.326 − 0.529 + 0.791 − 0.689 − 0.129 −
Inflation does not Granger cause T-GARCH cond. variance 0.000 + 0.000 + 0.000 + 0.000 + 0.000 + 0.000 +
T-GARCH cond. variance does not Granger cause inflation 0.234 − 0.313 − 0.514 + 0.789 − 0.674 − 0.130 −
Inflation does not Granger cause C-GARCH cond. variance 0.000 + 0.000 + 0.000 + 0.000 + 0.000 + 0.000 +
C-GARCH cond. variance does not Granger cause inflation 0.452 + 0.495 + 0.689 + 0.891 − 0.901 − 0.114 −
S Se ea as so on na al ll ly y   a ad dj ju us st te ed d   C CP PI I   i in nf fl la at ti io on n   - -   S Sa am mp pl le e: :   2 20 00 01 1M M0 01 1   2 20 00 08 8M M1 12 2
Null Hypothesis: Probability (p-values)
Inflation does not Granger cause GARCH cond. variance 0.100 + 0.010 + 0.011 + 0.046 + 0 0. .0 05 52 2 + 0.131 +
GARCH cond. variance does not Granger cause inflation 0.258 − 0.323 − 0.496 − 0.683 − 0.828 − 0.519 +
Inflation does not Granger cause T-GARCH cond. variance 0.157 + 0.016 + 0.020 + 0 0. .0 07 75 5 + 0 0. .0 08 83 3 + 0.182 +
T-GARCH cond. variance does not Granger cause inflation 0.265 − 0.324 − 0.498 − 0.683 − 0.828 − 0.507 +
Inflation does not Granger cause C-GARCH cond. variance 0.001 − 0.000 + 0.000 + 0.002 + 0.003 + 0.005 +
C-GARCH cond. variance does not Granger cause inflation 0 0. .1 19 96 6 − 0 0. .2 24 45 5 − 0 0. .3 39 94 4 − 0 0. .5 54 48 8 − 0 0. .6 68 84 4 − 0 0. .3 35 54 4 +
Causality horizon (in months): 2 3 4 6 8 12
Table 3 Granger causality tests - structural break in 2001
Note: Figures in normal fonts denote that the null can be rejected at the 1% significance level.
Figures in italics denote that the null can be rejected at the 5% significance level.
Figures in bold italics denote that the null can be rejected at the 10% significance level.
Figures in bold underlined italics denote that the null cannot be rejected at the 10% significance level.
Plus and minus symbols indicate the sign of the sum of the relevant estimated coefficients in the corresponding auxiliary equation.the ECB as a monetary policy authority, have
created a strong anchor for inflation expec-
tations which appears to have diluted if not
disrupted  the  causal  relationship  between
inflation and inflation uncertainty that had
existed in the case of Greece. It must be noted
that there is no evidence of a “stabilisation
motive” as such on behalf of the monetary
authorities,  i.e.  we  detect  no  Granger
causality from inflation uncertainty to infla-
tion. This of course is not surprising, since
monetary  policy  is  set  not  on  the  basis  of
Greek inflation but inflation in the euro area
as a whole. Neither is there evidence of infla-
tion  Granger-causing  inflation  uncertainty,
something which might result from the rela-
tively low level of inflation during this period.
These findings are in line with those of Grier
and Perry (1998) and Fountas, Ioannidis and
Karanasos  (2004),  who  report  a  relation
between  the  presence  and  direction  of
Granger causality with the degree of central
bank independence, as well as with those of
Kontonikas (2004), who finds that, when the
effects  of  lower  average  inflation  are  con-
trolled for, the adoption of an explicit inflation
target  eliminates  inflation  persistence  and
reduces long-run inflation uncertainty.
5 CONCLUSION
This  paper  has  examined  the  relationship
between inflation and inflation uncertainty for
Greece for the period 1981-2008. The ration-
ale for conducting such an exercise stems from
the theoretical observation that a significant





S Se ea as so on na al ll ly y   a ad dj ju us st te ed d   C CP PI I   i in nf fl la at ti io on n   - -   S Sa am mp pl le e: :   1 19 98 81 1M M0 01 1   1 19 99 93 3M M1 12 2
Null Hypothesis: Probability (p-values)
Inflation does not Granger cause GARCH cond. variance 0.000 + 0.000 + 0.000 + 0.000 + 0.000 + 0.001 +
GARCH cond. variance does not Granger cause inflation 0.765 − 0.760 + 0.785 + 0.958 + 0.952 − 0.615 −
Inflation does not Granger cause T-GARCH cond. variance 0.000 + 0.000 + 0.000 + 0.000 + 0.000 + 0.001 +
T-GARCH cond. variance does not Granger cause inflation 0.756 − 0.759 + 0.775 + 0.958 + 0.952 − 0.619 −
Inflation does not Granger cause C-GARCH cond. variance 0.012 + 0.024 + 0.017 + 0.031 + 0.047 + 0.175 +
C-GARCH cond. variance does not Granger cause inflation 0.879 − 0.893 + 0.952 + 0.992 − 0.980 − 0.514 −
S Se ea as so on na al ll ly y   a ad dj ju us st te ed d   C CP PI I   i in nf fl la at ti io on n   - -   S Sa am mp pl le e: :   1 19 99 94 4M M0 01 1   2 20 00 08 8M M1 12 2
Null Hypothesis: Probability (p-values)
Inflation does not Granger cause GARCH cond. variance 0.463 + 0.323 + 0.474 + 0.610 + 0.112 + 0.372 +
GARCH cond. variance does not Granger cause inflation 0.350 − 0.131 − 0.125 − 0.236 − 0.482 − 0.124 −
Inflation does not Granger cause T-GARCH cond. variance 0.289 + 0.262 + 0.392 + 0.538 + 0 0. .0 09 91 1 + 0.354 +
T-GARCH cond. variance does not Granger cause inflation 0.299 − 0.109 − 0.112 − 0.232 − 0.463 − 0.127 −
Inflation does not Granger cause C-GARCH cond. variance 0 0. .0 09 99 9 + 0.028 + 0.037 + 0 0. .0 08 84 4 + 0.047 + 0 0. .2 24 42 2 +
C-GARCH cond. variance does not Granger cause inflation 0 0. .8 87 76 6 − 0 0. .1 10 08 8 − 0 0. .0 09 90 0 + 0 0. .1 19 99 9 − 0 0. .4 49 90 0 − 0.044 −
Causality horizon (in months): 2 3 4 6 8 12
Table 4 Granger causality tests - structural break in 1994
Note: Figures in normal fonts denote that the null can be rejected at the 1% significance level.
Figures in italics denote that the null can be rejected at the 5% significance level.
Figures in bold italics denote that the null can be rejected at the 10% significance level.
Figures in bold underlined italics denote that the null cannot be rejected at the 10% significance level.
Plus and minus symbols indicate the sign of the sum of the relevant estimated coefficients in the corresponding auxiliary equation.The results suggest that the direction of causal-
ity in the Greek case does indeed run from infla-
tion to inflation uncertainty, and not vice versa.
Moreover, the sign of this causal effect is pos-
itive, i.e. higher inflation causes higher uncer-
tainty. This is supportive of the Friedman-Ball
hypothesis. Interestingly, these results break
down in the post-1993 and post-2000 periods. In
neither period (either 1994-2008 or 2001-2008)
is there much evidence of causality in any direc-
tion. This is arguably a consequence of the infla-
tion-targeting monetary policy adopted during
these sub-periods, which resulted in far lower
levels of inflation as compared to the earlier
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A central query in financial economics is the
extraction of information on investors’ per-
ception of the uncertainty of future market
conditions; given its direct implications for
capital allocation and risk aversion, this gen-
eral topic has become critical recently. In this
context, the empirical finance literature has
focused on measures stemming from financial
markets, in order to exploit potential infor-
mation contained in them in order to be used
as ‘forward-looking’ variables for market con-
ditions.
A growing strand of the empirical finance lit-
erature focuses on the correlation between
bond and stock returns (hereafter ‘stock-bond
correlation’, for brevity)1 as a tool for detect-
ing asset price imbalances, thus motivating its
use for financial stability purposes. The ration-
ale behind the use of the correlations among
stock and bond returns as a proxy for market
conditions and the underlying risk can be
found in the perception of the existence of
common pricing factors and different risk char-
acteristics.
Against this backdrop, if the notion of factors
affecting the pricing of both stocks and bonds,
establishes, theoretically, the relation between
the information contained in the stock-bond
correlations, their time-varying characteristics
allow for empirical examination. In this
respect, the stock-bond correlation has been
found to take negative values, under stressed
market conditions. Among the reasons for this
phenomenon,‘flight-to-quality’ effects are the
most prominent answer and are related to the
market’s perception of bonds as safer than
equities (see d’Addona and Kind, 2006, and
Ehrmann et al., 2005, among others). Flight-to-
quality effects refer to increases in holdings of
safer assets and sales of assets which are per-
ceived as more uncertain; within this context,
negative correlations between returns in stock
and bond markets are explained in the empir-
ical literature as reflecting interrelated oppo-
site transactions in the two markets (see e.g.
Hakkio and Keeton, 2009, and Baur and
Lucey, 2009).
Furthermore, the stock-bond correlation has
been found to be negatively related to high
volatility regimes in equity markets (Connolly
et al., 2007). Thus, the ‘decoupling’ phenom-
enon between stocks and bonds appears to be
related to conditions of high uncertainty. A
reasonable explanation is given by Baur and
Lucey (2009); investors’ tendency to “chase the
yield(s)” or find shelters in turbulent periods
is revealed in the time variation and reversals
in the stock-bond correlation.
On the other hand, numerous papers have
dealt with interactions among markets and
financial segments (e.g. Baele et al., 2004,
Davies, 2006, and Yang et al., 2004). Further-
more, in the event that the examination focuses
on the transmission of the negative effects
from one market to another, during turbulent
periods, this phenomenon is referred to as
‘contagion’. From this perspective, there is
broad consensus in the empirical finance lit-
erature that contagion refers to unforeseeable
negative returns in a market, which are caused
by shocks initiated in another market and
transmitted through portfolio rebalancing and
risk aversion effects (see Beirne et al., 2009).2
As a result, previous studies relate stock-bond
correlation to market uncertainty, while con-
tagion effects arise in turbulent periods as well.
However, little emphasis has been given to
explaining the dynamics of the stock-bond cor-
relation for Greece. Although investigations of




1 1 For definitions and terminology we refer to Connolly et al. (2005),
Yang et al. (2009) and Baur and Lucey (2009), among others.
2 2 Contagion presumes a high degree of integration in order for diver-
sification effects to be inactive.“flight-to-quality”  effects  have  occasionally
included Greece in their samples (see Beber et
al., 2006), there has not been a specific inves-
tigation  of  the  determinants  of  the  Greek
stock-bond  correlation.  In  this  context,  we
assess the extent to which the information con-
tained  in  the  stock-bond  correlation  is
explained by several risk proxies related to (i)
stock market uncertainty, (ii) credit risk and
(iii) liquidity conditions in the banking sector.
Additionally, we examine whether the Greek
stock-bond correlation is subject to spillover
effects from the dynamics of the relevant cor-
relations of the United States, Germany and
Italy.3
The present empirical analysis unfolds in the
following way. Section 2 continues the discus-
sion of the literature, focusing on properties of
the stock-bond correlation and financial inter-
actions.  Section  3  describes  the  empirical
investigation framework and Section 4 presents
the  empirical  findings  and  discusses  policy
implications. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 PROPERTIES OF THE STOCK-BOND 
CORRELATION
Early on, several works dealt with the common
deterministic process underlying the pricing of
stocks and bonds. Fama and French (1993)
investigated the sources of the common pric-
ing patterns between stocks and bonds; they
have found that several risk factors generate
variations in the returns on both equities and
bonds.  Their  assessment  motivates  further
exploration of the relation between risk and
the correlation of stock and bond returns. 
Campbell and Ammer (1993) show that several
common  factors,  including  expected  excess
stock returns, the real interest rate and infla-
tion, exercise causal effects on both equities
and bonds. Interestingly, they find that shocks
to expected stock returns produce variations in
stock and bond returns of the same direction,
while increasing expected inflation results in
opposite effects on bond and stock returns.
Their results highlight the fact that stocks are
a good inflation hedge, whereas bond yields4
are known to carry the inflation risk premium.
As  a  result,  expected  inflation  stands  as  a
potential source of ‘decoupling’ effects, that is,
periods  in  which  stock  returns  decreases
(increases)  and  bond  returns  increases
(decreases) may be related to higher (lower)
expected inflation.
Laloux et al. (2000) investigate the statistical
properties  of  correlation  coefficients  stem-
ming from financial time series. The authors
investigate the S&P500; their findings indicate
that choosing an asset allocation that min-
imises the risk of the portfolio is similar to
choosing a portfolio with large weights on the
smallest eigenvalues of the correlation matrix
eigenvector. In plain terms, this finding leads
to  a  need  to  examine  the  extent  to  which
deterministic factors in the form of financial
variables  can  explain  the  correlations;  the
more  variability  of  the  correlation  can  be
explained by economically meaningful vari-
ables, the less risky is the underlying portfo-
lio. This finding motivates the examination of
the stationarity properties of the stock-bond
correlation; according to the aforementioned
argument, in the event that there exist signif-
icant diversification effects between stocks and
bonds, as expected, their correlation should be
stationary.
Overall, the stock-bond correlation measure
has been found to have small but positive val-
ues whereas it is positively related to short-
term rates and inflation (Yang et al., 2009).
Additionally, Cappiello et al. (2003) argued
for  the  time-varying  characteristics  of  the




3 3 The United States and Germany were chosen for obvious reasons
related to market size and their respective international and Euro-
pean benchmark status. Italy is also included for two main reasons;
it is the ‘high-yielders’ benchmark, according to Lane (2006), while
it could be conceived as a regional leader, in the globalisation con-
cept of Krugman (1991).
4 4 It is clear that variable yield bonds are excluded from this refer-
ence.variation has been attributed to stock market
uncertainty by Connoly et al. (2005); ‘flight-
to-quality’ effects are found to be reflected in
the stock-bond correlation, according to Baur
and Lucey (2009). Specifically, it is argued
that,  in  periods  of  turbulence  in  financial
markets,  investors  have  strong  motives  to
change their portfolio distribution towards
lowering the weight of risky assets in the port-
folio; as a result, bonds’ and equities’ returns
would  diverge.  This  would  produce  a
‘decoupling effect’ that would be reflected in
negative stock-bond correlations. Adopting
this point of view on the information con-
tained  in  stock-bond  correlations,  Hakkio
and Keeton (2009) have included the meas-
ure under examination as a component to the
financial stress index they have compiled for
the Fed.
Connoly et al. (2005) also relate decoupling
effects between stocks and bonds, as reflected
in the stock-bond correlation, with increases in
the volatility of stock markets. Their analysis
argues that the probability for a negative stock-
bond correlation increases in a high-volatility
regime.
Summarising  the  aforementioned  findings
leads  to  several  useful  remarks.  First,  the
stock-bond correlation is found to be related
to the degree of uncertainty present in finan-
cial markets at any time; the usually positive
correlation declines, or even turns negative
under  financial  markets’  turbulence.  These
effects are in line with the explanation given by
the literature investigating the co-variates of
stock and bond returns; shocks produced by
expected stock returns move these assets in the
same  direction,  whereas  real  interest  rates,
expected inflation and market volatility con-
tribute to ‘decoupling’ effects.
2.2 ESTIMATING MARKETS INTERACTIONS
The notion of interactions between two mar-
kets refers to whether movements in one mar-
ket are, at least partially, caused by movements
in another. Ultimately, under the Law of One
Price,  assets  with  the  same  characteristics
should be priced equally even across different
markets. This aspect, while proving to be par-
ticularly useful for investigating financial inte-
gration effects, also gives a proxy for estimat-
ing whether the dynamics in the stock-bond
correlation of one country are influenced by
similar dynamics in other countries.
The methodological frameworks employed
for the examination of interactions between
markets or segments are set to capture either
causal patterns or spillover effects. In the
first case, VARs and VECMs are used for
this purpose and Granger causality tests are
applied in order to examine the significance
and direction of the effects exercised in the
pricing processes.5 Second, several GARCH
(Generalised  Autoregressive  Conditional
Heteroskedasticity) models have been used
in order to detect variance spillover effects.
In  this  context,  correlations,  estimated
through  DCC-GARCH,  (Dynamic  Condi-
tional  Correlation-GARCH)  have  been
used in order to assess spillover and conta-
gion effects in financial markets (e.g. Chiang
et al., 2007).
3 THE EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK
3.1 DESCRIPTION OF DATA
Our analysis is based on data from three Euro-
pean  markets  with  different  characteristics
(Germany, Italy and Greece) and the United
States, for the period after EMU, i.e. January
1999 to December 2009. Both stock and bond
returns are included at weekly frequency; we
deemed that data of daily frequency would
contain noise, valuable for arbitrageurs but not
for our purposes, while data with a frequency
lower than weekly could result in the loss of
information contained in infrequent events. All





5 5 Interested readers can refer to Yang et al. (2004), Sarno and
Valente (2006), Vo (2009), among others. Stock market returns are estimated as weekly
differences  of  logged,  euro-denominated
MSCI indices for the aforementioned markets
and period.6 Similarly, weekly bond returns are
estimated by taking differences in yields-to-





Variables  used  for  the  explanation  of  risks
reflected in the stock-bond correlation are (i)
the spread between interbank rates of weekly
maturity, denominated in euro (Euribor) and
US dollars ($Libor), (ii) the spread between
the AAA corporate bond yield7 and the 10-year
benchmark Bunds, and (iii) a volatility proxy
for the Greek stock market, estimated as the
intraday  range  of  the  general  index  of  the
Athens Exchange (Athex). 
The difference between the weekly Euribor
and $Libor rates ((E-L)t), is intended to cap-
ture changes in the relative banking sector liq-
uidity  positions  between  Europe  and  the
United States.8 As a result, liquidity constraints
in  the  European  banking  sector  would  be
reflected in variations in the relative spread. In
this  context,  as  EMU  money  markets  are
reported to be fully integrated (see Centeno
and Mello, 1999) we believe that this variable
is a reliable proxy for the Greek banking sec-
tor as well.
The  credit  spread  (CSt)  is  intended  to
approximate credit risk conditions. However,
due to a lack of activity in the Greek sec-
ondary market for corporate bonds, relevant
reliable quotations could not be found. As a
result, we rely on overall European corporate
bond rates. Even though they are not set to
capture idiosyncratic credit risk conditions
for the Greek market, they can be used as
proxies for credit conditions in the European
bond market.
Finally, the intraday price range for the Greek
stock  market  is  intended  to  capture  Greek
stock market volatility. The intraday range is
estimated as the difference between the high-
est intraday value of the general stock market
index (SH) and its lowest (intraday) value (SL).
After all that has been reported in relevant
empirical finance literature, this aggregate is
considered suitable for capturing market par-
ticipants’ uncertainty about the “fair-price”.9
Briefly, it should be noted that the argument
for using the range as an indicator of investors’
uncertainty is that in case the highest and the
lowest bids are very divergent, this may reflect
large differences in market’s participants’ per-
spectives about fair prices for stocks. Even in
the event that it is an effect of thin trading
activity, it still captures a significant compo-
nent of market risk, i.e. liquidity risk.
Finally, we use stock-bond correlations from
other markets (namely, the US, Germany and
Italy) as proxies for interactions across coun-
tries. In the event that these variables exercise
significant effects on the Greek stock-bond
correlation, there will exist cross-country con-
tagion effects, especially when the significant
effects are evident in periods of ‘decoupling’
effects. 
3.2 METHODOLOGY 
In  order  to  estimate  the  correlation  coeffi-
cients between stock and bond returns, we use
the dynamic conditional correlation framework
established by Engle (2002). Consider the cor-
relation between stock and bond returns in
time t, conditional on information available up






6 6 For the estimation of stock returns under this formulation, see Cap-
piello et al. (2003). 
7 7 Extracted from the iBoxx AAA index compiled of highly liquid cor-
porate bonds, with a term to maturity 10+ years, denominated in
euro.
8 8 Alexopoulou et al. (2009) provide a more formal discussion on the
information expected to be reflected by the spread between short-
term rates.
9 9 For empirical applications using the “intraday range” as a meas-
ure for stock market volatility, we refer to Christensen and Podol-
skij (2006) and Joshy (2008). It should be reminded that so far there
is no implied volatility index for the Greek stock exchange, as the
one traded in the Chicago Board of Exchange (ticker: VIX) or the
German equities’ implied volatility index (VDAX).(1)
where, i stands for the countries included in the
present analysis, Et-1(rt
s ,rt
b) denotes the con-
ventional covariance of stock and bond returns,
and  Et-1[(rt
s)2],  Et-1[(rt
b)2],  are  the  respective
variances, conditioned on information avail-
able until time t-1. 
Afterwards,  Bollerslev  (1990)  proposes  the
estimation of the conditional constant corre-
lation (CCC) model specified in matrix form,
as Ht=DtRDt, in which R stands for the sam-
ple correlation matrix and D is the kxk diago-
nal matrix of time-varying standard deviations
from GARCH(1,1) models with  on the
jth diagonal; that is the square root of the esti-
mated variance.
Then, following Engle, one can relax the con-
stancy assumption of the correlation matrix,










i , we then examine its sta-
tistical properties. Emphasis is given to unit
root tests, in order to specify the proper econo-
metric  treatment  of  the  correlation  as  a
dependent variable. We test the null hypoth-
esis of a unit root in the data both against the
alternative of stationarity, by using conven-
tional  Dickey-Fuller  tests,  and  against  the
near-unit-root alternative, set to capture trend
stationary series, by applying the test of Elliott
et al. (1996).
Then we turn to the examination of our main
question: what drives the stock-bond correla-
tion. Conditional upon the appropriate sta-
tionarity properties of the variables that enter
in  the  regression,  we  estimate  the  relation
below:
(3)
Equation 3 is to be estimated with the method
of least squares, with heteroskedasticity con-
sistent  errors  by  applying  the  Newey-West
modification. We run several regressions ini-
tially for the whole sample and then for four
sub-samples, chosen exogenously according to
specific market-related conditions. The first is
related  to  the  EMU  accession  period  for
Greece (1999-2001); additionally, this period
is associated with the bursting of the bubble on
the domestic stock market. The second period
is  the  post-EMU,  pre-crisis  period  (2001  –
August 2007).10 The third sub-period is related
to the global credit crisis (2007-2009), while the
fourth sub-period begins with the date of the
Lehman Brothers bankruptcy (15 September
2008). 
Lastly, we repeat this analysis by regressing
only negative values of the Greek stock-bond
correlation on the aforementioned explanatory
variables. In this way, we intend to take into
account switches in the deterministic structure
of the system, as the dependent variable moves
between positive and negative ground. Again,
the periods under examination are the same













1 10 0 It should be reminded that on 9 August 2007 the Eurosystem’s
extraordinary liquidity provision to the banking system amounted
to ᾬ95 billion after the “complete evaporation of liquidity”, as BNP
Paribas stated to its investors. 4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the
variable under examination and its determi-
nants. The table contains descriptive statistics,
for the whole sample in the upper panel, and
conventional (DF) and efficient (DF-GLS) unit
root tests in the lower panel. First, the statistics
confirm the overall consensus in relevant lit-
erature that the stock-bond correlation is pos-
itive and low in value. It should be stressed that
the figures reported are very similar to those
obtained by Conolly et al. (2007), as far as the
United  States  and  Germany  are  concerned.
Additionally, we report figures for Greece and
Italy; the mean stock-bond correlations for the
two countries and the period under examina-
tion were 0.105 and 0.19 respectively. 
Next, we focus on the unit root test results.
Overall, our data are indicated to be station-
ary, whereas in the case of the interbank rates
spread the variable is found to contain a unit
root by conventional unit root tests but the
tests of Elliott et al. (1996) confirm trend-sta-
tionarity of the series. 
In addition, Chart 1 illustrates the dynamic
behaviour of the Greek stock-bond correlation.
The illustration of the correlation reveals that
it has ventured into negative territory at sev-
eral times in the past; an effect that has been
related to flight-to-quality effects in the pre-
vious literature. The appearance of negative
correlations  is  mainly  concentrated  in  the
period 1999-2001 and late 2007 onwards. We
deem that in the first case the reversal captures
the bursting of the bubble on the Athens stock
market, while in the second period the nega-
tive stock-bond correlation is directly related
to the credit crisis that erupted in 2007.
Next, we investigate whether the decoupling
effects that are reflected in negative stock-bond
correlations in Greece are interrelated with
similar decoupling effects in the United States,
Germany and Italy at time t-1. For the whole




ˁGR 0.105 0.137 -0.388 -0.356
ˁUS 0.253 0.205 -0.115 -0.415
ˁDE 0.289 0.220 0.213 -0.365
ˁʙʤ 0.190 0.185 0.232 -0.223
CS 0.627 1.011 12.069 -2.799
E-L -0.304 1.36 -1.485 -0.097
SH –SL 0.007 0.005 9.657 2.597
Unit root tests
DF (lags=1) DF (lags=5) DF-GLS (lags=1) DF-GLS (lags=5)
ˁGR -4.167 -3.812 -3.330 -2.894
ˁUS -2.613* -2.532* -2.607 -2.526
ˁDE -3.481 -3.357 -3.381 -3.273
ˁʙʤ -5.295 -4.902 -5.299 -4.907
CS -4.502 -4.982 -3.993 -4.273
E-L -1.342** -1.257** -2.544* -2.654
SH –SL -10.165 -5.443 -2.919 2.340
Critical values 1%= -3.444       5%= -2.867       10%= -2.570 1%=-2.58       5%=-1.95       10%=-1.62
Mean Standard error Kurtosis Skewness
Table 1 Properties of the data30% and 44.2% of the negative values of the
Greek correlation occur when negative corre-
lations  have  also  registered  for  the  United
States, Germany and Italy, respectively. How-
ever, when we restrict the period to the 2007-
2009 crisis, these figures are considerably dif-
ferent; in the cases of the US and Germany,
negative stock-bond correlations are found with
negative Greek stock-bond correlations only
29.4% and to 5.8% of the time, respectively; by
contrast, 70.6% of negative values of the stock-
bond correlation in Greece coincide with neg-
ative Italian stock-bond correlations. Finally,
when the period is further restricted to the
post-Lehman-collapse period, the respective
figures are 35.7%, 0% and 67.8%, respectively.
From these figures one gains an insight into the
interlinkages between the decoupling effects
for Greek stock and bond markets with the
respective  markets  from  the  United  States,
Germany and Italy. The results suggest that, as
far as the United States and Germany are con-
cerned, there exist only weak (if any) evidence
for  linkages  between  these  effects.  On  the
other hand, these findings initiate the need to
further explore the links between the Italian
and  the  Greek  stock-bond  correlations.  Of
course, these figures are not adequate in order
to argue for the existence of spillover effects,
but they provide strong motivation for the fol-
lowing investigation of contagion effects in the
Greek stock-bond correlation.
As a result, we turn to the findings of the
determinants  of  the  stock-bond  correlation
dynamics for Greece, according to the for-
mulation of equation 3. Table 2 presents the
relevant results. For the whole sample (1999-
2009),  the  Greek  stock-bond  correlation  is
found to be explained by previous observa-
tions of the interbank rates spread (E-L)t-1 and
the previous week’s stock-bond correlations
for Italy (ρt-1
IT) and Germany (ρt-1
DE). The first
variable is found to be negatively related to
the correlation, while the coefficients of the
last two variables are positive. These effects
indicate that an increase in the spread between
the interbank offer rates of the euro area and
the United States explains, to a great extent,
a subsequent decrease in the stock-bond cor-
relation in Greece, while there exist spillover
effects from the stock-bond correlations of
Italy and Germany.
However,  these  findings  differ  considerably
when we examine several sub-periods of our
sample. Overall, the diagnostics, contained in
the lower panel of the table, indicate that the
formulation under examination explains effi-
ciently and to a great extent (except for the
1999-2001 period) the dynamics of the Greek
stock-bond correlation. Nevertheless, a more
thorough inspection of the findings reveals sev-
eral interesting points. Specifically, it is indi-
cated that in the period after the launch of the
EMU  and  before  the  official  accession  of
Greece, only the dynamics of German stock-
bond  correlation  are  found  to  significantly
affect movements in the Greek stock-bond cor-
relation. This effect has outlived the accession
of Greece in the euro area, while it is associ-
ated with the emergence of significant effects
33
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rates; a finding that we deem is quite reason-
able since the liquidity conditions in the euro
area banking sector, assumed to be reflected in
the respective variable, have a direct impact on
the Greek banking sector. On the other hand,
since the onset of the credit crisis in 2007, only
the Italian stock-bond correlation is found to
significantly explain movements in the Greek
correlation. Additionally, the effects stemming
from the Italian variable are positive, indicat-
ing the existence of significant spillover effects,
during the credit crisis period. 
This last finding can be further clarified by the
examination  of  the  decoupling  effects,
reflected by negative values of the stock-bond
correlation.  The  respective  findings  are
reported in Table 3.
For the whole sample the intraday stock mar-
ket’s  range,  assumed  to  capture  underlying
uncertainty in the stock market, is found to sig-
nificantly explain movements in the stock-bond
correlation when it is negative. Specifically, the
results suggest that an increase11 in the stock
market’s intraday range causes the negative
stock-bond correlation to become even more
negative in the subsequent week. Additionally,
we find that the spread between the two inter-
bank  rates  leads  to  positive  effects  on  the
stock-bond correlation. However, the signifi-
cance  of  this  variable  might  reflect  mostly
effects from the 2007-2009 period, when the
US  banking  system,  initially,  experienced
strong deterioration in its liquidity conditions.
Finally, the significant relation of the Greek
and  Italian  stock-bond  correlations  is  con-
firmed in periods of decoupling effects in the
Greek stock and bond markets as well.
However, the examination of the relation dur-
ing the selected sub-periods reveals that the
explanatory  variables  under  review  do  not
provide a meaningful explanation concerning
the negative values of the correlation, over
the period 1999-2007. The variables explain
the dynamics of the Greek stock-bond corre-
lation only for the period which followed the
onset  of  the  credit  crisis.  In  this  context,




1 11 1 An increase in the range has been reported to reflect an increase
in investors’ uncertainty. Interested readers should refer to empir-
ical literature mentioned in Section 3 (footnote 8).
Note: Each cell presents the value (standard error) of the coefficient of the respective explanatory variable, as in equation 3, with the depend-
ent variable being the Greek stock-bond correlation estimated by DCC-GARCH, as in equation 2. The estimation has been performed






































































~ R2 0.472 0.033 0.405 0.653 0.358











Table 2 Determinants of the Greek stock-bond correlationby the intraday range) is found to have sig-
nificant explanatory power for the decoupling
effects reflected in the negative values of the
stock-bond correlation in the period 2007-
2009, while there exist significant contagion
effects stemming from the Italian correlation
over the Greek correlation for the whole cri-
sis  period.  Furthermore,  the  interbank
spread  and  the  US  stock-bond  correlation
have a decisive impact on the dynamics of the
Greek correlation, but this does not apply for
the  period  after  the  collapse  of  Lehman
Brothers. Finally, an important finding is that
an increase in the US stock-bond correlation
leads to a decrease in the Greek stock-bond
correlation, which is highly likely to reflect
diversification effects. 
In  sum,  it  is  assumed  that  monitoring  the
dynamics of stock and bond yields over time
provides valuable insight into the underlying
conditions prevailing in the Greek financial sec-
tor. Conversely, it would be useful to define the
objectives of such an exercise beforehand, in
order to ensure the efficient use of the measure.
Notably, we find that the Greek stock-bond
correlation is affected by liquidity conditions
in the banking system and by interactions stem-
ming from stock-bond correlations in other
markets, particularly the Italian market. In tur-
bulent periods only the latter effects are sig-
nificant. Overall, decoupling effects reflected
in negative correlations are found to be sig-
nificantly related to increased market uncer-
tainty, liquidity conditions in the banking sys-
tem and contagion effects mainly stemming
from Italy. These results are also confirmed as
regards the turbulent period after 2007. By
contrast, the AAA credit spread has not been
found to significantly affect the Greek stock-
bond correlation; this suggests that the decou-
pling  effects  are  not  to  be  interpreted  as
reflecting deteriorating credit risk conditions.
This  finding  indicates  that  the  decoupling
effects reflected in the negative stock-bond
correlations cannot be explained as flight-to-
quality against credit risk. 
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has assessed the dynamic correla-
tion between Greek stocks and bonds. Our
main objective was to examine the determi-




Note: Each cell presents the value (standard error) of the coefficient of the respective explanatory variable, as in equation 3, with the depend-
ent variable being the negative values of the Greek stock-bond correlation. The estimation has been performed with consistent het-






































































~ R2 0.241 0.137 0.035 0.436 0.191











Table 3 Determinants of negative values of the Greek stock-bond correlationcorrelation. In this context, we included vari-
ables  reflecting  stock  market  uncertainty,
credit risk, liquidity conditions in the banking
system and interactions from similar correla-
tion dynamics in the US, Germany and Italy.
Our findings indicate that the correlation is
influenced by the degree of uncertainty, while
negative correlations have been explained as
indicating flight-to-quality effects. 
The  results  presented  confirm  the  findings
reported  in  empirical  literature  concerning
other markets, namely that the stock-bond cor-
relation is negatively related to uncertainty and
subject to contagion effects. In particular, the
examination of the determinants of negative
values of the stock-bond correlation suggests
flight-to-quality effects, indicating that the cor-
relation is a good proxy for market uncertainty.
However, our findings suggest that flight-to-
quality reflected in the correlation between
Greek stocks and bonds may not be a result of
heightened credit risk.
In this context, our analysis has assessed the driv-
ing factors of the stock-bond correlation. We
deem that our findings may serve as a basis for
using stock-bond correlation as a tool for mar-
ket analysis and policy decisions, for Greece.
However, the dynamic nature of this measure
and the changing nature of market conditions
disallow  optimism  that  the  answer  provided
herein is conclusive; the main technical finding
is that the dependent variable is subject to shifts
related to different states of volatility. Addi-
tionally, apart from the specified determinants
related to a variety of risk perceptions, several
other explanatory variables may exist, probably
explaining the residual variations. In this respect,
we deem that macroeconomic reflections in the
Greek stock-bond correlation would be an inter-
esting topic for future research.
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Members of the SEEMHN Data Collection Task Force
The SEEMHN Data Collection Task Force is
a cross-national collaboration of economists
and statisticians from six Southeastern Euro-
pean (SEE) countries that put together for the
first time a comprehensive collection of mon-
etary data for the pre-WWI period. The coun-
tries covered include: Albania, Austria-Hun-
gary, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania and Serbia.
For each country, historical aggregates are pre-
ceded by an introduction which provides an
institutional  and  historical  narrative  on  the
SEE region and its monetary institutions and
standards. The dataset refers to four key vari-
ables: banknotes in circulation, total reserves,
exchange rates and central bank discount rates.
The frequency is monthly and the time span
covers the period from 1870 or earlier to 1914.
Each country uses standardised definitions for
each  series  to  facilitate  cross-country  com-
parison. A foreword by Michael Bordo on the
paramount importance of historical data series
is supplemented by a detailed introduction by
Matthias  Morys  placing  an  emphasis  on  a
cross-country  historical  comparison  of  the
countries’  monetary  institutional  structures
and the policy-making process. 
Modelling distortionary taxation
Working Paper ʝʿ. 95
Panagiotis Chronis 
The main aim of this work is to provide a
methodology for analysing the distortionary
character of the tax system. It offers a formal
proof of a general functional form which can
be used for this purpose. 
In public economics, distortionary taxation is
related, on the one hand, to the distortions
income tax brings to the labour market – by
affecting  the  behaviour  of  tax  payers  via
income and substitution effects (Stiglitz, 1988;
Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980; Cowel, 1981) or
by  affecting  labour  mobility  (Goodspeed,
2002) – and on the other hand, to “tax com-
pliance” (Andreony et al., 1998) and “tax eva-
sion” (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Clotfel-
ter, 1983; Feinstain, 1991), as the higher the
tax burden, the higher the probability of tax
evasion. In the presence of tax evasion, unre-
ported  income  escapes  taxation  and,  as  a
result, the higher the required taxes, or equiv-
alently the tax rates, the greater the distor-
tionary effect of income taxation. This is also
related to tax incidence, since for those bur-
dened by taxation it is easier to evade and pay
fewer taxes. Hence, the tax rate has a substi-
tution effect encouraging tax evasion and an
income effect discouraging it (Yitzaki, 1974;
Clotfelter, 1983).
Therefore, the choice of tax rate has a decisive
role to play in the framework of distortionary
taxation, and its relation to the notions of tax
compliance, tax evasion and tax collection. It is
also clear that the tax rate is related to the behav-
iour of tax payers; it determines their behaviour
regarding methods of tax burden avoidance. As
a result, within a distortionary taxation system,
tax revenues are lower compared to a non-dis-
tortionary system (e.g. lump-sum taxation).
Turning now to the majority of macroeconomic
models that use taxation in their analysis, we






Fertility determinants and economic uncertainty: an assessment using European panel data 
Working Paper ʝʿ. 96
George Hondroyiannis 
duced. The first treats the tax instrument as
exogenous, by assuming lump-sum taxation.
Consequently, it ignores the relation between
taxes and income, as well as its growth rate,
since, under this assumption, no distortions
exist. The second way taxation is treated in the
literature is the proportional taxation scheme,
where tax revenue is written as a fraction of
income. This is often called a distortionary tax-
ation system (in the sense that changes in the
level of income, caused by the fiscal authority’s
tax policy, affect tax revenues).
Furthermore, the proportional taxation scheme
is consistent with Ramsey’s approach, usually
used in macroeconomics in order to study opti-
mal policy problems in a dynamic setting, where
the deviation from lump-sum taxation allows
the benevolent government to avoid the first
best solution, and hence a distortionary frame-
work ensues. However, this approach is subject
to criticism. Golosov et al. (2006) argue that,
under the Ramsey setting, the main goal for the
government is to mimic lump-sum taxes, while
it is not clear why the tax instrument takes a
particular  form.  As  a  result,  the  Ramsey
approach does not provide a theoretical foun-
dation for distortionary taxation. Distortions
are simply assumed and their overall level is
determined  exogenously  by  the  need  of  the
benevolent government to finance its spending. 
A closer look at the above taxation schemes
makes clear that the notion of a distortionary
taxation system, in the sense described previ-
ously (including tax compliance, tax evasion
and tax collection), is depicted neither in the
lump-sum  nor  the  proportional  taxation
scheme. In fact, including it would complicate
the analysis, since it will introduce a non-lin-
ear dynamic relation that relates the behaviour
of tax payers to the path of tax revenue, the tax
rate and its relation to income. This dynamic
relation results in a loss of tax revenue for the
fiscal authority, with a deterministic role in
equilibrium (if equilibrium occurs at all) of
economic models that investigate the relation
between distortionary taxation and the path of
debt, and/or its relation to inflation and the
path  of  income  (Woodford,  2001,  2003;
Leeper, 1991, 2005; Chari and Kehoe, 2007).
To the best of our knowledge, the approach
just described is not treated in the relevant lit-
erature. Hence, if one wants to include into
the  analysis  the  consequences  of  a  distor-
tionary taxation system on the economy, it is
vital to deal with the above mentioned prob-
lem of non-linearity.
The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  provide  a
methodology for dealing with this problem by
using formal analysis. For this we build and
suggest  a  general  functional  form  which
relates the behaviour of tax payers to the tax
rate and the path of tax revenue, and we then
study its properties as well as its economic
rationale. We finally use an example, in order
to show the way this functional form can be
applied to economic models.
This paper examines the determinants of fer-
tility, using panel data for 27 European coun-
tries. We employ panel cointegration to esti-
mate fertility as a function of demographic and
economic variables. The analysis suggests that
fertility variations in Europe are explained by
changes in infant mortality, female employ-
ment, nuptiality, old age dependency ratio, real
income per capita, real wage and output volatil-
ity. Two measures, production volatility and the
unemployment  rate,  are  used  as  proxies  to




Macroeconomic implications of alternative tax regimes: the case of Greece
Working Paper ʝʿ. 97
Dimitris Papageorgiou
The empirical results for the panel data indi-
cate that a downward shock to infant mortality,
due to e.g. medical advances, leads to lower fer-
tility. An upward shock in real GDP per capita,
due to e.g. improved terms of trade, leads to an
increase  in  fertility.  This  implies  a  positive
income  effect  on  the  demand  for  children.
However, an increase in the real wage, which is
a proxy for the opportunity cost of children, will
decrease fertility. This implies a negative sub-
stitution  effect,  which  is  reinforced  by  the
increase  in  female  employment.  Hence  the
opportunity cost of time devoted to childcare
has increased as a result of increasing real wage
and female labour force participation, and con-
sequently fertility has declined. At the same
time, an increase in nuptiality leads to higher
fertility, since children constitute one of the
most important gains of marriage. 
Finally, the empirical results support the propo-
sition that economic uncertainty might be an
important determinant of the fertility decision,
explaining the decline in fertility in Europe.
The  empirical  findings  suggest  that  in
economies  with  high  per  capita  income,  an
increase in output volatility associated with low
economic performance leads to lower fertility.
Contrary to that, in economies with low income
per capita, an increase in output volatility asso-
ciated with a downturn in economic activity, or
an increase in real economic activity associated
with  reduction  in  volatility,  will  result  in  a
decline of fertility. Likewise, high unemploy-
ment  increases  labour  market  insecurities.
Since  children  are  long-term  commitments,
labour market uncertainties might dominate
adults’ decisions for partnership and parent-
hood, since responsible couples will decide to
have children when they are able to secure their
present and future income.
The empirical results have important implica-
tions for the sample of European countries,
with declining fertility and aging population.
Fertility is found to be related to demographic
and economic factors, such as infant mortality,
nuptiality rate, female employment, real per
capita output, real wage and uncertainty, so
that the movements in fertility rates observed
over the last three decades can be accounted
for by changes in these economic variables.
Therefore, the declining fertility rates in the
European countries can be explained by the
positive effect of a lower infant mortality rate,
the negative effect of a higher price of having
children, due to increasing female employment,
outperforming the positive effect of a higher
income on the demand for children. Finally, the
declining fertility rates may be attributed to the
growing uncertainties related to labour market
insecurities, which are a major feature of mod-
ern European societies, characterised by inter-
nationalisation and globalisation.
This paper examines how changes in the tax
mix (defined as distribution of revenue by type
of tax) influence economic activity and welfare
in the Greek economy. Conducting tax policy
analysis using a Dynamic General Equilibrium
model which incorporates a detailed fiscal (tax-
spending) policy structure, this is the first study
that analyses the implications of changes in the
tax policy mix for the Greek economy within a
Dynamic General Equilibrium framework. 
The results suggest that tax reforms reducing
the capital income tax rate and increasing the
labour or the consumption tax rates lead to
higher  levels  of  output,  consumption  and
investment. A reduction in the labour income
tax rate met by an increase in the consumption
tax rate increases output, consumption, invest-
ment and hours worked. The opposite results
are observed when the capital tax rate increases
in order to meet the loss in labour tax revenue.33
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Cuts in the consumption tax rate compensated
by increases in labour or capital income tax
rates have a negative impact on output and
investment both in the short and the long run.
The results also suggest that if the goal of tax
policy is to promote growth by replacing one
distortionary  tax  rate  with  another,  then  it
should reduce the tax rate on capital income
and increase the tax rate on consumption. On
the other hand, if the goal of tax policy is to
promote  lifetime  welfare,  then  it  should
decrease  the  labour  income  tax  rate  and
increase the consumption tax rate.
The present study has two aims. The first is to
analyse the degree of convergence of six new
member states (NMS) of the European Union
with the euro area, in an attempt to evaluate
their readiness to adopt the euro. The six coun-
tries are Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary,
The aim of the present paper is to shed some
additional light on the issue of the sustain-
ability of the Greek current account deficit.
The variety of techniques employed and con-
clusions reached in the literature regarding the
specific issue points to the use of Artificial
Neural Networks as the appropriate analysis
tool, given a number of advantages over tra-
ditional  methods  of  analysis.  The  paper
demonstrates that, despite its size, the current
account deficit of Greece can be considered
sustainable. The conclusion takes into consid-
eration that the current account has been bur-
dened during the past few years by a number
of exogenous disturbances (in particular, oil
price increases as well as import payments for
ships to cover the high demand for global sea
transport  services),  the  effect  of  which  is
expected to be either temporary or linked to
investment activity. In addition, the reduction
in the effect brought about by some of these
exogenous variables, to a large extent as a con-
sequence of the recent international crisis, is
expected  to  help  by  bringing  the  current
account as a share to GDP down to possibly
one-digit levels.
The endogenous structural weaknesses of the
economy, however, appearing in the form of
import price inelasticity and lack of import
substitution, together with high income elas-
ticity of imports on one hand and the well-
known  competitiveness  problems  on  the
other, are expected to continue imposing a
number of binding constraints on the function
of  the  Greek  external  sector,  and  conse-
quently sustaining the pressures exercised on
the  current  account  deficit  even  in  the
absence of any financing requirements. This
means that unless such imbalances are taken
care of, the threat of an unsustainable current
account  deficit  will  persist,  despite  the
absence of any financing requirements, espe-
cially in an environment of recovery from the
recent global crisis, with all the adverse reper-
cussions that such a deficit figure might entail
for vital economic aggregates like growth and
employment. 
The Greek current account deficit: is it sustainable after all?
Working Paper ʝʿ. 98
George A. Zombanakis, Constantinos Stylianou and Andreas S. Andreou
Optimum currency areas, structural changes and the endogeneity of the OCA criteria:
evidence from six new EU Member States
Working Paper ʝʿ. 99
Dimitrios SiderisPoland and Romania, which have not adopted
the euro yet but plan to do so at some future
date, and the Slovak Republic which adopted the
euro  in  January  2009.  The  work  examines
whether these countries form an OCA with the
euro area by using the Generalised Purchasing
Power Parity (GPPP) theory. The GPPP theory
proposes testing whether the real exchange rates
of a group of economies with respect to a base
currency converge in the long run. 
The second aim is to investigate whether the
introduction of the euro and the decision of the
six countries to seek to join the euro area have
fostered integration of these countries with the
euro area. We argue that the decision of the six
economies to join the monetary union and the
policy steps made towards convergence with it,
have already promoted integration. This idea is
in line with the endogenous OCA theory, which
supports the view that countries joining a cur-
rency union may satisfy the criteria of an OCA
ex post, even if they do not ex ante. 
In the empirical work, cointegration analysis is
employed to test the GPPP hypothesis, after an
initial assessment of the stationarity of each
real exchange rate series. The cointegration
analysis examines the joint behaviour of the
rates, in three different periods: the full period
1993.1-2007.12,  and  the  periods  before  and
after the introduction of the euro. The results
provide evidence in favour of an OCA with the
euro area only for the period following the
introduction of the euro. The results indicate
that the group of the six economies has enjoyed
reduced real exchange rate instability in the
post-euro  period.  This  could  be  due  to
increased trade integration of the six economies
with the EU, caused by the introduction of the
euro and the switch of the exchange rate poli-
cies  of  most  NMSs  towards  euro-based
exchange rate regimes.
For indicative purposes, a similar analysis with
respect to the US economy is also performed. It
suggests that alignment of the countries with the
US is supported by the data for the period before
the introduction of the euro, but not for the
period following it. These results probably reflect
the weakening role of the dollar in the European
markets and the policy change in the six countries. 
Overall, the findings imply that the conver-
gence process with the euro area has been pro-
moted in recent years probably as a result of the
convergence  of  the  policies  of  the  six
economies, the structural changes that took
place in the economic systems of the countries,
their increased trade integration with the Euro-
pean Union and the significant role of the euro
in the European markets. Thus, at present, the
six economies are quite well aligned with the
euro area.
The  study  examines  the  value  creation  of
Merger and Acquisition (M&A) deals in Euro-
pean banking from 1990 to 2004. This is per-
formed,  first,  by  examining  the  stock  price
reaction  of  banks  to  the  announcement  of
M&A  deals  and,  second,  by  analysing  the
determinants  of  this  reaction.  The  findings
provide evidence of value creation in Euro-
pean banks, as the shareholders of the targets
have benefited from positive and (statistically)
significant abnormal returns, while those of the
acquirers have earned small negative but non-
significant abnormal returns. In the case of the
shareholders  of  the  acquirers,  domestic
M&As, and especially those between banks
with shares listed on the stock market, seem to
be more beneficial compared to cross-border
ones,  or  those  when  the  target  is  unlisted.
Shareholders of the targets earn in all cases
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Ioannis Asimakopoulos and Panayiotis P. AthanasoglouUnderstanding the transmission mechanism is
crucial for monetary policy. In this respect, the
special  role  of  banking  institutions  in  this
mechanism has been studied extensively both
at a theoretical and empirical level. The exist-
ing evidence shows that banks alter their lend-
ing  behaviour  in  specific  ways  following  a
change in monetary policy. But does this reac-
tion involve only changes in lending behaviour,
as studied in the bulk of the literature? And do
all banks in the market respond uniformly to
monetary policy changes? This paper tries to
answer these questions by analysing empirically
the heterogeneous response of US and euro
area banks over the period 1994-2007 in terms
of their lending and risk-taking decisions fol-
lowing a monetary policy change. The ultimate
impact of a monetary policy change on bank
performance is also considered. In the empir-
ical strategy, the distributional effects of mon-
etary policy stem from a number of bank char-
acteristics, namely liquidity, capitalisation and
market power.
The empirical analysis elucidates the sources
of  differences  in  the  response  of  banks  to
changes in policy interest rates by disaggre-
gating, down to the individual bank level. This
is achieved by the use of a Local GMM tech-
nique that also enables a quantification of the
degree of heterogeneity in the transmission
mechanism.
As banks have a special role in the financing of
economic activity, their heterogeneous behav-
iour is of particular importance to researchers
and policy makers alike. The results of this
paper show that the extensive heterogeneity in
banks’ response identifies overlooked conse-
quences  of  bank  behaviour  and  highlights
potential  monetary  sources  of  the  current
financial distress.
The theory of optimum currency areas was
conceived and developed in three highly influ-
ential  papers,  written  by  Mundell  (1961),
McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969). Those
authors identified characteristics that poten-
tial members of a monetary union should ide-
ally possess in order to make it feasible to sur-
render a nationally-tailored monetary policy
and the adjustment of an exchange rate of a
national currency. We trace the development
of optimum-currency-area theory, which, after
a  flurry  of  research  into  the  subject  in  the
1960s, was relegated to intellectual purgatory
for about 20 years. We then discuss factors that
led  to  a  renewed  interest  into  the  subject,
beginning in the early 1990s. Milton Friedman
plays a pivotal role in our narrative; Fried-
man’s work on monetary integration in the
early  1950s  presaged  subsequent  optimum-




the link between abnormal returns and fun-
damental characteristics of the banks is rather
weak, it appears that the acquisition of smaller,
less efficient banks generating more diversified
income is more value-creating, while acquisi-
tion of less efficient, liquid banks characterised
by higher credit risk is not a value-creating
option.
Bank heterogeneity and monetary policy transmission
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An Optimum-Currency-Area Odyssey
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Harris Dellas and George S. TavlasThe present paper formulates a multivariate
framework  that  captures  the  interactions
between fixed income markets, by taking into
account  the  time-varying  characteristics  of
financial integration. The main contribution of
this paper to the relevant literature is that it
relaxes the linearity restriction on the inter-
actions  between  the  markets  examined,  by
allowing the system to shift between regimes
according to underlying causal relations. In
particular,  we  suggest  that  causal  relations
among financial markets are subject to regime
shifts, resulting in changes in the strength and
direction of interactions between them.
Our empirical analysis focuses on the interac-
tions of major bond markets of the euro area,
namely  Germany,  France,  Italy  and  the
Netherlands, and the US Treasury market, for
the  period  1992-2007.  First,  we  specify  the
long-run relations of the system. Specifically,
we examine the cointegration properties of the
underlying system and find that there exists a
single common trend governing the stochastic
process of the system, thus satisfying the pre-
condition imposed by previous financial inte-
gration literature (Haug et al., 2000). Next, we
estimate the long-run equilibrium relations, by
imposing restrictions in line with the interest
rates parity hypothesis. The tests confirm that
the system is characterised by significant par-
ity relations.
In the second part of the empirical analysis, we
examine whether the causal relations of the sys-
tem are subject to regime-switching effects, by
applying the Markov Switching Vector Error
Correction  Model  (VECM).  Employing  the
MS-VECM framework proves informative as it
reveals the impact of monetary unification in
Europe  on  underlying  interactions  between
markets. Specifically, a regime shift is found to
have occurred close to the time of the launch
of the common currency, resulting in strength-
ened interactions among the underlying vari-
ables and significantly enhanced causal adjust-
ment effects towards the long-run equilibria.
In the last part of our paper, we assess leader-
follower  relations  by  means  of  a  variance
decomposition  analysis  for  each  of  the  two
regimes (L￼tkepohl and Reimers, 1998). The
results indicate significant changes in the pro-
portion of the variables’ variances explained by
the  Bund  or  the  Treasury  after  1999.
Although  these  two  variables  are  found  to
explain the largest proportion of the variance
in the system prior to the monetary unification,
their dominant characteristics are significantly
limited after the regime shift and replaced by
a three-fold benchmark status. In particular, in
the period after monetary unification, move-
ments in European variables are found to be
caused, to a large degree, by the Bund but only
for the initial period (1-2 months) after the
shock. However, in the longer run, the vari-
ables with the most important effects are found
to be the French OAT (for the period of 5-12
months after the shock) and the Italian bond




formulation of an optimal currency area was
aimed,  in  part,  at  refuting  Friedman’s
“strong” case for floating exchange rates; and
Friedman’s work on the role of monetary pol-
icy had the effect of helping to revive interest
in optimum-currency-area analysis. The paper
concludes with a discussion of recent analyti-
cal work, using New Keynesian models, which
has the promise of fulfilling the unfinished
agenda set-out by the original contributors to
the optimum-currency-area literature, that is,
providing a consistent framework in which a
country’s characteristics can be used to deter-
mine its optimal exchange-rate regime.
Benchmark bonds interactions under regime shifts
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Petros M. Migiakis and Dimitris A. Georgoutsosline with recent empirical findings on bench-
mark status in European bond markets (Dunne
et al., 2002). However, they provide a more
complex answer to the question of ‘benchmark
status’ in the European government bond mar-
ket, allowing for the characterisation of a bond
as benchmark to be related to the duration of
its causality effects.
In the context of the current macroeconomic
and financial market turmoil, and in the pres-
ence of asset price swings, expansionary fiscal
policy has been at the forefront. As the eco-
nomic  recovery  gathers  pace,  governments
around the globe will start withdrawing some
of the fiscal stimulus and initiating fiscal con-
solidation in order to ensure sustainable fiscal
positions. These consolidation efforts will be
affected by asset price movements as the econ-
omy picks up.
As  has  been  discussed  by  earlier  literature
(Schuknecht  and  Eschenbach,  2004),  asset
prices  can  affect  the  budget  via  a  series  of
channels. Directly, they affect the budget via
certain revenue categories, e.g. taxes related to
capital  gains/losses.  Indirectly,  higher  asset
prices  raise  consumer  confidence  and  con-
sumption, via the wealth effect, and increase
the collection of indirect taxes. Finally, in case
of asset price busts and ailing financial insti-
tutions, the state might be asked to intervene
bearing some of the costs. 
The objective of this paper is to improve our
understanding of the links between asset price
movements and fiscal adjustments. Building on
previous literature on the determinant of suc-
cessful fiscal adjustments (Alesina and Perotti,
1995  and  1997;  Tavares,  2004;  Tagkalakis,
2009), it goes one step further by investigating
whether asset price movements have any effect
on the probability of initiating and successfully
concluding fiscal adjustment. Following earlier
studies (Borio and Lowe, 2002), we use a real
aggregate asset price index (from the Bank of
International Settlements) and its three sub-
components, real residential, real commercial
and real equity prices.
Our findings suggest that a pick up in asset
prices increases the probability of initiating a
fiscal adjustment, but does not necessarily lead
to a sustainable correction of fiscal imbalances.
This finding is reaffirmed both for residential
and commercial property prices. This is in line
with the recent experiences of several countries
which faced a rapid deterioration of tax rev-
enues  following  the  collapse  of  residential
activity  and  prices.  However,  increases  in
equity prices contribute positively both to the
initiation and the successful conclusion of a fis-
cal adjustment.
Therefore, fiscal policy makers should focus
their attention on the sustainable improvement
of fiscal balances by adopting measures of a
structural nature. In doing so, they should also
take on board, on top of the effect of the eco-
nomic cycle, the effects that asset price move-
ments have on fiscal balances, in order to have
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Athanasios TagkalakisThis paper attempts to provide, for the first
time, a survey of the construction of estimates
of the quantity of money in Greece since the
establishment of the National Bank of Greece
in 1842 until the eve of WWII. Specifically, we
describe in detail the methods of construction
and the sources of data used in building these
aggregates. We discuss the data collection pro-
cedure  and  publication  practices.  The  end
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The ongoing economic and financial market
turmoil has been accompanied by a signifi-
cant  fall  in  asset  prices,  following  several
years of asset price boom. These asset price
movements  affect  the  fiscal  policy  stance
through  a  series  of  channels  (see  e.g.
Schuknecht and Eschenbach, 2004). Directly,
they affect specific revenue categories, e.g.
capital gains and losses related to direct taxes
on households and businesses. Indirectly, they
affect  revenue  via  a  feedback  loop  from
higher asset prices to real economic activity
(higher  asset  prices  raise  consumer  confi-
dence and consumption, via the wealth effect)
which  increases  the  collection  of  indirect
taxes. Finally, in case asset price busts lead to
defaults of financial institutions, the state will
be asked to intervene to preserve the stabil-
ity of the financial system.
This paper, building on the work of Fatas and
Mihov (2003), goes beyond the previous liter-
ature in examining whether asset price volatil-
ity amplifies the volatility of fiscal policy out-
comes.  Following  previous  studies  such  as
Jaeger and Schuknecht (2004), we use a real
aggregate asset price index (taken from the
Bank  of  International  Settlements)  and  its
three  subcomponents:  real  residential,  real
commercial and real equity prices. According
to our findings, there is significant evidence
that asset price volatility affects the volatility
of discretionary fiscal policy in a positive and
significant manner. Higher residential property
price volatility leads to more volatile govern-
ment spending and, thus, to a more volatile dis-
cretionary  fiscal  policy  stance.  Equity  price
volatility affects the volatility of the fiscal pol-
icy stance primarily via the government rev-
enue channel.
These findings point to the need for adjusting
fiscal balances, and in particular government
revenues, for both the economic and the asset
price cycle, in order for the policy maker to
have a clear grasp of developments in the fis-
cal policy stance.
Given that asset price movements amplify the
volatility  of  the  discretionary  fiscal  policy
stance, which in turn amplifies business cycle
fluctuations  and  harms  economic  growth
(Fatas and Mihov, 2003), a word of caution is
needed as regards the continuation of fiscal
policy interventions undertaken in response to
the ongoing economic and financial market
turmoil. Such interventions also entail the risk
of increasing policy volatility, generating a neg-
ative effect on economic growth, thus putting
a toll on economic recovery.
The effect of asset price volatility on fiscal policy outcomes 
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Athanasios TagkalakisThe hypothesis of efficient markets states that
asset prices reflect all available information,
hence, future prices are not predictable from
past and current information. By contrast, the
so-called technical analysis (i.e. the study of
market action, primarily through the use of
charts, for the purpose of forecasting future
price trends) has been a thriving activity for
more than a century. Among the trading rules
used by researchers to test market efficiency,
the one employed most frequently is the so-
called moving average (MA) rule. In one of its
simplest  versions,  two  non-centred,  moving
averages  with  different  lengths  are  created
from the time series of stock prices. Buy (sell)
signals are then generated when the relatively
shorter moving average crosses the relatively
longer moving average from below (above).
A usual way of measuring the predictive power
of the MA trading rule is to test for the statis-
tical significance of the difference between the
mean return of individual trading periods char-
acterised as “buy” (trading periods that accord-
ing to the MA trading rule the investor’s cap-
ital should remain invested in the market) and
the  mean  return  of  the  whole  investment
period, and/or the mean return of individual
trading periods characterised as “sell” (trading
periods that the investment capital should be
liquidated or sold short) and the mean return
of  “buy”  trading  periods,  and/or  the  mean
return of “sell” periods and either the mean
return of the whole investment period or zero.
Although on several occasions simple t-tests
have been used to test for the statistical sig-
nificance of such differences, strictly speaking,
the application of the t-test which assumes nor-
mal, stationary and time-independent distri-
butions is not legitimate since one or more of
these assumptions is very often violated in time
series of asset returns. To overcome this prob-
lem bootstrapping techniques have been sug-
gested and this approach has been recognised
as  the  established  one  and  used  by  most
authors.
This paper suggests an alternative testing pro-
cedure for assessing the predictive perform-
ance of the MA trading rule and argues that it
has  some  considerable  advantages  over  the
existing  one.  In  principle  the  proposed
approach allows for the concurrent estimation
of measures of the predictive power of the MA
trading  rule,  such  as  the  ones  mentioned
above, and at the same time takes into con-
sideration  the  interdependence  in  asset
returns.
The intended testing procedure is a modifica-
tion of the so-called impact assessment mod-
els, originally developed by Box and Tiao. The
term impact assessment means a test of the
null hypothesis that an event caused a change
in a stochastic process measured by a time
series. Events (also called “interventions” in
time series literature) may be represented by
binary variables. However, the standard para-
metric or non-parametric statistical tests used
to  test  differences  in  levels  (e.g.  the  t-test,
ANOVA, etc.) cannot be used in serially cor-
related  data,  as  was  explained  previously.
Moreover, a change in level may not take place
instantaneously, but gradually.
The Box and Tiao method of impact assess-
ment takes into account serial correlation, as
well  as  gradual  level  shifts,  and  allows  for
simultaneous maximum likelihood estimation
of the parameters related to the level change
and  those  related  to  the  serial  correlation.
Hence, it can be considered as a generalisation
of the t-test. Thus far, the method has been
used to study the effect of events which occur
on continuous lags. In this work a modification
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Alexandros E. Milionis and Evangelia Papanagiotou and applied in cases where the events occur
discontinuously.  This  can  be  made  possible
under the assumption that the effect of such
events is transient. More specifically, as was
previously explained, the role of the MA trad-
ing rule is to classify each individual trading
period (in this case each individual day) as
“buy” or “sell”. The “buy” days are considered
to be the discontinuous interventions. In that
way the modified Box and Tiao approach is
used to examine whether or not there is pre-
dictive power in the MA trading rule as applied
to capital markets.
In particular, the trading rule is applied to daily
closing prices of the FT30 Index of the London
Stock Exchange for the time period 1935-1994.
The total time period that the dataset consid-
ered in this work covers, as well as the partic-
ular capital market, approximately coincide
with that of previous studies by other scholars
who examined the predictive performance of
the  MA  trading  rule  for  the  same  stock
exchange index, but using different techniques.
This  allows  for  a  direct  comparison  of  the
results  derived  following  the  statistical
approach suggested above with those of the
previous  studies.  The  total  time  period  is
divided into three 20-year subperiods: 1935-
1954, 1955-1974 and 1975-1994; and each sub-
period is also examined. Moreover, the par-
ticular combinations of long and short moving
averages for the application of the MA trading
rules employed are deliberately taken to coin-
cide with those of previous studies.
For this purpose two different classes of mod-
els are tested. The intervention component for
both models is the simplest possible (techni-
cally, a model with a zero order intervention
component is used for both classes) and rep-
resents the relative average increase (if any) on
returns during the “buy” periods, as compared
to the “sell” periods. With the first class of
models  (simple  benchmarks)  any  linear
dependencies among index returns are disre-
garded. Therefore, results for the statistical sig-
nificance of the intervention parameter may be
directly  compared  with  the  results  from  an
ordinary t-test for the mean difference of “buy-
sell” for index returns. The effects of linear
dependencies in index returns are taken into
account with the second class of models that is
used,  and  the  statistical  significance  of  the
intervention component may be compared with
the results from bootstrapping techniques. The
results derived from the application of the pro-
posed  methodology  as  compared  with  the
results  of  existing  methods  (such  as  boot-
strapping  and  the  so-called  cointegration
cumulative profit test) using the same dataset
are found to be, by and large, equivalent. More
specifically, the results for statistical signifi-
cance for the intervention component agree
completely with the results derived by boot-
strapping techniques for all time periods and
all trading rules. 
Direct comparison regarding the significance
of the intervention component is not possible
when the cointegration cumulative profit is
considered, since the approach followed by the
latter is based on a different reasoning. Qual-
itatively, all methods provide evidence of a
pronounced weakening of the predictive power
of the MA trading rule for the last sub-period
(1975-1994) for the London Stock Exchange,
which  implies  that  the  market  gradually
became more efficient. 
An advantage of the proposed methodology is
that it may be enhanced further, as it is sus-
ceptible  to  several  improvements  at  both  a
technical and practical level. At first, a possi-
ble problem with non-normal distributions in
asset returns may be alleviated by considering
the more general class of GED distributions for
the testing procedure. Further, second-order
dependencies in asset returns such as autore-
gressive conditional heteroscedasticity may also
be taken into account by considering a general
ARMA-GARCH model for the noise compo-
nent of the impact assessment model. More-
over, the proposed methodology is suitable to
quantitatively test empirical techniques of tech-
nical analysis by allowing a higher-order inter-
vention component in the stochastic model. In







nals may be modelled and tested. It is noted
that the proposed methodology is less compu-
tationally intensive than bootstrapping, and its
application is relatively easy for practitioners
in  the  field.  Hence,  overall,  the  proposed
methodology seems promising and potentially
has some considerable advantages compared to
the established and the existing ones.
Apart from a decrease in base wages, firms
could use other ways of reducing labour costs
when faced by negative external shocks, e.g. cut
bonuses and benefits, encourage earlier retire-
ment and hire workers at lower wages than
those who have recently quit. The adjustment
of non-wage labour costs has gained attention
in  the  policy  debate  for  two  main  reasons.
First, non-wage labour costs represent a sub-
stantial part of total compensation. Since firms
are primarily concerned with total compensa-
tion per employee, an assessment of the flex-
ibility of non-wage labour costs is as important
as the evaluation of the degree of wage flexi-
bility.  Second,  in  an  environment  of  sticky
prices and nominal wages, non-wage labour
costs become an important tool for adjustment
to external shocks, allowing a dampening of the
effects of negative demand shocks on the firm’s
employment.
Using a unique survey of firms from 12 coun-
tries  of  the  European  Union  conducted
between the second half of 2007 and the first
quarter of 2008 within the framework of the
Wage Dynamics Network coordinated by the
European Central Bank, the paper examines
the importance and determinants of alternative
strategies firms might use to adjust their labour
costs.  In  the  survey,  firms’  managers  were
asked directly about their use of these policies
in the recent past. Specifically, the incidence
of the following six labour-cost saving strate-
gies  can  be  identified:  reduce  or  eliminate
bonus  payments;  reduce  non-pay  benefits;
change shift assignments or shift premia; slow
or freeze the rate of promotions; recruit new
employees at a lower wage level than those
who  left  voluntarily;  and  encourage  early
retirement to replace high wage employees by
entrants with lower wages. 
The paper’s contribution to the literature is
threefold.  First,  it  documents  comparable
information on labour cost adjustment prac-
tices beyond base wages for a large set of EU
countries and sectors. This allows the analy-
sis of the relative importance of each indi-
vidual strategy across countries characterised
by different sets of laws and institutions gov-
erning their labour markets. The survey shows
that to reduce labour costs firms fairly com-
monly  use  strategies  other  than  base  wage
reduction: 63% of the firms’ managers said
they had used at least one other margin of
adjustment in the recent past, and 58% had
used at least one of the six margins explicitly
identified in the survey. The results show that
there is substantial heterogeneity in the use of
these strategies across countries and firms,
depending on firm characteristics and labour
market institutions.
Second, the paper examines the characteristics
of firms and the environments in which they
operate that determine the relative importance
of each type of labour cost adjustment mech-
anism. The use of each margin is related to sev-
eral firm characteristics, such as the relative
size or skills distribution, as well as several
indicators  of  the  economic  environment  in
which they operate. In particular, larger firms
show a greater flexibility with respect to using
any of these strategies in order to adjust labour
costs.  Different  indicators  of  competition
intensity suggest that firms in more competi-
The margins of labour cost adjustment: survey evidence from European firms
Working Paper ʝʿ. 108
Jan Babecký, Philip Du Caju, Theodora Kosma, Martina Lawless, Julián Messina and Tairi Rõõm33
Economic Bulletin
May 2010105
tive environments are more likely to use some
of these strategies more heavily. Furthermore,
the results indicate that the presence of unions
in wage-setting is associated with a greater use
of most of the strategies. A plausible explana-
tion is that unions limit the flexibility of wages,
pushing firms towards alternative labour-cost-
cutting strategies.
Finally, the paper shows how the use of these
adjustment practices can be related to firms’
experience regarding nominal wage rigidity, as
well as to the extent of wage indexation applied
by firms. The impact of unionisation on the use
of alternative margins remains even after dif-
ferent indicators of wage rigidity (either nom-
inal wage rigidity or alternative definitions of
wage indexation) are controlled for. Interest-
ingly, it is shown that firms subject to nominal
wage rigidities are much more likely to use
each of the six cost-cutting strategies. This indi-
cates  that  there  is  some  degree  of  substi-
tutability between wage flexibility and the flex-
ibility of other labour cost components, and
that this substitutability is not limited by the
presence of unions in wage setting.
Melnik et al. (2008) propose a measure in order
to assess whether the firm with the highest mar-
ket share in an industry can be characterised as
dominant. A positive answer to this question is
a prerequisite for further investigating the extent
to which market dominance comes together with
the abuse of such a dominant position, accord-
ing to Article 82 of the EC Treaty.
Additionally, Guidelines, Regulations, related
statements by the European Commission and
European Court Decisions point to the inves-
tigation of the degree of monopoly power that
creates or strengthens a dominant position,
particularly in cases of planned mergers or
buyouts.
In this paper we investigate certain mathe-
matical properties of the proposed measure,
identifying some of its weak points and relat-
ing it to other research papers Melnik et al.
had not considered in their study.
Assessing market dominance: a comment and an extension
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Based on a unique firm-level survey carried out
between late 2007 and early 2008 within the
framework of the Wage Dynamics Network,
the flexibility of wages across 14 countries of
the European Union (EU) is analysed. The
objective of the paper is to examine the extent
and determinants of downward nominal and
real wage rigidity. 
Downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR) is
defined on the basis of nominal wage freezes.
Firms freezing nominal base wages at any point
during the five-year period prior to the survey
are considered to be subject to nominal wage
rigidity. Downward real wage rigidity (DRWR)
is defined on the basis of wage indexation.
Firms that have an automatic link between
nominal base wages and past or expected infla-
tion are regarded as being subject to DRWR.
The survey-based measures of downward nom-
inal and real wage rigidity used in the paper are
closely  related  to  the  alternative  measures
Downward nominal and real wage rigidity: survey evidence from European firms
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derived by earlier studies on the basis of the
wage change distributions.
The evidence indicates that the incidence of
both types of wage rigidity is quite substantial
in Europe – approximately 10% of firms expe-
rienced wage freezes and 17% of firms applied
wage indexation mechanisms. Thus, indexation
(DRWR) is much more prevalent in the EU
countries than wage freezes (DNWR). This is
consistent with other evidence on wage rigid-
ity in most continental European countries, as
opposed to the US and the UK. Overall, non-
euro area countries of the EU are more likely
to experience wage freezes compared to euro
area  countries,  whereas  indexation  mecha-
nisms are more widely used in the euro area
countries included in our sample.
Next,  the  paper  analyses  how  DNWR  and
DRWR are related to a number of firm-level
and institutional characteristics of labour mar-
kets in the countries covered by the sample.
The multinomial logit estimation method is
employed, which makes it possible to assess
these  relationships  simultaneously  for  both
types of rigidities. The estimations indicate
that country-specific factors appear to be sig-
nificant determinants of downward wage rigidi-
ties, and that institutional differences between
countries are an important factor behind this
finding. For example, high collective bargain-
ing coverage is positively related to real wage
rigidity, while the estimated relationship with
nominal wage rigidity is insignificant. A pos-
sible  interpretation  of  this  finding  is  that
unions have the capacity to provide their mem-
bers with information about inflation expec-
tations and explain the importance of main-
taining the real income level of workers. Thus,
union  coverage  reduces  the  prevalence  of
money illusion. 
Analysis of the union contracts negotiated at
different levels (firm-level versus higher-level
bargaining contracts) implies that firm-level
contracts are a more likely source of real wage
rigidity  in  centralised  wage-setting  environ-
ments. However, there is a substantial degree
of heterogeneity across countries regarding the
impact of different types of union contracts.
The institutional aspects related to the diffi-
culty of the employer to lay off workers are also
related to wage rigidity. The paper shows that
nominal wage rigidity is positively associated
with  the  extent  of  permanent  contracts.  In
addition, permanent contracts have a stronger
effect on wage rigidity in countries with stricter
labour regulations. 
Workforce composition also appears to play a
significant role in determining wage rigidities.
Both types of rigidity are positively correlated
with  the  share  of  high-skilled  white-collar
workers;  DNWR  is  positively  related  to
employees’ tenure in the firms under study.
Both of these significant relationships are con-
sistent with the implications of related theo-
retical models. In addition, firms employing
labour-intensive technologies are more likely
to have rigid wages.
Finally, there seems to be a positive relation-
ship between product market competition and
DNWR, although the results are dependent on
the way competition is measured. A possible
cause of this empirical result is that in highly
competitive industries rents should be low, and
therefore  so  should  wages.  This  leaves
smaller margins to reduce wages, because firms
paying low wages that are closer to a collec-
tively agreed or legislative minimum level have
less flexibility than firms having a so-called
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